Narrative:

I was hand flying after passing tomsn intersection on the arrival. We were given a 060 degree heading. Once we approached within approximately 3 mi from the final approach course, I slowed to 220 KTS, then slowed to 200 KTS. The approach controller asked what our speed was and we responded 200 KTS. At that point, he became very agitated and said 'I told you to hold 250 KTS, increase to 250 KTS now.' then he continued to admonish us for the next 30 seconds. We had no speed restr at tomsn. I felt that I was on a modified base and that I was a bit high and fast -- that was the reason for slowing. We were cleared to 13000 ft and when all of this started (ie, the controller's admonishment), as we were coming up on 14000 ft and descending at about 1200 FPM, I addressed the issue of the speed with the controller and explained that I felt I needed to slow to be stable on the approach. The controller's voice overrode the altitude alert horn from what we can figure, because neither of us recalled hearing it. By the time we realized what had happened, we were at 12400 ft. At that point, the first officer said we were only cleared to 13000 ft and we climbed back up to 13000 ft. Human factors involved: high time month for the captain and his last trip of the month, 93.53 hour credit month. 2 14-hour days on the last 2 idents which the captain waived. The last 14 hour day with a minimum rest at the hotel. The layover the night prior to the incident was 13 hour duty day with a 9 hour minimum layover at the hotel. The controller picked a very inopportune time to start his lecture for 30 seconds. Approach controllers are asking us to fly faster to a shorter distance from the airport. This might have worked when pilots only flew 60 hard hours a month, but it won't work now. If you continue to have pilots fly or make pilots fly to make up financial losses, 85-95 hard hours a month, plus having a 12-14+ hour duty day, then the air carrier is toying with a disaster. I have never written a report until the last 2 months, and I have written 3. I called TRACON upon arrival and spoke to supervisor and explained the situation to him. He assured me that nothing was written up, no alarms were rung and that he would speak with the controller and explain that it is inappropriate to 'dress down' a pilot for that length of time while they are flying in the approach environment. I take full responsibility for the entire situation for not advising the controller that I was going too slow. Air carrier's better wake up before it's too late and they pay the ultimate price of killing a plane full of passenger by overworking their employees.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW SLOWED WITHOUT THE APCH CTLR'S CONCURRENCE. DURING A DISCUSSION OF THE EVENT WITH THE CTLR THE CREW HAD AN ALT OVERSHOOT.

Narrative: I WAS HAND FLYING AFTER PASSING TOMSN INTXN ON THE ARR. WE WERE GIVEN A 060 DEG HDG. ONCE WE APCHED WITHIN APPROX 3 MI FROM THE FINAL APCH COURSE, I SLOWED TO 220 KTS, THEN SLOWED TO 200 KTS. THE APCH CTLR ASKED WHAT OUR SPD WAS AND WE RESPONDED 200 KTS. AT THAT POINT, HE BECAME VERY AGITATED AND SAID 'I TOLD YOU TO HOLD 250 KTS, INCREASE TO 250 KTS NOW.' THEN HE CONTINUED TO ADMONISH US FOR THE NEXT 30 SECONDS. WE HAD NO SPD RESTR AT TOMSN. I FELT THAT I WAS ON A MODIFIED BASE AND THAT I WAS A BIT HIGH AND FAST -- THAT WAS THE REASON FOR SLOWING. WE WERE CLRED TO 13000 FT AND WHEN ALL OF THIS STARTED (IE, THE CTLR'S ADMONISHMENT), AS WE WERE COMING UP ON 14000 FT AND DSNDING AT ABOUT 1200 FPM, I ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF THE SPD WITH THE CTLR AND EXPLAINED THAT I FELT I NEEDED TO SLOW TO BE STABLE ON THE APCH. THE CTLR'S VOICE OVERRODE THE ALT ALERT HORN FROM WHAT WE CAN FIGURE, BECAUSE NEITHER OF US RECALLED HEARING IT. BY THE TIME WE REALIZED WHAT HAD HAPPENED, WE WERE AT 12400 FT. AT THAT POINT, THE FO SAID WE WERE ONLY CLRED TO 13000 FT AND WE CLBED BACK UP TO 13000 FT. HUMAN FACTORS INVOLVED: HIGH TIME MONTH FOR THE CAPT AND HIS LAST TRIP OF THE MONTH, 93.53 HR CREDIT MONTH. 2 14-HR DAYS ON THE LAST 2 IDENTS WHICH THE CAPT WAIVED. THE LAST 14 HR DAY WITH A MINIMUM REST AT THE HOTEL. THE LAYOVER THE NIGHT PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT WAS 13 HR DUTY DAY WITH A 9 HR MINIMUM LAYOVER AT THE HOTEL. THE CTLR PICKED A VERY INOPPORTUNE TIME TO START HIS LECTURE FOR 30 SECONDS. APCH CTLRS ARE ASKING US TO FLY FASTER TO A SHORTER DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT. THIS MIGHT HAVE WORKED WHEN PLTS ONLY FLEW 60 HARD HRS A MONTH, BUT IT WON'T WORK NOW. IF YOU CONTINUE TO HAVE PLTS FLY OR MAKE PLTS FLY TO MAKE UP FINANCIAL LOSSES, 85-95 HARD HRS A MONTH, PLUS HAVING A 12-14+ HR DUTY DAY, THEN THE ACR IS TOYING WITH A DISASTER. I HAVE NEVER WRITTEN A RPT UNTIL THE LAST 2 MONTHS, AND I HAVE WRITTEN 3. I CALLED TRACON UPON ARR AND SPOKE TO SUPVR AND EXPLAINED THE SIT TO HIM. HE ASSURED ME THAT NOTHING WAS WRITTEN UP, NO ALARMS WERE RUNG AND THAT HE WOULD SPEAK WITH THE CTLR AND EXPLAIN THAT IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO 'DRESS DOWN' A PLT FOR THAT LENGTH OF TIME WHILE THEY ARE FLYING IN THE APCH ENVIRONMENT. I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ENTIRE SIT FOR NOT ADVISING THE CTLR THAT I WAS GOING TOO SLOW. ACR'S BETTER WAKE UP BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE AND THEY PAY THE ULTIMATE PRICE OF KILLING A PLANE FULL OF PAX BY OVERWORKING THEIR EMPLOYEES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.