Narrative:

Holding short of runway 24 at teb, we were cleared for takeoff on runway 24. We taxied onto the runway and PNF (me) performed the 'line-up' checklist. Upon completion of the checklist, PF confirmed I was ready for departure and advanced the power levers. I confirmed the power was set, armed the approach and started the timer. I looked up, down the runway, and saw a challenger taxiing north on taxiway left. The challenger appeared to slow at the hold line at runway 24 but then continued onto runway 24. PNF called 'he is not stopping' and PF performed an aborted takeoff. During this time, the challenger had stopped with approximately 5-10 ft of its nose over the runway 24 surface. Our aircraft was at a relatively low speed when the abort was begun and the PF moved a few ft right of the centerline to ensure clearance of our left wing and the challenger's nose. We continued past the challenger with no damage to either aircraft. I believe contributing factors include the hold short line for runway 24 on taxiway left is very close to runway 24 in order to prevent an aircraft that is holding from blocking the intersection of txwys left and C. Note that the spot where this incident occurred is noted as a 'hot spot' on airport charts. Post-incident discussions with the teb control tower showed that neither air crew was at fault -- the error may have occurred with the ground controller. It is possible that sloppy radio communications contributed to this incident. The WX at the time was 10 mi visibility with a clear sky and light winds from the southwest. Supplemental information from acn 612676: I was operating as PIC during a flight from teb to bur on mar/wed/04 during day VMC conditions. The event was a runway incursion and took place as we were taxiing from FBO to take off on runway 24. We received our first taxi clearance from teb ground control to 'taxi to runway 24, hold short of runway 24 at lima.' the copilot read back these exact instructions. We were also given the choice of exiting the ramp area via taxiway J or taxiway K. We proceeded out of taxiway J and onto taxiway left ahead of landing aircraft that was exiting runway 19 at taxiway J. Approximately 20-30 ft into our taxi on taxiway left, we received an amended taxi clearance from ground to 'cross runway 24, taxi and hold short of runway 19.' the copilot read back these instructions to ground control and we continued our taxi. As we approached the crossing of runway 24, I verbalized to the copilot that we were cleared to cross runway 24. He agreed and we both began clearing the area for traffic. He called that we were clear on the right side (runway 24 arrival end) and I also acknowledged that we were clear on the left side (runway 24 departure end). He again verbalized that the right side was clear and I began to proceed across runway 24. Approximately 5 ft of the nose of the aircraft was across the vertical plane of the runway when the copilot commanded 'stop, stop, stop.' we immediately stopped. About 2-3 seconds after that, an aircraft passed from right to left approximately 20 ft in front of us. I would estimate his speed to be about 40-60 KTS. He had apparently been cleared for takeoff and then subsequently ordered to abort. At this point, the ground controller stated that we were told to 'hold short of runway 24.' my copilot answered back, 'negative, we were told to cross runway 24 and to hold short of runway 19. That is what we read back.' ground control then reiterated the clearance to cross runway 24 and to hold short of runway 19. We read back this clearance. The rest of the taxi was uneventful. When we asked the ground controller for further clarification on the previous event, he said that 'they were reviewing the tapes.' we departed teb without further incident. Approximately 30 mins after departure, the copilot called teb tower to get further clarification. He was told that after replaying the tapes, the clearance to cross runway 24 was given by the ground controller and was read back by our crew properly. In his words, the pilots were 'clean as a whistle' and that 'it was an internal matter that involved no pilots.' an operational consideration I will change in the future will be to ensure all landing/taxi/strobe lights are on for crossing active runways during the day -- not just for night operations. Supplemental information from acn 612675: I spoke with the acting ATC supervisor. He responded by saying 'nothing. You guys are clean as a whistle. This is now an internal matter that involves no pilots.' he also indicated that the controller confused us with another challenger aircraft also on the frequency, and his clearance was erroneously conveyed to us. Supplemental information from acn 612917: challenger crew should have seen us rolling with all lights on. We must look, but we must see!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HS125 DEP FROM TEB RWY 24 ABORTS TKOF OBSERVING CL604 XING RWY.

Narrative: HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 24 AT TEB, WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 24. WE TAXIED ONTO THE RWY AND PNF (ME) PERFORMED THE 'LINE-UP' CHKLIST. UPON COMPLETION OF THE CHKLIST, PF CONFIRMED I WAS READY FOR DEP AND ADVANCED THE PWR LEVERS. I CONFIRMED THE PWR WAS SET, ARMED THE APCH AND STARTED THE TIMER. I LOOKED UP, DOWN THE RWY, AND SAW A CHALLENGER TAXIING N ON TXWY L. THE CHALLENGER APPEARED TO SLOW AT THE HOLD LINE AT RWY 24 BUT THEN CONTINUED ONTO RWY 24. PNF CALLED 'HE IS NOT STOPPING' AND PF PERFORMED AN ABORTED TKOF. DURING THIS TIME, THE CHALLENGER HAD STOPPED WITH APPROX 5-10 FT OF ITS NOSE OVER THE RWY 24 SURFACE. OUR ACFT WAS AT A RELATIVELY LOW SPD WHEN THE ABORT WAS BEGUN AND THE PF MOVED A FEW FT R OF THE CTRLINE TO ENSURE CLRNC OF OUR L WING AND THE CHALLENGER'S NOSE. WE CONTINUED PAST THE CHALLENGER WITH NO DAMAGE TO EITHER ACFT. I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 24 ON TXWY L IS VERY CLOSE TO RWY 24 IN ORDER TO PREVENT AN ACFT THAT IS HOLDING FROM BLOCKING THE INTXN OF TXWYS L AND C. NOTE THAT THE SPOT WHERE THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED IS NOTED AS A 'HOT SPOT' ON ARPT CHARTS. POST-INCIDENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TEB CTL TWR SHOWED THAT NEITHER AIR CREW WAS AT FAULT -- THE ERROR MAY HAVE OCCURRED WITH THE GND CTLR. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SLOPPY RADIO COMS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. THE WX AT THE TIME WAS 10 MI VISIBILITY WITH A CLR SKY AND LIGHT WINDS FROM THE SW. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 612676: I WAS OPERATING AS PIC DURING A FLT FROM TEB TO BUR ON MAR/WED/04 DURING DAY VMC CONDITIONS. THE EVENT WAS A RWY INCURSION AND TOOK PLACE AS WE WERE TAXIING FROM FBO TO TAKE OFF ON RWY 24. WE RECEIVED OUR FIRST TAXI CLRNC FROM TEB GND CTL TO 'TAXI TO RWY 24, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 24 AT LIMA.' THE COPLT READ BACK THESE EXACT INSTRUCTIONS. WE WERE ALSO GIVEN THE CHOICE OF EXITING THE RAMP AREA VIA TXWY J OR TXWY K. WE PROCEEDED OUT OF TXWY J AND ONTO TXWY L AHEAD OF LNDG ACFT THAT WAS EXITING RWY 19 AT TXWY J. APPROX 20-30 FT INTO OUR TAXI ON TXWY L, WE RECEIVED AN AMENDED TAXI CLRNC FROM GND TO 'CROSS RWY 24, TAXI AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19.' THE COPLT READ BACK THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO GND CTL AND WE CONTINUED OUR TAXI. AS WE APCHED THE XING OF RWY 24, I VERBALIZED TO THE COPLT THAT WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 24. HE AGREED AND WE BOTH BEGAN CLRING THE AREA FOR TFC. HE CALLED THAT WE WERE CLR ON THE R SIDE (RWY 24 ARR END) AND I ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE WERE CLR ON THE L SIDE (RWY 24 DEP END). HE AGAIN VERBALIZED THAT THE R SIDE WAS CLR AND I BEGAN TO PROCEED ACROSS RWY 24. APPROX 5 FT OF THE NOSE OF THE ACFT WAS ACROSS THE VERT PLANE OF THE RWY WHEN THE COPLT COMMANDED 'STOP, STOP, STOP.' WE IMMEDIATELY STOPPED. ABOUT 2-3 SECONDS AFTER THAT, AN ACFT PASSED FROM R TO L APPROX 20 FT IN FRONT OF US. I WOULD ESTIMATE HIS SPD TO BE ABOUT 40-60 KTS. HE HAD APPARENTLY BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY ORDERED TO ABORT. AT THIS POINT, THE GND CTLR STATED THAT WE WERE TOLD TO 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 24.' MY COPLT ANSWERED BACK, 'NEGATIVE, WE WERE TOLD TO CROSS RWY 24 AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19. THAT IS WHAT WE READ BACK.' GND CTL THEN REITERATED THE CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 24 AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19. WE READ BACK THIS CLRNC. THE REST OF THE TAXI WAS UNEVENTFUL. WHEN WE ASKED THE GND CTLR FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON THE PREVIOUS EVENT, HE SAID THAT 'THEY WERE REVIEWING THE TAPES.' WE DEPARTED TEB WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. APPROX 30 MINS AFTER DEP, THE COPLT CALLED TEB TWR TO GET FURTHER CLARIFICATION. HE WAS TOLD THAT AFTER REPLAYING THE TAPES, THE CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 24 WAS GIVEN BY THE GND CTLR AND WAS READ BACK BY OUR CREW PROPERLY. IN HIS WORDS, THE PLTS WERE 'CLEAN AS A WHISTLE' AND THAT 'IT WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER THAT INVOLVED NO PLTS.' AN OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATION I WILL CHANGE IN THE FUTURE WILL BE TO ENSURE ALL LNDG/TAXI/STROBE LIGHTS ARE ON FOR XING ACTIVE RWYS DURING THE DAY -- NOT JUST FOR NIGHT OPS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 612675: I SPOKE WITH THE ACTING ATC SUPVR. HE RESPONDED BY SAYING 'NOTHING. YOU GUYS ARE CLEAN AS A WHISTLE. THIS IS NOW AN INTERNAL MATTER THAT INVOLVES NO PLTS.' HE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE CTLR CONFUSED US WITH ANOTHER CHALLENGER ACFT ALSO ON THE FREQ, AND HIS CLRNC WAS ERRONEOUSLY CONVEYED TO US. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 612917: CHALLENGER CREW SHOULD HAVE SEEN US ROLLING WITH ALL LIGHTS ON. WE MUST LOOK, BUT WE MUST SEE!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.