Narrative:

We were flying a giv sp. I was taking off from teb, runway 24. The SID called for runway heading to 1500 ft MSL, then a right turn to heading 280 degrees, maintain 1500 ft until teb VOR 4.5 DME, then climb to 2000 ft. Target airspeed for the airport traffic area was 200 KIAS. We were in departure position for 15-20 seconds when teb tower cleared us for takeoff. I released brakes and pushed up the throttles above 1.17 EPR (minimum to engage the autothrottles) and attempted to engage the autothrottles. Autothrottles did not engage. I tried to engage autothrottles again and informed the captain. Together we manually set takeoff power and I continued the takeoff. At positive rate, I called for gear up and at 400 ft AGL, I called for flaps up. At 1500 ft MSL, I leveled off and began a turn to heading 280 degrees, but I did not make a timely and appropriate power reduction and my airspeed quickly squirted up to 300 KIAS. During the turn, as a result of the excessive power setting, my altitude gently increased to 1660 ft. When I did reduce power, the aircraft gently descended to 1400 ft as a result of nose down trim and the gwps gave us a 'don't sink' verbal warning. New york departure then cleared us to a higher altitude (I recall it as 4000 ft). I then engaged the autoplt and autothrottle and we climbed out at 250 KIAS. New york departure control did not mention any loss of separation and our TCAS did not give us a TA/RA. Later on, at cruise, I discussed my failure to make a timely power reduction. Most of the time, the automation (autothrottle) engages normally and maintains proper airspeed. Due to the fairly short runway, 6000 ft, setting takeoff power quickly and getting safely airborne was my first concern. I also observed gear and flap retraction and 1500 ft came fast. I became fixated on leveling off and turning 40 degrees right to 280 degrees. Airspeed fell out of my crosscheck and resulted in excessive airspeed and altitude deviation. This is not typical of my normal performance. I have hundreds of hours instructing in high performance aircraft which do not have autothrottles. I believe I fell into a habit of relying on the automation of this high performance aircraft. In the future, I will deliberately hand fly some departures with early level offs to emphasize proper and timely power reductions. Simulator training scenarios don't necessarily cover this, although it seems like common sense. I also wear active noise reduction headsets with ear-cups which significantly decreased the wind rush noise of excessive airspeed. On my behalf I must say that it is possible that hotel disturbances the night prior resulted in acute fatigue and decreased my situational awareness.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A GIV FO ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT REDUCE POWER IN TIME TO PREVENT AN ALT OVERSHOOT WHEN DEP TEB ON THE SID.

Narrative: WE WERE FLYING A GIV SP. I WAS TAKING OFF FROM TEB, RWY 24. THE SID CALLED FOR RWY HDG TO 1500 FT MSL, THEN A R TURN TO HDG 280 DEGS, MAINTAIN 1500 FT UNTIL TEB VOR 4.5 DME, THEN CLB TO 2000 FT. TARGET AIRSPEED FOR THE ARPT TFC AREA WAS 200 KIAS. WE WERE IN DEP POSITION FOR 15-20 SECONDS WHEN TEB TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF. I RELEASED BRAKES AND PUSHED UP THE THROTTLES ABOVE 1.17 EPR (MINIMUM TO ENGAGE THE AUTOTHROTTLES) AND ATTEMPTED TO ENGAGE THE AUTOTHROTTLES. AUTOTHROTTLES DID NOT ENGAGE. I TRIED TO ENGAGE AUTOTHROTTLES AGAIN AND INFORMED THE CAPT. TOGETHER WE MANUALLY SET TKOF POWER AND I CONTINUED THE TKOF. AT POSITIVE RATE, I CALLED FOR GEAR UP AND AT 400 FT AGL, I CALLED FOR FLAPS UP. AT 1500 FT MSL, I LEVELED OFF AND BEGAN A TURN TO HDG 280 DEGS, BUT I DID NOT MAKE A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE POWER REDUCTION AND MY AIRSPEED QUICKLY SQUIRTED UP TO 300 KIAS. DURING THE TURN, AS A RESULT OF THE EXCESSIVE POWER SETTING, MY ALT GENTLY INCREASED TO 1660 FT. WHEN I DID REDUCE POWER, THE ACFT GENTLY DSNDED TO 1400 FT AS A RESULT OF NOSE DOWN TRIM AND THE GWPS GAVE US A 'DON'T SINK' VERBAL WARNING. NEW YORK DEP THEN CLRED US TO A HIGHER ALT (I RECALL IT AS 4000 FT). I THEN ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE AND WE CLBED OUT AT 250 KIAS. NEW YORK DEP CTL DID NOT MENTION ANY LOSS OF SEPARATION AND OUR TCAS DID NOT GIVE US A TA/RA. LATER ON, AT CRUISE, I DISCUSSED MY FAILURE TO MAKE A TIMELY POWER REDUCTION. MOST OF THE TIME, THE AUTOMATION (AUTOTHROTTLE) ENGAGES NORMALLY AND MAINTAINS PROPER AIRSPEED. DUE TO THE FAIRLY SHORT RWY, 6000 FT, SETTING TKOF POWER QUICKLY AND GETTING SAFELY AIRBORNE WAS MY FIRST CONCERN. I ALSO OBSERVED GEAR AND FLAP RETRACTION AND 1500 FT CAME FAST. I BECAME FIXATED ON LEVELING OFF AND TURNING 40 DEGS R TO 280 DEGS. AIRSPEED FELL OUT OF MY CROSSCHECK AND RESULTED IN EXCESSIVE AIRSPEED AND ALT DEV. THIS IS NOT TYPICAL OF MY NORMAL PERFORMANCE. I HAVE HUNDREDS OF HOURS INSTRUCTING IN HIGH PERFORMANCE ACFT WHICH DO NOT HAVE AUTOTHROTTLES. I BELIEVE I FELL INTO A HABIT OF RELYING ON THE AUTOMATION OF THIS HIGH PERFORMANCE ACFT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL DELIBERATELY HAND FLY SOME DEPS WITH EARLY LEVEL OFFS TO EMPHASIZE PROPER AND TIMELY POWER REDUCTIONS. SIMULATOR TRAINING SCENARIOS DON'T NECESSARILY COVER THIS, ALTHOUGH IT SEEMS LIKE COMMON SENSE. I ALSO WEAR ACTIVE NOISE REDUCTION HEADSETS WITH EAR-CUPS WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED THE WIND RUSH NOISE OF EXCESSIVE AIRSPEED. ON MY BEHALF I MUST SAY THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HOTEL DISTURBANCES THE NIGHT PRIOR RESULTED IN ACUTE FATIGUE AND DECREASED MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.