Narrative:

On apr/fri/04 at approximately XA15, I departed from lam en route to aeg. Conditions were less than favorable and getting worse by the min. This prompted me to hurry my preflight and departure. I had talked with flight watch about current conditions at both airports and for the route I was to be taking and at the time there were scattered thunderstorms throughout the area. I was also trying to get to a meeting scheduled for later that afternoon that I did not want to miss. I had been up in this type of WX in the #2 seat many, many times before and thought that if I could get up and out about 1 mi from the end of the runway, I could make the determination of whether or not I would be able to make the flight home. If conditions were not favorable to continue the flight, I would do a 90/270 degree turn back to the runway and land. Immediately after takeoff (1/2 mi and 300 ft), I was in the clouds. This was not what I had planned and immediately fear and panic set in. Next came spatial disorientation with much more fear and panic. Unknowingly I put the plane in a hard bank to the left and a very steep climb. Absolutely nothing was making sense to me and the next thing I remember was seeing the airspeed indicator at approximately 50 mph. More panic and fear and I knew the plane was in a stall. My first instinct was to 'push the plane over' to stop the stall (do not remember any stall warning indication), which I did. I do not know the exact sequence of events that occurred next but will relate as best possible items that I remember, but not necessarily in the sequence they occurred. I then saw the vsi pegged off scale low (greater than 2000 FPM descent) and then broke through the clouds long enough to see the ground coming up at me over the propeller, which is a view I had never seen before and will never see again, I promise you that. They say you see your life flash in front of you when you are ready to die, yet that did not happen to me. Rather, I thought of how stupid I was to get into this mess and that due to my stupidity I was about to cause the deaths of the 2 passenger that were flying with me that day. I knew at that instant I had to pull the plane out of the death spiral (my instructor told me that he thought that is what I was in, not a full spin when we talked after it was all over) and pulled up hard. The plane recovered and I remember doing this several times in the next few mins of trying to stabilize the aircraft. The oscillations became less and less severe as I tried desperately to regain control of the aircraft. It was apparent that not only had fear, panic and spatial disorientation set in but also that I was probably in shock too. My mind was not able to digest the tremendous amount of data it was receiving and I was trying to hang on by a thread. I was grasping on to any single piece of data that I could possibly use, being in the state of shock I was in. I remember the attitude indicator all blue or a hard bank left then right. The airspeed indicator being at 120 mph then going down to 60 mph. At some point in time as I felt that I might be getting some control, I pushed the 'next up' on the radio, which was ZAB. My first transmission was, 'ZAB this is cherokee xxxxx and I am in trouble, I am in the clouds and need help, need a vector to get out.' ZAB responded by giving me a squawk code. The passenger sitting next to me dialed in the code and pushed identify. I had showed her how to do that during the morning flight and looking back I do not think I could have been able to dial that in during that time of the flight. ZAB then responded by telling me to head to 070 degrees and climb to 13500 ft which I said I could not do. As things progressed, I was able to climb to 10500 ft though my heading was all over the place. Center then said to maintain my current heading and I should be out of the clouds in about 3 or 4 mi. About 20 seconds later, I saw an opening to go down through the clouds and I took it. I made a controled descent down through the opening and was out of the clouds at about 9000 ft MSL, which was about 2000 ft AGL. I then called center and statedthat I was in VFR conditions and accepted their offer for flight following to aeg. Though I was white as a ghost and sweating profusely, the remainder of the ride home was easy. The landing was fine and both passenger were fine. I apologized many, many times to both passenger and they both said that the ride was just like being on a roller coaster ride and that they were more concerned with me having a heart attack than getting out the clouds safely. I think that they just did not know what really was happening so they weren't really scared. It was a good ending to a tragic situation. As I look back at things, there are many things that can be said. It was incredible how fast things went bad and there was absolutely nothing at all that I could do about it. Was this a miracle? Was I just lucky? If I didn't see the ground on my first stall recovery, would I have pulled up in time? Why didn't I just concentrate on the gauges and control the aircraft as you do on a normal takeoff or landing? Why did I ever take off with conditions as bad as they were and getting worse? Why didn't I listen to any of the people I had talked with prior to takeoff that recommended not going? One person said that I listened to only what I wanted to hear and not what I should have been listening to. There were so many signs telling me not to take off that day, yet I still did. I truly believe in safety first, yet everything I did showed just the opposite. It has been told to me that 90% of the people put into that condition, with my level of skill, die in the first 90 seconds. As I relate this story to many, a close friend said (trying to make me feel better) someone has to be in the other 10%. It is hard to put things like this behind you, but that is what must be done. I have learned a great deal from this event and I am committed to pass this story on to all who are interested in listening. In this way I hope that those that choose to listen might learn one little thing from my story that could help save their lives if ever they were to get into a similar situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA32 PLT HAD NO INST RATING. HE TOOK OFF INTO 300 FT OVCST AND ONE HALF MI CONDITIONS.

Narrative: ON APR/FRI/04 AT APPROX XA15, I DEPARTED FROM LAM ENRTE TO AEG. CONDITIONS WERE LESS THAN FAVORABLE AND GETTING WORSE BY THE MIN. THIS PROMPTED ME TO HURRY MY PREFLT AND DEP. I HAD TALKED WITH FLT WATCH ABOUT CURRENT CONDITIONS AT BOTH ARPTS AND FOR THE RTE I WAS TO BE TAKING AND AT THE TIME THERE WERE SCATTERED TSTMS THROUGHOUT THE AREA. I WAS ALSO TRYING TO GET TO A MEETING SCHEDULED FOR LATER THAT AFTERNOON THAT I DID NOT WANT TO MISS. I HAD BEEN UP IN THIS TYPE OF WX IN THE #2 SEAT MANY, MANY TIMES BEFORE AND THOUGHT THAT IF I COULD GET UP AND OUT ABOUT 1 MI FROM THE END OF THE RWY, I COULD MAKE THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR NOT I WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE THE FLT HOME. IF CONDITIONS WERE NOT FAVORABLE TO CONTINUE THE FLT, I WOULD DO A 90/270 DEG TURN BACK TO THE RWY AND LAND. IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF (1/2 MI AND 300 FT), I WAS IN THE CLOUDS. THIS WAS NOT WHAT I HAD PLANNED AND IMMEDIATELY FEAR AND PANIC SET IN. NEXT CAME SPATIAL DISORIENTATION WITH MUCH MORE FEAR AND PANIC. UNKNOWINGLY I PUT THE PLANE IN A HARD BANK TO THE L AND A VERY STEEP CLB. ABSOLUTELY NOTHING WAS MAKING SENSE TO ME AND THE NEXT THING I REMEMBER WAS SEEING THE AIRSPD INDICATOR AT APPROX 50 MPH. MORE PANIC AND FEAR AND I KNEW THE PLANE WAS IN A STALL. MY FIRST INSTINCT WAS TO 'PUSH THE PLANE OVER' TO STOP THE STALL (DO NOT REMEMBER ANY STALL WARNING INDICATION), WHICH I DID. I DO NOT KNOW THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT OCCURRED NEXT BUT WILL RELATE AS BEST POSSIBLE ITEMS THAT I REMEMBER, BUT NOT NECESSARILY IN THE SEQUENCE THEY OCCURRED. I THEN SAW THE VSI PEGGED OFF SCALE LOW (GREATER THAN 2000 FPM DSCNT) AND THEN BROKE THROUGH THE CLOUDS LONG ENOUGH TO SEE THE GND COMING UP AT ME OVER THE PROP, WHICH IS A VIEW I HAD NEVER SEEN BEFORE AND WILL NEVER SEE AGAIN, I PROMISE YOU THAT. THEY SAY YOU SEE YOUR LIFE FLASH IN FRONT OF YOU WHEN YOU ARE READY TO DIE, YET THAT DID NOT HAPPEN TO ME. RATHER, I THOUGHT OF HOW STUPID I WAS TO GET INTO THIS MESS AND THAT DUE TO MY STUPIDITY I WAS ABOUT TO CAUSE THE DEATHS OF THE 2 PAX THAT WERE FLYING WITH ME THAT DAY. I KNEW AT THAT INSTANT I HAD TO PULL THE PLANE OUT OF THE DEATH SPIRAL (MY INSTRUCTOR TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT THAT IS WHAT I WAS IN, NOT A FULL SPIN WHEN WE TALKED AFTER IT WAS ALL OVER) AND PULLED UP HARD. THE PLANE RECOVERED AND I REMEMBER DOING THIS SEVERAL TIMES IN THE NEXT FEW MINS OF TRYING TO STABILIZE THE ACFT. THE OSCILLATIONS BECAME LESS AND LESS SEVERE AS I TRIED DESPERATELY TO REGAIN CTL OF THE ACFT. IT WAS APPARENT THAT NOT ONLY HAD FEAR, PANIC AND SPATIAL DISORIENTATION SET IN BUT ALSO THAT I WAS PROBABLY IN SHOCK TOO. MY MIND WAS NOT ABLE TO DIGEST THE TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF DATA IT WAS RECEIVING AND I WAS TRYING TO HANG ON BY A THREAD. I WAS GRASPING ON TO ANY SINGLE PIECE OF DATA THAT I COULD POSSIBLY USE, BEING IN THE STATE OF SHOCK I WAS IN. I REMEMBER THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR ALL BLUE OR A HARD BANK L THEN R. THE AIRSPD INDICATOR BEING AT 120 MPH THEN GOING DOWN TO 60 MPH. AT SOME POINT IN TIME AS I FELT THAT I MIGHT BE GETTING SOME CTL, I PUSHED THE 'NEXT UP' ON THE RADIO, WHICH WAS ZAB. MY FIRST XMISSION WAS, 'ZAB THIS IS CHEROKEE XXXXX AND I AM IN TROUBLE, I AM IN THE CLOUDS AND NEED HELP, NEED A VECTOR TO GET OUT.' ZAB RESPONDED BY GIVING ME A SQUAWK CODE. THE PAX SITTING NEXT TO ME DIALED IN THE CODE AND PUSHED IDENT. I HAD SHOWED HER HOW TO DO THAT DURING THE MORNING FLT AND LOOKING BACK I DO NOT THINK I COULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DIAL THAT IN DURING THAT TIME OF THE FLT. ZAB THEN RESPONDED BY TELLING ME TO HEAD TO 070 DEGS AND CLB TO 13500 FT WHICH I SAID I COULD NOT DO. AS THINGS PROGRESSED, I WAS ABLE TO CLB TO 10500 FT THOUGH MY HDG WAS ALL OVER THE PLACE. CTR THEN SAID TO MAINTAIN MY CURRENT HDG AND I SHOULD BE OUT OF THE CLOUDS IN ABOUT 3 OR 4 MI. ABOUT 20 SECONDS LATER, I SAW AN OPENING TO GO DOWN THROUGH THE CLOUDS AND I TOOK IT. I MADE A CTLED DSCNT DOWN THROUGH THE OPENING AND WAS OUT OF THE CLOUDS AT ABOUT 9000 FT MSL, WHICH WAS ABOUT 2000 FT AGL. I THEN CALLED CTR AND STATEDTHAT I WAS IN VFR CONDITIONS AND ACCEPTED THEIR OFFER FOR FLT FOLLOWING TO AEG. THOUGH I WAS WHITE AS A GHOST AND SWEATING PROFUSELY, THE REMAINDER OF THE RIDE HOME WAS EASY. THE LNDG WAS FINE AND BOTH PAX WERE FINE. I APOLOGIZED MANY, MANY TIMES TO BOTH PAX AND THEY BOTH SAID THAT THE RIDE WAS JUST LIKE BEING ON A ROLLER COASTER RIDE AND THAT THEY WERE MORE CONCERNED WITH ME HAVING A HEART ATTACK THAN GETTING OUT THE CLOUDS SAFELY. I THINK THAT THEY JUST DID NOT KNOW WHAT REALLY WAS HAPPENING SO THEY WEREN'T REALLY SCARED. IT WAS A GOOD ENDING TO A TRAGIC SIT. AS I LOOK BACK AT THINGS, THERE ARE MANY THINGS THAT CAN BE SAID. IT WAS INCREDIBLE HOW FAST THINGS WENT BAD AND THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING AT ALL THAT I COULD DO ABOUT IT. WAS THIS A MIRACLE? WAS I JUST LUCKY? IF I DIDN'T SEE THE GND ON MY FIRST STALL RECOVERY, WOULD I HAVE PULLED UP IN TIME? WHY DIDN'T I JUST CONCENTRATE ON THE GAUGES AND CTL THE ACFT AS YOU DO ON A NORMAL TKOF OR LNDG? WHY DID I EVER TAKE OFF WITH CONDITIONS AS BAD AS THEY WERE AND GETTING WORSE? WHY DIDN'T I LISTEN TO ANY OF THE PEOPLE I HAD TALKED WITH PRIOR TO TKOF THAT RECOMMENDED NOT GOING? ONE PERSON SAID THAT I LISTENED TO ONLY WHAT I WANTED TO HEAR AND NOT WHAT I SHOULD HAVE BEEN LISTENING TO. THERE WERE SO MANY SIGNS TELLING ME NOT TO TAKE OFF THAT DAY, YET I STILL DID. I TRULY BELIEVE IN SAFETY FIRST, YET EVERYTHING I DID SHOWED JUST THE OPPOSITE. IT HAS BEEN TOLD TO ME THAT 90% OF THE PEOPLE PUT INTO THAT CONDITION, WITH MY LEVEL OF SKILL, DIE IN THE FIRST 90 SECONDS. AS I RELATE THIS STORY TO MANY, A CLOSE FRIEND SAID (TRYING TO MAKE ME FEEL BETTER) SOMEONE HAS TO BE IN THE OTHER 10%. IT IS HARD TO PUT THINGS LIKE THIS BEHIND YOU, BUT THAT IS WHAT MUST BE DONE. I HAVE LEARNED A GREAT DEAL FROM THIS EVENT AND I AM COMMITTED TO PASS THIS STORY ON TO ALL WHO ARE INTERESTED IN LISTENING. IN THIS WAY I HOPE THAT THOSE THAT CHOOSE TO LISTEN MIGHT LEARN ONE LITTLE THING FROM MY STORY THAT COULD HELP SAVE THEIR LIVES IF EVER THEY WERE TO GET INTO A SIMILAR SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.