37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 610589 |
Time | |
Date | 200403 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : atl.airport |
State Reference | GA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi ground : takeoff roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : atl.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 80 flight time total : 7249 flight time type : 80 |
ASRS Report | 610589 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical conflict : ground critical ground encounters : vehicle |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb other other : 4 |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : rejected takeoff |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew other other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
A320 rejected takeoff atl. Engine shutdown, tow bar, brakes. FAA maintenance inspector on board, in cockpit jumpseat. First officer leg, first officer stated 'setting 50%' and I called stabilized. First officer then smoothly advanced thrust levers to the climb detent allowing the engine RPM's to follow the thrust levers before advancing to the flex 48 degree setting. I called the FMA, 'manual, flex, sensors' and when takeoff thrust was set, I assumed control of the throttles. Approaching 80 KIAS I called 'thrust set.' within 1 - 1 1/2 seconds and prior to 100 KIAS (we never made the '100 KTS' call because we never reached 100 KIAS) a very loud bang shuddered the airplane accompanied by an immediate and excessive yaw to the left of centerline. I stated, 'I have control, stop' and assumed full control of the aircraft. As I was taking control of the aircraft for the abort, I glanced at the engine instruments briefly to make an instant assessment. All engine indications appeared symmetrical and within normal operating parameters. As I retarded the throttle levers towards the idle detent, and then reverse thrust with 'maximum' braking selected, I corrected back to centerline. First officer announced, 'atl tower, flight is aborting the takeoff on runway 26L.' after the aircraft was tracking the centerline, I again scanned the engine instruments and every parameter was still symmetrical and well within parameters. This was confirmed by the first officer. (The FAA inspector on board estimated that we only drifted 5-10 ft left of centerline.) we stopped straight ahead on runway 26L and the first officer advised tower that we needed to make a quick assessment on the runway. At that time an air carrier Y flight on the parallel taxiway radioed on tower frequency that 'air carrier X, we saw a huge fireball come from aircraft left, good job.' since the aircraft underwent 2 tire changes earlier in the day, we were not completely sure that we may or may not have suffered a blown tire(south) in addition to, or causing any engine malfunction. After we stopped on runway 26L all 3 of us on the flight deck briefly discussed the engine parameters. The FAA inspector, sitting in the center and scanning the engine instruments throughout the takeoff roll, noted that he never saw any abnormal or unsymmetrical indications either. Suspecting at least a compressor stall, we were puzzled by the lack of any other associated indications or ECAM messages or engine vibration. Since the aircraft was not leaning to one side or the other and all other indications were normal, we taxied clear of the runway and turned right onto B10, then pointed the aircraft west onto taxiway B, between the 2 parallel runways on the north complex. We discussed the engine instruments and whether or not to shut down the #1 engine. Again, we noted no abnormal indications and the #1 engine matched exactly the #2 engine instruments. Before we took any further action concerning the #1 engine, we cell phoned local maintenance. We got a hold of mechanic mr X who was working on our aircraft out on the FBO ramp on the northernmost part of the airfield. I explained the complete scenario to him and asked whether or not we should shut down. Again we confirmed that all indications were normal. Mr X suggested that we continue to situation on taxiway B, engines running at idle until the tug gets out to the aircraft. The flight deck crew made numerous radio calls and cell phone calls to a plethora of maintenance and management personnel while we waited for a tug confirming our current status and confign. We requested a mechanic to also come out and perform a visual inspection for any damage before the aircraft was towed. At XA35, 56 mins after the takeoff roll was started, the tug showed up and we shut down the engines. The mechanic performed his inspection and informed us that he saw no visible signs of any engine or gear/tire damage. At about XA40 we released the parking brake and began our tow with the mechanic riding the tug along with the air carrier X tug operator, following airport authority/authorized vehicle escort. The aircraft was towed wbound on taxiway B to either dixie or C and we waited while the tug crew received permission to cross the inboard runway 26L. We were then towed across runway 26L and onto E7, which is only a 45 degree turn onto the high speed taxiway. During our turn onto the outboard parallel taxiway east, the tug operator stated 'captain, please set your brake, captain set your brake.' I immediately applied a rapid and forceful application to the brake pedals. I estimate that we were under tow at approximately 10 KTS ground speed just prior to brake application. We came to an abrupt and rapid halt and just as the aircraft stopped we heard a noise from under the nose of the aircraft. The tug operator announced that his bar snapped. The mechanic then got on the headset and informed us that as the tow bar snapped, the driver panicked and stopped the tug instead of rolling forward. The mechanic stated that he slapped the tug operator's back and told him to 'gun it' so as not to get hit by the aircraft. The mechanic then stated that it appears that the remaining broken part of the tow bar that was connected to the tug came up against the electrical conduit and face plate on the nose gear strut. He claimed that there appeared to be no structural damage, only some cosmetic damage and that towing could be resumed once we found another tow bar, approximately 215 mins later. Another tow bar arrived and we continued the rest of the tow to gate uneventfully. I inspected the nose gear and there appeared to be some additional scratches in the outer sleeve of the oleo strut. Maintenance personnel reviewed the computer printouts upon arrival and stated to our crew that there were no indications or readings to indicate any problem with the #1 engine at that time. I talked to maintenance the following day and learned that they found 2 compressor section blades that came apart and damaged the turbine section of the #1 engine. The FAA inspector that was on board the aircraft, in the jumpseat with the crew during the whole incident, praised the crew for their actions. He then filled out an incident report on the tow bar malfunction. Crew duty day actually started at XP30 and this was our third aircraft and third attempt to depart atl en route to sfo following an aircraft change and an airborne turn back from overhead the memphis VOR -- all with the FAA inspector on board. Describing all of the events that led up to the broken tow bar allows some idea into the thought processes of the flight deck crew. We feel that the poor or inadequate training provided to the tug operator by his company did not detail actions to be taken under various abnormal conditions. Therefore, he stopped the tug in front of our aircraft after the tow bar snapped rather than continuing so as to allow room for our aircraft to stop safely. In addition, increased tug/aircraft communication training should be addressed to cover abnormal conditions. The rapid actions by the crew prevented the potential for greater damage and bodily harm.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A320 CREW ABORTED TKOF AFTER THE #1 ENG HAD A COMPRESSOR STALL. WHEN THE ACFT WAS BEING TOWED TO THE GATE THE TOW BAR BROKE.
Narrative: A320 REJECTED TKOF ATL. ENG SHUTDOWN, TOW BAR, BRAKES. FAA MAINT INSPECTOR ON BOARD, IN COCKPIT JUMPSEAT. FO LEG, FO STATED 'SETTING 50%' AND I CALLED STABILIZED. FO THEN SMOOTHLY ADVANCED THRUST LEVERS TO THE CLB DETENT ALLOWING THE ENG RPM'S TO FOLLOW THE THRUST LEVERS BEFORE ADVANCING TO THE FLEX 48 DEG SETTING. I CALLED THE FMA, 'MANUAL, FLEX, SENSORS' AND WHEN TKOF THRUST WAS SET, I ASSUMED CTL OF THE THROTTLES. APCHING 80 KIAS I CALLED 'THRUST SET.' WITHIN 1 - 1 1/2 SECONDS AND PRIOR TO 100 KIAS (WE NEVER MADE THE '100 KTS' CALL BECAUSE WE NEVER REACHED 100 KIAS) A VERY LOUD BANG SHUDDERED THE AIRPLANE ACCOMPANIED BY AN IMMEDIATE AND EXCESSIVE YAW TO THE L OF CTRLINE. I STATED, 'I HAVE CTL, STOP' AND ASSUMED FULL CTL OF THE ACFT. AS I WAS TAKING CTL OF THE ACFT FOR THE ABORT, I GLANCED AT THE ENG INSTS BRIEFLY TO MAKE AN INSTANT ASSESSMENT. ALL ENG INDICATIONS APPEARED SYMMETRICAL AND WITHIN NORMAL OPERATING PARAMETERS. AS I RETARDED THE THROTTLE LEVERS TOWARDS THE IDLE DETENT, AND THEN REVERSE THRUST WITH 'MAX' BRAKING SELECTED, I CORRECTED BACK TO CTRLINE. FO ANNOUNCED, 'ATL TWR, FLT IS ABORTING THE TKOF ON RWY 26L.' AFTER THE ACFT WAS TRACKING THE CTRLINE, I AGAIN SCANNED THE ENG INSTS AND EVERY PARAMETER WAS STILL SYMMETRICAL AND WELL WITHIN PARAMETERS. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY THE FO. (THE FAA INSPECTOR ON BOARD ESTIMATED THAT WE ONLY DRIFTED 5-10 FT L OF CTRLINE.) WE STOPPED STRAIGHT AHEAD ON RWY 26L AND THE FO ADVISED TWR THAT WE NEEDED TO MAKE A QUICK ASSESSMENT ON THE RWY. AT THAT TIME AN ACR Y FLT ON THE PARALLEL TXWY RADIOED ON TWR FREQ THAT 'ACR X, WE SAW A HUGE FIREBALL COME FROM ACFT L, GOOD JOB.' SINCE THE ACFT UNDERWENT 2 TIRE CHANGES EARLIER IN THE DAY, WE WERE NOT COMPLETELY SURE THAT WE MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE SUFFERED A BLOWN TIRE(S) IN ADDITION TO, OR CAUSING ANY ENG MALFUNCTION. AFTER WE STOPPED ON RWY 26L ALL 3 OF US ON THE FLT DECK BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE ENG PARAMETERS. THE FAA INSPECTOR, SITTING IN THE CTR AND SCANNING THE ENG INSTS THROUGHOUT THE TKOF ROLL, NOTED THAT HE NEVER SAW ANY ABNORMAL OR UNSYMMETRICAL INDICATIONS EITHER. SUSPECTING AT LEAST A COMPRESSOR STALL, WE WERE PUZZLED BY THE LACK OF ANY OTHER ASSOCIATED INDICATIONS OR ECAM MESSAGES OR ENG VIBRATION. SINCE THE ACFT WAS NOT LEANING TO ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER AND ALL OTHER INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL, WE TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY AND TURNED R ONTO B10, THEN POINTED THE ACFT W ONTO TXWY B, BTWN THE 2 PARALLEL RWYS ON THE N COMPLEX. WE DISCUSSED THE ENG INSTS AND WHETHER OR NOT TO SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. AGAIN, WE NOTED NO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS AND THE #1 ENG MATCHED EXACTLY THE #2 ENG INSTS. BEFORE WE TOOK ANY FURTHER ACTION CONCERNING THE #1 ENG, WE CELL PHONED LCL MAINT. WE GOT A HOLD OF MECH MR X WHO WAS WORKING ON OUR ACFT OUT ON THE FBO RAMP ON THE NORTHERNMOST PART OF THE AIRFIELD. I EXPLAINED THE COMPLETE SCENARIO TO HIM AND ASKED WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD SHUT DOWN. AGAIN WE CONFIRMED THAT ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL. MR X SUGGESTED THAT WE CONTINUE TO SIT ON TXWY B, ENGS RUNNING AT IDLE UNTIL THE TUG GETS OUT TO THE ACFT. THE FLT DECK CREW MADE NUMEROUS RADIO CALLS AND CELL PHONE CALLS TO A PLETHORA OF MAINT AND MGMNT PERSONNEL WHILE WE WAITED FOR A TUG CONFIRMING OUR CURRENT STATUS AND CONFIGN. WE REQUESTED A MECH TO ALSO COME OUT AND PERFORM A VISUAL INSPECTION FOR ANY DAMAGE BEFORE THE ACFT WAS TOWED. AT XA35, 56 MINS AFTER THE TKOF ROLL WAS STARTED, THE TUG SHOWED UP AND WE SHUT DOWN THE ENGS. THE MECH PERFORMED HIS INSPECTION AND INFORMED US THAT HE SAW NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF ANY ENG OR GEAR/TIRE DAMAGE. AT ABOUT XA40 WE RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AND BEGAN OUR TOW WITH THE MECH RIDING THE TUG ALONG WITH THE ACR X TUG OPERATOR, FOLLOWING ARPT AUTH VEHICLE ESCORT. THE ACFT WAS TOWED WBOUND ON TXWY B TO EITHER DIXIE OR C AND WE WAITED WHILE THE TUG CREW RECEIVED PERMISSION TO CROSS THE INBOARD RWY 26L. WE WERE THEN TOWED ACROSS RWY 26L AND ONTO E7, WHICH IS ONLY A 45 DEG TURN ONTO THE HIGH SPD TXWY. DURING OUR TURN ONTO THE OUTBOARD PARALLEL TXWY E, THE TUG OPERATOR STATED 'CAPT, PLEASE SET YOUR BRAKE, CAPT SET YOUR BRAKE.' I IMMEDIATELY APPLIED A RAPID AND FORCEFUL APPLICATION TO THE BRAKE PEDALS. I ESTIMATE THAT WE WERE UNDER TOW AT APPROX 10 KTS GND SPD JUST PRIOR TO BRAKE APPLICATION. WE CAME TO AN ABRUPT AND RAPID HALT AND JUST AS THE ACFT STOPPED WE HEARD A NOISE FROM UNDER THE NOSE OF THE ACFT. THE TUG OPERATOR ANNOUNCED THAT HIS BAR SNAPPED. THE MECH THEN GOT ON THE HEADSET AND INFORMED US THAT AS THE TOW BAR SNAPPED, THE DRIVER PANICKED AND STOPPED THE TUG INSTEAD OF ROLLING FORWARD. THE MECH STATED THAT HE SLAPPED THE TUG OPERATOR'S BACK AND TOLD HIM TO 'GUN IT' SO AS NOT TO GET HIT BY THE ACFT. THE MECH THEN STATED THAT IT APPEARS THAT THE REMAINING BROKEN PART OF THE TOW BAR THAT WAS CONNECTED TO THE TUG CAME UP AGAINST THE ELECTRICAL CONDUIT AND FACE PLATE ON THE NOSE GEAR STRUT. HE CLAIMED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE, ONLY SOME COSMETIC DAMAGE AND THAT TOWING COULD BE RESUMED ONCE WE FOUND ANOTHER TOW BAR, APPROX 215 MINS LATER. ANOTHER TOW BAR ARRIVED AND WE CONTINUED THE REST OF THE TOW TO GATE UNEVENTFULLY. I INSPECTED THE NOSE GEAR AND THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME ADDITIONAL SCRATCHES IN THE OUTER SLEEVE OF THE OLEO STRUT. MAINT PERSONNEL REVIEWED THE COMPUTER PRINTOUTS UPON ARR AND STATED TO OUR CREW THAT THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OR READINGS TO INDICATE ANY PROB WITH THE #1 ENG AT THAT TIME. I TALKED TO MAINT THE FOLLOWING DAY AND LEARNED THAT THEY FOUND 2 COMPRESSOR SECTION BLADES THAT CAME APART AND DAMAGED THE TURBINE SECTION OF THE #1 ENG. THE FAA INSPECTOR THAT WAS ON BOARD THE ACFT, IN THE JUMPSEAT WITH THE CREW DURING THE WHOLE INCIDENT, PRAISED THE CREW FOR THEIR ACTIONS. HE THEN FILLED OUT AN INCIDENT RPT ON THE TOW BAR MALFUNCTION. CREW DUTY DAY ACTUALLY STARTED AT XP30 AND THIS WAS OUR THIRD ACFT AND THIRD ATTEMPT TO DEPART ATL ENRTE TO SFO FOLLOWING AN ACFT CHANGE AND AN AIRBORNE TURN BACK FROM OVERHEAD THE MEMPHIS VOR -- ALL WITH THE FAA INSPECTOR ON BOARD. DESCRIBING ALL OF THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE BROKEN TOW BAR ALLOWS SOME IDEA INTO THE THOUGHT PROCESSES OF THE FLT DECK CREW. WE FEEL THAT THE POOR OR INADEQUATE TRAINING PROVIDED TO THE TUG OPERATOR BY HIS COMPANY DID NOT DETAIL ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN UNDER VARIOUS ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. THEREFORE, HE STOPPED THE TUG IN FRONT OF OUR ACFT AFTER THE TOW BAR SNAPPED RATHER THAN CONTINUING SO AS TO ALLOW ROOM FOR OUR ACFT TO STOP SAFELY. IN ADDITION, INCREASED TUG/ACFT COM TRAINING SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO COVER ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. THE RAPID ACTIONS BY THE CREW PREVENTED THE POTENTIAL FOR GREATER DAMAGE AND BODILY HARM.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.