Narrative:

Ground control at mdw instructed us to taxi from parking to runway 22L, via taxiway Y, hold short of runway 31L. I read back the taxi instructions correctly and went over them with the PIC (who was taxiing). Mdw was exceptionally busy, and the surface winds were gusting up to 31 KTS. During the taxi, I became distraction by the quantity of radio traffic, watching for other taxiing aircraft, and the PIC struggling to hold the control yoke steady (the angle and velocity of the wind were causing the yoke to oscillate forward and backward violently). When the PIC asked for clarification on which runway to hold short of, I mistakenly told him runway 31C (runway 31C was the active, runway 31R was also being used, but I am quite sure that runway 31L was not in use). As we taxied across runway 31L, I remembered that we were to hold short of it -- but it was too late to stop. We held short of runway 31C and the ground controller reminded us that we were supposed to hold short of runway 31L, and he told us to hold short of runway 31C. No aircraft were diverted, no collision potential existed (we visually 'cleared' runway 31L before crossing it). My perception of what caused this incident was the combination of my familiarity with the airport (we are routinely instructed to hold short of runway 31C, but rarely runway 31L), the incredible amount of ground traffic and radio communications, and the distraction of the gusty winds and control yoke oscillations. Supplemental information from acn 611912: the copilot then informed me that we were to hold short of runway 31C (both of us missed the fact, that this was the incorrect hold short instruction).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE40 CROSSED RWY AT MDW WITHOUT ATC CLRNC.

Narrative: GND CTL AT MDW INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI FROM PARKING TO RWY 22L, VIA TXWY Y, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 31L. I READ BACK THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS CORRECTLY AND WENT OVER THEM WITH THE PIC (WHO WAS TAXIING). MDW WAS EXCEPTIONALLY BUSY, AND THE SURFACE WINDS WERE GUSTING UP TO 31 KTS. DURING THE TAXI, I BECAME DISTR BY THE QUANTITY OF RADIO TFC, WATCHING FOR OTHER TAXIING ACFT, AND THE PIC STRUGGLING TO HOLD THE CTL YOKE STEADY (THE ANGLE AND VELOCITY OF THE WIND WERE CAUSING THE YOKE TO OSCILLATE FORWARD AND BACKWARD VIOLENTLY). WHEN THE PIC ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION ON WHICH RWY TO HOLD SHORT OF, I MISTAKENLY TOLD HIM RWY 31C (RWY 31C WAS THE ACTIVE, RWY 31R WAS ALSO BEING USED, BUT I AM QUITE SURE THAT RWY 31L WAS NOT IN USE). AS WE TAXIED ACROSS RWY 31L, I REMEMBERED THAT WE WERE TO HOLD SHORT OF IT -- BUT IT WAS TOO LATE TO STOP. WE HELD SHORT OF RWY 31C AND THE GND CTLR REMINDED US THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 31L, AND HE TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 31C. NO ACFT WERE DIVERTED, NO COLLISION POTENTIAL EXISTED (WE VISUALLY 'CLRED' RWY 31L BEFORE XING IT). MY PERCEPTION OF WHAT CAUSED THIS INCIDENT WAS THE COMBINATION OF MY FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT (WE ARE ROUTINELY INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 31C, BUT RARELY RWY 31L), THE INCREDIBLE AMOUNT OF GND TFC AND RADIO COMS, AND THE DISTR OF THE GUSTY WINDS AND CTL YOKE OSCILLATIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 611912: THE COPLT THEN INFORMED ME THAT WE WERE TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 31C (BOTH OF US MISSED THE FACT, THAT THIS WAS THE INCORRECT HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.