Narrative:

During the airborne flight planning process for flight xx, I made the decision to refuse the aircraft after reviewing the maintenance log history of the aircraft. I communicated this refusal to dispatch via ACARS. This aircraft had numerous deferred maintenance items which I felt rendered it inappropriate for the flight contemplated. I listed my reason for refusal as 'an abundance of maintenance defects.' it was further my considered opinion that this aircraft should not leave a maintenance station with these defects and be dumped on another captain at an out-station. The defects included: 1) a small hydraulic leak of unknown origin. 2) the left wing cockpit fuel gauge inoperative. 3) the left ignition system on both engines inoperative. 4) the ground test function of the wing anti-ice system inoperative. Upon arrival at ord on flight from ewr, I had a message to call the duty flight manager. I reached duty flight manager captain xy (no first name given) by phone shortly after blocking in at the gate. Captain xy initially was seeking clarification of my refusal and I explained my decision to him. Upon hearing my explanation, captain xy stated that 'a captain should accept an airplane with proper deferrals under any circumstances.' I told him I did not share that view and that my decision was appropriate as I saw it. I have never refused an aircraft for a flight unless I believed that safety might be compromised by accepting it. Captain xy attempted to engage me in a discussion of hypothetical sits and continually asked me 'what number of defects would you accept on an airplane?' I explained that every situation was different and required careful consideration. He also said it was my responsibility to investigate any deferrals that I considered inappropriate or in error. (I had expressed concern to dispatch about the hydraulic leak of unknown origin being deferred.) I explained to captain xy that I had not had time to contact maintenance controller about this particular deferral (dispatch could have done so if they had chosen to) and that the time constraints under which B737 pilots operate frequently prohibited doing so. I felt the best course of action was to give early notification of my refusal (2 hours 30 mins) and let the pwrs that be sort it out. Our discussion continued for almost 15 mins and captain xy was unrelenting in his criticism of my decision to refuse the aircraft. I found his attitude and tone disturbing and naive and this was the first time in my 7+ yrs as captain that anyone at my airline has questioned my decision to refuse an aircraft. At the time our conversation was taking place, another aircraft had already been assigned for flight and I had already signed for it. Flight left the gate early despite the time I had to spend on the phone explaining myself to captain xy. It is my hope that captain xy understood that I do not make such decisions lightly and that he should support such decisions made by other capts. I am fully aware of the problems associated with 'downing' an airplane and I make every reasonable effort not to do so. In all cases, if I err, I do so on the side of safety as I am all too aware of the disastrous impact the loss of an aircraft would have on my airline.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CAPT REFUSED AN ACFT BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS ITEMS THAT WERE DEFERRED ACCORDING TO THE MEL.

Narrative: DURING THE AIRBORNE FLT PLANNING PROCESS FOR FLT XX, I MADE THE DECISION TO REFUSE THE ACFT AFTER REVIEWING THE MAINT LOG HISTORY OF THE ACFT. I COMMUNICATED THIS REFUSAL TO DISPATCH VIA ACARS. THIS ACFT HAD NUMEROUS DEFERRED MAINT ITEMS WHICH I FELT RENDERED IT INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE FLT CONTEMPLATED. I LISTED MY REASON FOR REFUSAL AS 'AN ABUNDANCE OF MAINT DEFECTS.' IT WAS FURTHER MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT THIS ACFT SHOULD NOT LEAVE A MAINT STATION WITH THESE DEFECTS AND BE DUMPED ON ANOTHER CAPT AT AN OUT-STATION. THE DEFECTS INCLUDED: 1) A SMALL HYD LEAK OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN. 2) THE L WING COCKPIT FUEL GAUGE INOP. 3) THE L IGNITION SYS ON BOTH ENGS INOP. 4) THE GND TEST FUNCTION OF THE WING ANTI-ICE SYS INOP. UPON ARR AT ORD ON FLT FROM EWR, I HAD A MESSAGE TO CALL THE DUTY FLT MGR. I REACHED DUTY FLT MGR CAPT XY (NO FIRST NAME GIVEN) BY PHONE SHORTLY AFTER BLOCKING IN AT THE GATE. CAPT XY INITIALLY WAS SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF MY REFUSAL AND I EXPLAINED MY DECISION TO HIM. UPON HEARING MY EXPLANATION, CAPT XY STATED THAT 'A CAPT SHOULD ACCEPT AN AIRPLANE WITH PROPER DEFERRALS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.' I TOLD HIM I DID NOT SHARE THAT VIEW AND THAT MY DECISION WAS APPROPRIATE AS I SAW IT. I HAVE NEVER REFUSED AN ACFT FOR A FLT UNLESS I BELIEVED THAT SAFETY MIGHT BE COMPROMISED BY ACCEPTING IT. CAPT XY ATTEMPTED TO ENGAGE ME IN A DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHETICAL SITS AND CONTINUALLY ASKED ME 'WHAT NUMBER OF DEFECTS WOULD YOU ACCEPT ON AN AIRPLANE?' I EXPLAINED THAT EVERY SIT WAS DIFFERENT AND REQUIRED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. HE ALSO SAID IT WAS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO INVESTIGATE ANY DEFERRALS THAT I CONSIDERED INAPPROPRIATE OR IN ERROR. (I HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN TO DISPATCH ABOUT THE HYD LEAK OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN BEING DEFERRED.) I EXPLAINED TO CAPT XY THAT I HAD NOT HAD TIME TO CONTACT MAINT CTLR ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR DEFERRAL (DISPATCH COULD HAVE DONE SO IF THEY HAD CHOSEN TO) AND THAT THE TIME CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH B737 PLTS OPERATE FREQUENTLY PROHIBITED DOING SO. I FELT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO GIVE EARLY NOTIFICATION OF MY REFUSAL (2 HRS 30 MINS) AND LET THE PWRS THAT BE SORT IT OUT. OUR DISCUSSION CONTINUED FOR ALMOST 15 MINS AND CAPT XY WAS UNRELENTING IN HIS CRITICISM OF MY DECISION TO REFUSE THE ACFT. I FOUND HIS ATTITUDE AND TONE DISTURBING AND NAIVE AND THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME IN MY 7+ YRS AS CAPT THAT ANYONE AT MY AIRLINE HAS QUESTIONED MY DECISION TO REFUSE AN ACFT. AT THE TIME OUR CONVERSATION WAS TAKING PLACE, ANOTHER ACFT HAD ALREADY BEEN ASSIGNED FOR FLT AND I HAD ALREADY SIGNED FOR IT. FLT LEFT THE GATE EARLY DESPITE THE TIME I HAD TO SPEND ON THE PHONE EXPLAINING MYSELF TO CAPT XY. IT IS MY HOPE THAT CAPT XY UNDERSTOOD THAT I DO NOT MAKE SUCH DECISIONS LIGHTLY AND THAT HE SHOULD SUPPORT SUCH DECISIONS MADE BY OTHER CAPTS. I AM FULLY AWARE OF THE PROBS ASSOCIATED WITH 'DOWNING' AN AIRPLANE AND I MAKE EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT NOT TO DO SO. IN ALL CASES, IF I ERR, I DO SO ON THE SIDE OF SAFETY AS I AM ALL TOO AWARE OF THE DISASTROUS IMPACT THE LOSS OF AN ACFT WOULD HAVE ON MY AIRLINE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.