Narrative:

While on vectors to an ILS approach to ZZZ, the flight director autoplt system (flight director/autoplt) off flag came into view. This was followed by a smell of burning or shorted wires in the cockpit, noticed first by the PF. Passenger also noted the burning smell. As a descent was authority/authorized by ATC, the PF noted that electric pitch trim was inoperative. The annunciator light not being illuminated confirmed this. An emergency was declared, followed by an immediate turn to the airport. ATC passed on the emergency to tower who requested confirmation and souls and fuel on board. A landing was made with a taxi to the ramp. No smoke or fire appeared in the cockpit and the burning smell was gone upon landing. The aircraft system were troubleshot and it was determined that the electric pitch trim system was inoperable. This system provides power to the flight director/autoplt to confirm the system is inoperative. The primary attitude indicator and horizontal situation indicator were operating normal. The flight director/autoplt were inoperative and were placarded inoperative. The standby vacuum attitude indicator was operating normally. The pitch trim circuit breaker was removed and the system marked inoperative. The electric pitch trim switch was marked inoperative. All other system checked normal. Ground and tower were contacted for a VFR departure to fly to an airport for maintenance. Upon departure, tower requested pilot information. Upon arrival at destination, FSDO notified PF of potential violation of operating an aircraft with a known deficiency. Pilot notified FSDO that aircraft was operated VFR with inoperative system placarded that were not on the MEL. After further review of the aircraft MEL, FSDO notified pilot that no certificate or remedial training was required. Flying VFR with an MEL does not guarantee safety, particularly after a short circuit, which could have developed into a fire on the return flight. Pressures to keep the schedule and return passenger as well as no avionics maintenance at FBO were factors in decision to continue. Taking off with inoperative system placarded and circuit breakers out seemed a prudent thing given the short 25 NM distance to maintenance site. This scenario gave me pause as to declaring an emergency and the events that followed from the FAA. If pilots perceive that FAA tower and ATC personnel are unnecessarily reporting actions to FSDO, there will be less candid communications and the likelihood of an emergency developing that is not declared due to concerns about certificate action. I now distrust the FAA and will be more vigilant in future dealings.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE55 PLT NOTICED AN ELECTRICAL BURNING ODOR IN THE COCKPIT. THE ELECTRIC PITCH TRIM SYS BECAME INOP.

Narrative: WHILE ON VECTORS TO AN ILS APCH TO ZZZ, THE FLT DIRECTOR AUTOPLT SYS (FLT DIRECTOR/AUTOPLT) OFF FLAG CAME INTO VIEW. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A SMELL OF BURNING OR SHORTED WIRES IN THE COCKPIT, NOTICED FIRST BY THE PF. PAX ALSO NOTED THE BURNING SMELL. AS A DSCNT WAS AUTH BY ATC, THE PF NOTED THAT ELECTRIC PITCH TRIM WAS INOP. THE ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT NOT BEING ILLUMINATED CONFIRMED THIS. AN EMER WAS DECLARED, FOLLOWED BY AN IMMEDIATE TURN TO THE ARPT. ATC PASSED ON THE EMER TO TWR WHO REQUESTED CONFIRMATION AND SOULS AND FUEL ON BOARD. A LNDG WAS MADE WITH A TAXI TO THE RAMP. NO SMOKE OR FIRE APPEARED IN THE COCKPIT AND THE BURNING SMELL WAS GONE UPON LNDG. THE ACFT SYS WERE TROUBLESHOT AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE ELECTRIC PITCH TRIM SYS WAS INOPERABLE. THIS SYS PROVIDES PWR TO THE FLT DIRECTOR/AUTOPLT TO CONFIRM THE SYS IS INOP. THE PRIMARY ATTITUDE INDICATOR AND HORIZ SIT INDICATOR WERE OPERATING NORMAL. THE FLT DIRECTOR/AUTOPLT WERE INOP AND WERE PLACARDED INOP. THE STANDBY VACUUM ATTITUDE INDICATOR WAS OPERATING NORMALLY. THE PITCH TRIM CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS REMOVED AND THE SYS MARKED INOP. THE ELECTRIC PITCH TRIM SWITCH WAS MARKED INOP. ALL OTHER SYS CHKED NORMAL. GND AND TWR WERE CONTACTED FOR A VFR DEP TO FLY TO AN ARPT FOR MAINT. UPON DEP, TWR REQUESTED PLT INFO. UPON ARR AT DEST, FSDO NOTIFIED PF OF POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF OPERATING AN ACFT WITH A KNOWN DEFICIENCY. PLT NOTIFIED FSDO THAT ACFT WAS OPERATED VFR WITH INOP SYS PLACARDED THAT WERE NOT ON THE MEL. AFTER FURTHER REVIEW OF THE ACFT MEL, FSDO NOTIFIED PLT THAT NO CERTIFICATE OR REMEDIAL TRAINING WAS REQUIRED. FLYING VFR WITH AN MEL DOES NOT GUARANTEE SAFETY, PARTICULARLY AFTER A SHORT CIRCUIT, WHICH COULD HAVE DEVELOPED INTO A FIRE ON THE RETURN FLT. PRESSURES TO KEEP THE SCHEDULE AND RETURN PAX AS WELL AS NO AVIONICS MAINT AT FBO WERE FACTORS IN DECISION TO CONTINUE. TAKING OFF WITH INOP SYS PLACARDED AND CIRCUIT BREAKERS OUT SEEMED A PRUDENT THING GIVEN THE SHORT 25 NM DISTANCE TO MAINT SITE. THIS SCENARIO GAVE ME PAUSE AS TO DECLARING AN EMER AND THE EVENTS THAT FOLLOWED FROM THE FAA. IF PLTS PERCEIVE THAT FAA TWR AND ATC PERSONNEL ARE UNNECESSARILY RPTING ACTIONS TO FSDO, THERE WILL BE LESS CANDID COMS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN EMER DEVELOPING THAT IS NOT DECLARED DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT CERTIFICATE ACTION. I NOW DISTRUST THE FAA AND WILL BE MORE VIGILANT IN FUTURE DEALINGS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.