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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 613471 |
Time | |
Date | 200404 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ols.airport |
State Reference | AZ |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 6000 msl bound upper : 10000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : u90.tracon tower : bfi.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Shorts SD-360 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 550 flight time type : 175 |
ASRS Report | 613471 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence other other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Environmental Factor Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
The captain and I arrived to nogales airport (ols) and began to load the freight. We encountered problems with the freight that forced us to break down and rearrange 2 skids in order to legally fit the freight inside the cargo compartments. The captain and I had a disagreement with this situation. The captain wanted to leave the last skid outside the designated forward cargo compartment in order to save time, but I expressed that I was not comfortable with that. I would not leave until we found a way to rearrange it correctly. This problem placed us 20 mins behind schedule. The captain ran in to pay the bill and I went to the cockpit to get ready for departure. When the captain came back, he said that the phone was not working so we would have to receive clearance in the air. I was ok with this since the conditions were VFR and the ceilings were high enough to contact ATC while remaining in VMC. Once we took off and began climb out, I began to attempt to contact tus approach. During the climb out, I looked at the en route chart and realized how close restr airspace was to the apt. I informed the captain and he replied that he knew. As we continued climbing, the captain slowly changed his heading from north (paralleling the restr airspace) to more of a northeast heading. As he did this, I again mentioned the airspace and pointed it out to him. His reply again was 'I know.' as he did this, I became nervous and began to attempt to contact tus approach more frequently. Upon initial contact with tus, they had negative radar contact and advised us to remain VFR. By this time, the captain had turned on course and I again expressed my concern. About this time, tus transmitted that they had radar contact and cleared us as filed. They did not mention anything about the airspace, which brought me great relief. After the flight was over and I was in my hotel room, I reviewed the flight. In my opinion, we had to be extremely close to, if not in, the restr airspace. The main problem was the fact that the captain's priority was placed on the schedule and not safety and regulations. I had already fought 1 battle with the captain and was reluctant to tell him to change course. At the time, I felt expressing my concern and informing him of potential problem was enough. Looking back, I should have been firm and disagreed with his decision.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SD36 COMMUTER CARGO FO TAKES UMBRAGE WITH THE PIC'S ALLEGED INDIFFERENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS CARGO LOADING AND LATER NAV TECHNIQUES NEAR A RESTR AREA AFTER TKOF FROM OLS, AZ.
Narrative: THE CAPT AND I ARRIVED TO NOGALES ARPT (OLS) AND BEGAN TO LOAD THE FREIGHT. WE ENCOUNTERED PROBS WITH THE FREIGHT THAT FORCED US TO BREAK DOWN AND REARRANGE 2 SKIDS IN ORDER TO LEGALLY FIT THE FREIGHT INSIDE THE CARGO COMPARTMENTS. THE CAPT AND I HAD A DISAGREEMENT WITH THIS SIT. THE CAPT WANTED TO LEAVE THE LAST SKID OUTSIDE THE DESIGNATED FORWARD CARGO COMPARTMENT IN ORDER TO SAVE TIME, BUT I EXPRESSED THAT I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THAT. I WOULD NOT LEAVE UNTIL WE FOUND A WAY TO REARRANGE IT CORRECTLY. THIS PROB PLACED US 20 MINS BEHIND SCHEDULE. THE CAPT RAN IN TO PAY THE BILL AND I WENT TO THE COCKPIT TO GET READY FOR DEP. WHEN THE CAPT CAME BACK, HE SAID THAT THE PHONE WAS NOT WORKING SO WE WOULD HAVE TO RECEIVE CLRNC IN THE AIR. I WAS OK WITH THIS SINCE THE CONDITIONS WERE VFR AND THE CEILINGS WERE HIGH ENOUGH TO CONTACT ATC WHILE REMAINING IN VMC. ONCE WE TOOK OFF AND BEGAN CLBOUT, I BEGAN TO ATTEMPT TO CONTACT TUS APCH. DURING THE CLBOUT, I LOOKED AT THE ENRTE CHART AND REALIZED HOW CLOSE RESTR AIRSPACE WAS TO THE APT. I INFORMED THE CAPT AND HE REPLIED THAT HE KNEW. AS WE CONTINUED CLBING, THE CAPT SLOWLY CHANGED HIS HDG FROM N (PARALLELING THE RESTR AIRSPACE) TO MORE OF A NE HDG. AS HE DID THIS, I AGAIN MENTIONED THE AIRSPACE AND POINTED IT OUT TO HIM. HIS REPLY AGAIN WAS 'I KNOW.' AS HE DID THIS, I BECAME NERVOUS AND BEGAN TO ATTEMPT TO CONTACT TUS APCH MORE FREQUENTLY. UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH TUS, THEY HAD NEGATIVE RADAR CONTACT AND ADVISED US TO REMAIN VFR. BY THIS TIME, THE CAPT HAD TURNED ON COURSE AND I AGAIN EXPRESSED MY CONCERN. ABOUT THIS TIME, TUS XMITTED THAT THEY HAD RADAR CONTACT AND CLRED US AS FILED. THEY DID NOT MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT THE AIRSPACE, WHICH BROUGHT ME GREAT RELIEF. AFTER THE FLT WAS OVER AND I WAS IN MY HOTEL ROOM, I REVIEWED THE FLT. IN MY OPINION, WE HAD TO BE EXTREMELY CLOSE TO, IF NOT IN, THE RESTR AIRSPACE. THE MAIN PROB WAS THE FACT THAT THE CAPT'S PRIORITY WAS PLACED ON THE SCHEDULE AND NOT SAFETY AND REGS. I HAD ALREADY FOUGHT 1 BATTLE WITH THE CAPT AND WAS RELUCTANT TO TELL HIM TO CHANGE COURSE. AT THE TIME, I FELT EXPRESSING MY CONCERN AND INFORMING HIM OF POTENTIAL PROB WAS ENOUGH. LOOKING BACK, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIRM AND DISAGREED WITH HIS DECISION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.