Narrative:

The washington dc air defense identification zone (ADIZ) is a known problem at pct TRACON. The problem is due to the lack of standardized procedures on how to handle aircraft within the ADIZ. Management insists on forcing controllers to work outside the realm of the FAAH7110.65. Controllers feel that due to this, if something drastic happens to two aircraft, the controller will be at fault. We are not operating in accordance with any procedures. We are 'winging it.' pilots and the general public feel secure about the service they are getting. There is no service. Controllers have asked the FAA for standardized procedures when dealing with the ADIZ and, in almost a year and a half, we still have no standard. Everyone works the airspace in a different manner. There is no security involved with the way we are being directed to handle the ADIZ. Isn't that why we have an ADIZ, for security purposes? We are fed up with being forced to do something that is not defined. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter expressed concern with the lack of standardization requested, but not provided by FAA management, providing controllers with clear and precise operational handling procedures for VFR aircraft operating in the dc ADIZ, outside the class B. The reporter stated that controllers utilize either a 'monitor only mode' precept while others provide traffic alerts and advisories based on workload. The 'monitor only mode' is to observe that a released aircraft into the ADIZ has an operating transponder with mode C and is proceeding on a track expected/cleared without being advised of radar contact or being issued traffic alerts and/or general traffic advisories. Other controllers issue radar contact and issue traffic alerts and/or radar traffic advisories. The reporter alleges that this inconsistency is known to FAA management. The reporter questions controller culpability should a tracked target with operating transponder with mode C collide with another tracked target that a controller is 'monitoring.' the reporter alleges that all aircraft requesting a transponder code are subsequently released into the ADIZ regardless of controller workload because management has stated that 'we are monitoring for far ADIZ compliance only.' the reporter believes that the flying public perceives that some level of ATC flight advisory service is being provided when it is not. The reporter advised that 'automatic releases' into the ADIZ frequently overwhelm the controller, even when the ADIZ control position is open and operational. The reporter advised that it is common for a controller to have more than 20 ADIZ aircraft operating and even a minimal level of class G/east flight advisories can not be provided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PCT CTLR CONCERNED THAT LCL MGMNT IS ASKING CTLRS TO APPLY DC ADIZ TRACKING PROC CONFLICTING WITH HANDBOOK 7110 PROCS FOR VFR ACFT OPERATING IN RESTR AIRSPACE.

Narrative: THE WASHINGTON DC AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE (ADIZ) IS A KNOWN PROB AT PCT TRACON. THE PROB IS DUE TO THE LACK OF STANDARDIZED PROCS ON HOW TO HANDLE ACFT WITHIN THE ADIZ. MANAGEMENT INSISTS ON FORCING CTLRS TO WORK OUTSIDE THE REALM OF THE FAAH7110.65. CTLRS FEEL THAT DUE TO THIS, IF SOMETHING DRASTIC HAPPENS TO TWO ACFT, THE CTLR WILL BE AT FAULT. WE ARE NOT OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANY PROCS. WE ARE 'WINGING IT.' PLTS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC FEEL SECURE ABOUT THE SERVICE THEY ARE GETTING. THERE IS NO SERVICE. CTLRS HAVE ASKED THE FAA FOR STANDARDIZED PROCS WHEN DEALING WITH THE ADIZ AND, IN ALMOST A YEAR AND A HALF, WE STILL HAVE NO STANDARD. EVERYONE WORKS THE AIRSPACE IN A DIFFERENT MANNER. THERE IS NO SECURITY INVOLVED WITH THE WAY WE ARE BEING DIRECTED TO HANDLE THE ADIZ. ISN'T THAT WHY WE HAVE AN ADIZ, FOR SECURITY PURPOSES? WE ARE FED UP WITH BEING FORCED TO DO SOMETHING THAT IS NOT DEFINED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR EXPRESSED CONCERN WITH THE LACK OF STANDARDIZATION REQUESTED, BUT NOT PROVIDED BY FAA MGMNT, PROVIDING CTLRS WITH CLR AND PRECISE OPERATIONAL HANDLING PROCS FOR VFR ACFT OPERATING IN THE DC ADIZ, OUTSIDE THE CLASS B. THE RPTR STATED THAT CTLRS UTILIZE EITHER A 'MONITOR ONLY MODE' PRECEPT WHILE OTHERS PROVIDE TFC ALERTS AND ADVISORIES BASED ON WORKLOAD. THE 'MONITOR ONLY MODE' IS TO OBSERVE THAT A RELEASED ACFT INTO THE ADIZ HAS AN OPERATING TRANSPONDER WITH MODE C AND IS PROCEEDING ON A TRACK EXPECTED/CLRED WITHOUT BEING ADVISED OF RADAR CONTACT OR BEING ISSUED TFC ALERTS AND/OR GENERAL TFC ADVISORIES. OTHER CTLRS ISSUE RADAR CONTACT AND ISSUE TFC ALERTS AND/OR RADAR TFC ADVISORIES. THE RPTR ALLEGES THAT THIS INCONSISTENCY IS KNOWN TO FAA MGMNT. THE RPTR QUESTIONS CTLR CULPABILITY SHOULD A TRACKED TARGET WITH OPERATING TRANSPONDER WITH MODE C COLLIDE WITH ANOTHER TRACKED TARGET THAT A CTLR IS 'MONITORING.' THE RPTR ALLEGES THAT ALL ACFT REQUESTING A TRANSPONDER CODE ARE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED INTO THE ADIZ REGARDLESS OF CTLR WORKLOAD BECAUSE MGMNT HAS STATED THAT 'WE ARE MONITORING FOR FAR ADIZ COMPLIANCE ONLY.' THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE FLYING PUBLIC PERCEIVES THAT SOME LEVEL OF ATC FLT ADVISORY SERVICE IS BEING PROVIDED WHEN IT IS NOT. THE RPTR ADVISED THAT 'AUTOMATIC RELEASES' INTO THE ADIZ FREQUENTLY OVERWHELM THE CTLR, EVEN WHEN THE ADIZ CTL POSITION IS OPEN AND OPERATIONAL. THE RPTR ADVISED THAT IT IS COMMON FOR A CTLR TO HAVE MORE THAN 20 ADIZ ACFT OPERATING AND EVEN A MINIMAL LEVEL OF CLASS G/E FLT ADVISORIES CAN NOT BE PROVIDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.