Narrative:

This flight was the return leg of a 2 leg flight from a foreign destination. It was delayed approximately 3.5 hours due to a positive identify bomb threat that was phoned in prior to passenger and baggage loading. Company procedure requires that the approach be stabilized below 1000 ft AGL and in the landing confign. The handoff from the center controller to the approach controller was late resulting in being approximately 4000 ft above the recommended VNAV profile. I began the descent at idle with the speed brakes out for vectors for a visual approach to the airport's longest runway. At the transition level, I called for gear extension and continued the descent at 250 KIAS with the gear and speed brakes extended. As I slowed for the final intercept, I began calling for flap extension at the maximum flap extension speeds. I continued the approach inside of the OM with the speed brakes out and slowing to the landing flaps extension speed. I reached that speed at approximately 15 KTS above recommended reference. I made a normal landing and rollout without unusual braking. After parking and secure checklists were accomplished, I asked the first officer for his input on the events that had taken place. His comment was that he knew what I was doing and did not have a concern about the outcome because of the long runway. I told him he should have suggested vectors or called a go around. I can only look at the contributing factors that led me to flying this unstabilized approach and file this experience as a lesson that I'm sure I'll never attempt again. Contributing factors included the mental gymnastics of the 3.5 hour delay following a bomb threat that included moving the aircraft to a remote location and subsequent searches, a planned arrival of XA00 became XE00 due to the bomb threat delay, fatigue due to flying 10 of the previous 13 days including two north atlantic xings, trying to get these passenger home without any further delay, a subconscious justification that the speed would not be a factor because of the long runways, an approximately 30 KT tailwind during the descent below 5000 ft AGL, and a breakdown of CRM in recognizing and correcting the problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 FLT CREW LAND THE ACFT FROM AN UNSTABILIZED APCH.

Narrative: THIS FLT WAS THE RETURN LEG OF A 2 LEG FLT FROM A FOREIGN DEST. IT WAS DELAYED APPROX 3.5 HRS DUE TO A POSITIVE IDENT BOMB THREAT THAT WAS PHONED IN PRIOR TO PAX AND BAGGAGE LOADING. COMPANY PROC REQUIRES THAT THE APCH BE STABILIZED BELOW 1000 FT AGL AND IN THE LNDG CONFIGN. THE HDOF FROM THE CTR CTLR TO THE APCH CTLR WAS LATE RESULTING IN BEING APPROX 4000 FT ABOVE THE RECOMMENDED VNAV PROFILE. I BEGAN THE DSCNT AT IDLE WITH THE SPD BRAKES OUT FOR VECTORS FOR A VISUAL APCH TO THE ARPT'S LONGEST RWY. AT THE TRANSITION LEVEL, I CALLED FOR GEAR EXTENSION AND CONTINUED THE DSCNT AT 250 KIAS WITH THE GEAR AND SPD BRAKES EXTENDED. AS I SLOWED FOR THE FINAL INTERCEPT, I BEGAN CALLING FOR FLAP EXTENSION AT THE MAX FLAP EXTENSION SPDS. I CONTINUED THE APCH INSIDE OF THE OM WITH THE SPD BRAKES OUT AND SLOWING TO THE LNDG FLAPS EXTENSION SPD. I REACHED THAT SPD AT APPROX 15 KTS ABOVE RECOMMENDED REF. I MADE A NORMAL LNDG AND ROLLOUT WITHOUT UNUSUAL BRAKING. AFTER PARKING AND SECURE CHKLISTS WERE ACCOMPLISHED, I ASKED THE FO FOR HIS INPUT ON THE EVENTS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE. HIS COMMENT WAS THAT HE KNEW WHAT I WAS DOING AND DID NOT HAVE A CONCERN ABOUT THE OUTCOME BECAUSE OF THE LONG RWY. I TOLD HIM HE SHOULD HAVE SUGGESTED VECTORS OR CALLED A GAR. I CAN ONLY LOOK AT THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THAT LED ME TO FLYING THIS UNSTABILIZED APCH AND FILE THIS EXPERIENCE AS A LESSON THAT I'M SURE I'LL NEVER ATTEMPT AGAIN. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED THE MENTAL GYMNASTICS OF THE 3.5 HR DELAY FOLLOWING A BOMB THREAT THAT INCLUDED MOVING THE ACFT TO A REMOTE LOCATION AND SUBSEQUENT SEARCHES, A PLANNED ARR OF XA00 BECAME XE00 DUE TO THE BOMB THREAT DELAY, FATIGUE DUE TO FLYING 10 OF THE PREVIOUS 13 DAYS INCLUDING TWO NORTH ATLANTIC XINGS, TRYING TO GET THESE PAX HOME WITHOUT ANY FURTHER DELAY, A SUBCONSCIOUS JUSTIFICATION THAT THE SPD WOULD NOT BE A FACTOR BECAUSE OF THE LONG RWYS, AN APPROX 30 KT TAILWIND DURING THE DSCNT BELOW 5000 FT AGL, AND A BREAKDOWN OF CRM IN RECOGNIZING AND CORRECTING THE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.