Narrative:

I filed an ADIZ flight plan with the elkins FSS. The flight plan called for me to obtain ADIZ clearance to enter the washington dc ADIZ at brooke VOR (brv). Also prior to the flight, I reviewed the washington sectional chart and confirmed that both st mary's and brv are outside the ADIZ. It appeared to me that a straight course from 2w6 to brv would keep me outside the ADIZ. I departed 2w6 VFR, squawking 1200 and proceeded west toward brv, crossing the northern corner of R-6612 at what I believed to be the edge of the ADIZ. At no time did my instruments show that I had entered the ADIZ. Approximately 10 miles east of brv, I contacted potomac TRACON and was given an IFF squawk code and was cleared to enter the ADIZ. Just prior to hand-off to the ZZZ tower, I was advised by TRACON that they had a telephone number they wanted me to call. At that point I was advised to sequence myself in with other traffic headed for ZZZ, so I told the controller, 'one second, I need to get something to write with.' while descending to traffic altitude (1100 ft MSL) and avoiding traffic, I began fumbling for a pencil and my kneeboard. Sensing my situation -- closing fast on ZZZ with traffic a half mile to my left and 1000 ft higher (and descending) but also headed for ZZZ -- the controller thoughtfully said, 'aircraft X, never mind, we'll pass the number to the tower. You can get it on the ground.' the controller also pointed out the traffic one more time before switching me to ZZZ tower. The traffic off my left was a cessna that was cleared to land ahead of me on runway 34L. I told the tower I would sequence in behind him. On approach, I allowed approximately 1-1.5 miles of separation with the cessna. I slowed to approximately 75-80 KIAS, lowered gear and flaps and completed the landing checklist. The cessna touched down normally and continued down the runway. As I approached short final, the cessna was still rolling but appeared to be about to turn off on to the taxiway. I asked the tower if I was cleared to land. Tower replied, 'aircraft still on the runway, not yet.' at this point, the cessna uncharacteristically had rolled out more than two-thirds of the runway. The tower then instructed the cessna to turn off the runway. At that point, I decided to execute a go around, so I applied power and raised the gear and flaps. Just as I slapped the flap switch to the up position, the tower broadcast, 'aircraft X, cleared to land.' I then slapped the flap switch down, pulled power and lined up on the centerline -- omitting gear extension. I landed with the gear retracted. In reviewing the circumstances that led to this gear up landing, I believe this was a classic case of pilot distraction. The two factors which contributed most to my distraction were 1) being told by TRACON to 'copy down a telephone number' while I was preparing to enter the pattern at ZZZ, and 2) the decision to go around, followed immediately by clearance to land and a reversal of the go around decision. In this report I wish to focus only on the TRACON communication regarding copying a phone number while in flight, particularly when it comes during the transition from TRACON to tower and the landing environment. Simply put, this is a totally unwarranted and unjustifiably dangerous practice. There is absolutely no reason why that notice cannot wait until a pilot has landed safely. Every pilot who flies in the national capitol region ADIZ feels that extra tension that is the consequence of the post 9/11 operating environment. We have all heard the stories about 'zero tolerance' for violations, and the warnings of being shot down. Having TRACON inform you that they have a 'telephone number' they want you to call is the aeronautical equivalent of seeing the state trooper in your rear view mirror, lights flashing, and he wants you to pull over. Your stomach tightens and immediately you begin recalling every detail of the flight, wondering where you went wrong -- all this just as you are entering one of the more stressful phases of the flight, landing. Almost every aviation mishap is the result of a sequence of events. In the case of landing accidents/incidents resulting from distraction, it is oftenpossible to identify the events that contributed to that distraction. In my case, I am absolutely certain that being notified by TRACON to copy down a telephone number just as I was approaching ZZZ, was a significant contributing factor that led to my distraction. This is a bad practice. It contributed to my mishap, and it will contribute to others if it is not stopped. I urge the FAA to stop the practice of notifying pilots while airborne to copy down a telephone number. It is totally unnecessary and it is unsafe. After landing, I was advised by the FSDO that I had apparently grazed the ADIZ along the southern edge, reported at 180 degrees/29 from dca.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BONANZA PLT LANDS GEAR UP AFTER A SERIES OF DISTRACTIONS BEGINNING WITH THE ATC REQUEST TO COPY A PHONE NUMBER FOLLOWED BY TFC SEQUENCING PROBS AT THE ARPT AND A LNDG CLRNC RECEIVED AFTER A GAR DECISION WAS MADE BECAUSE OF A PRECEDING ACFT DELAYING ITS RWY EXIT.

Narrative: I FILED AN ADIZ FLT PLAN WITH THE ELKINS FSS. THE FLT PLAN CALLED FOR ME TO OBTAIN ADIZ CLRNC TO ENTER THE WASHINGTON DC ADIZ AT BROOKE VOR (BRV). ALSO PRIOR TO THE FLT, I REVIEWED THE WASHINGTON SECTIONAL CHART AND CONFIRMED THAT BOTH ST MARY'S AND BRV ARE OUTSIDE THE ADIZ. IT APPEARED TO ME THAT A STRAIGHT COURSE FROM 2W6 TO BRV WOULD KEEP ME OUTSIDE THE ADIZ. I DEPARTED 2W6 VFR, SQUAWKING 1200 AND PROCEEDED WEST TOWARD BRV, XING THE NORTHERN CORNER OF R-6612 AT WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE THE EDGE OF THE ADIZ. AT NO TIME DID MY INSTRUMENTS SHOW THAT I HAD ENTERED THE ADIZ. APPROX 10 MILES EAST OF BRV, I CONTACTED POTOMAC TRACON AND WAS GIVEN AN IFF SQUAWK CODE AND WAS CLEARED TO ENTER THE ADIZ. JUST PRIOR TO HAND-OFF TO THE ZZZ TWR, I WAS ADVISED BY TRACON THAT THEY HAD A TELEPHONE NUMBER THEY WANTED ME TO CALL. AT THAT POINT I WAS ADVISED TO SEQUENCE MYSELF IN WITH OTHER TFC HEADED FOR ZZZ, SO I TOLD THE CTLR, 'ONE SECOND, I NEED TO GET SOMETHING TO WRITE WITH.' WHILE DESCENDING TO TFC ALT (1100 FT MSL) AND AVOIDING TFC, I BEGAN FUMBLING FOR A PENCIL AND MY KNEEBOARD. SENSING MY SITUATION -- CLOSING FAST ON ZZZ WITH TFC A HALF MILE TO MY L AND 1000 FT HIGHER (AND DSNDING) BUT ALSO HEADED FOR ZZZ -- THE CTLR THOUGHTFULLY SAID, 'ACFT X, NEVER MIND, WE'LL PASS THE NUMBER TO THE TWR. YOU CAN GET IT ON THE GND.' THE CTLR ALSO POINTED OUT THE TFC ONE MORE TIME BEFORE SWITCHING ME TO ZZZ TWR. THE TFC OFF MY L WAS A CESSNA THAT WAS CLRED TO LAND AHEAD OF ME ON RWY 34L. I TOLD THE TWR I WOULD SEQUENCE IN BEHIND HIM. ON APCH, I ALLOWED APPROX 1-1.5 MILES OF SEPARATION WITH THE CESSNA. I SLOWED TO APPROX 75-80 KIAS, LOWERED GEAR AND FLAPS AND COMPLETED THE LNDG CHECKLIST. THE CESSNA TOUCHED DOWN NORMALLY AND CONTINUED DOWN THE RWY. AS I APCHED SHORT FINAL, THE CESSNA WAS STILL ROLLING BUT APPEARED TO BE ABOUT TO TURN OFF ON TO THE TXWY. I ASKED THE TWR IF I WAS CLRED TO LAND. TWR REPLIED, 'ACFT STILL ON THE RWY, NOT YET.' AT THIS POINT, THE CESSNA UNCHARACTERISTICALLY HAD ROLLED OUT MORE THAN TWO-THIRDS OF THE RWY. THE TWR THEN INSTRUCTED THE CESSNA TO TURN OFF THE RWY. AT THAT POINT, I DECIDED TO EXECUTE A GO AROUND, SO I APPLIED POWER AND RAISED THE GEAR AND FLAPS. JUST AS I SLAPPED THE FLAP SWITCH TO THE UP POSITION, THE TWR BROADCAST, 'ACFT X, CLEARED TO LAND.' I THEN SLAPPED THE FLAP SWITCH DOWN, PULLED POWER AND LINED UP ON THE CTRLINE -- OMITTING GEAR EXTENSION. I LANDED WITH THE GEAR RETRACTED. IN REVIEWING THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THIS GEAR UP LNDG, I BELIEVE THIS WAS A CLASSIC CASE OF PLT DISTRACTION. THE TWO FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED MOST TO MY DISTRACTION WERE 1) BEING TOLD BY TRACON TO 'COPY DOWN A TELEPHONE NUMBER' WHILE I WAS PREPARING TO ENTER THE PATTERN AT ZZZ, AND 2) THE DECISION TO GAR, FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY CLRNC TO LAND AND A REVERSAL OF THE GAR DECISION. IN THIS RPT I WISH TO FOCUS ONLY ON THE TRACON COM REGARDING COPYING A PHONE NUMBER WHILE IN FLT, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT COMES DURING THE TRANSITION FROM TRACON TO TWR AND THE LNDG ENVIRONMENT. SIMPLY PUT, THIS IS A TOTALLY UNWARRANTED AND UNJUSTIFIABLY DANGEROUS PRACTICE. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO REASON WHY THAT NOTICE CANNOT WAIT UNTIL A PLT HAS LANDED SAFELY. EVERY PLT WHO FLIES IN THE NATIONAL CAPITOL REGION ADIZ FEELS THAT EXTRA TENSION THAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE POST 9/11 OPERATING ENVIRONMENT. WE HAVE ALL HEARD THE STORIES ABOUT 'ZERO TOLERANCE' FOR VIOLATIONS, AND THE WARNINGS OF BEING SHOT DOWN. HAVING TRACON INFORM YOU THAT THEY HAVE A 'TELEPHONE NUMBER' THEY WANT YOU TO CALL IS THE AERONAUTICAL EQUIVALENT OF SEEING THE STATE TROOPER IN YOUR REAR VIEW MIRROR, LIGHTS FLASHING, AND HE WANTS YOU TO PULL OVER. YOUR STOMACH TIGHTENS AND IMMEDIATELY YOU BEGIN RECALLING EVERY DETAIL OF THE FLT, WONDERING WHERE YOU WENT WRONG -- ALL THIS JUST AS YOU ARE ENTERING ONE OF THE MORE STRESSFUL PHASES OF THE FLT, LNDG. ALMOST EVERY AVIATION MISHAP IS THE RESULT OF A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS. IN THE CASE OF LNDG ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS RESULTING FROM DISTRACTION, IT IS OFTENPOSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY THE EVENTS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THAT DISTRACTION. IN MY CASE, I AM ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT BEING NOTIFIED BY TRACON TO COPY DOWN A TELEPHONE NUMBER JUST AS I WAS APCHING ZZZ, WAS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTING FACTOR THAT LED TO MY DISTRACTION. THIS IS A BAD PRACTICE. IT CONTRIBUTED TO MY MISHAP, AND IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO OTHERS IF IT IS NOT STOPPED. I URGE THE FAA TO STOP THE PRACTICE OF NOTIFYING PLTS WHILE AIRBORNE TO COPY DOWN A TELEPHONE NUMBER. IT IS TOTALLY UNNECESSARY AND IT IS UNSAFE. AFTER LNDG, I WAS ADVISED BY THE FSDO THAT I HAD APPARENTLY GRAZED THE ADIZ ALONG THE SOUTHERN EDGE, RPTED AT 180 DEGS/29 FROM DCA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.