37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 619333 |
Time | |
Date | 200405 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | navaid : ttt.vor |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 11000 msl bound upper : 12000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Weather Elements | other |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zfw.artcc tracon : d10.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-82 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : intermediate altitude descent : holding descent : approach |
Route In Use | arrival star : ukw |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zfw.artcc tracon : d10.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : intermediate altitude descent : approach |
Route In Use | arrival star : ukw |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine pilot : commercial |
ASRS Report | 619333 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met altitude deviation : undershoot conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : clearance non adherence : required legal separation other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment : tcas other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 500 vertical : 1000 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Environmental Factor ATC Human Performance Weather Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Narrative:
After holding for over 1 hour, we were about 4TH or 5TH on the UKW8 arrival into dfw. The center (just before handing off to approach control) controller was very task saturated. One of the mistakes I distinctly remember controller making was clearing us direct to a fix that we had just passed. Controller kept us high on the arrival to the point the captain asked for a descent to make the altitude restr. We were holding at, and started the arrival at, FL240. Controller stepped us down a couple of times to about FL190 and gave us a vector to get someone in ahead of us. Controller finally cleared us direct to bambe, then told us to pass kagle at 11000 ft and 250 KTS. The altitude restr was going to be close even with full speed brakes (we were also limited to 280 KTS in the descent). When handed off to approach control, the captain checked in with the altitude we were cleared to (11000 ft), and the approach controller said nothing of a potential conflict. We were very tight on the aircraft in front of us, so I indicated to the captain that I thought the speed was going to be more critical than the altitude and that he should probably tell approach control we were probably not going to make the altitude restr, which he did. Just about the time the captain was telling approach we weren't going to make the restr (13000 ft, with about 4 mi to go), and the rate of descent slowed considerably from what it had been, we received a TA. The traffic was indicating directly below us at 11000 ft. The captain looked out his window, and even though in thin clouds, could see the aircraft, and told me to level off and turn away. We had not yet received an RA because of the decreased rate of descent apparently. I leveled off at 12000 ft and turned about 30 degrees off heading. The captain promptly got on the radio and informed the controller who seemingly still had not noticed the conflict. When first informed of the problem, the controller acted like we should have been at 11000 ft and was confused about why we were at 12000 ft and turning away. I think it was at the point that the 'blips' began to diverge that he finally became aware that there was a problem. He cleared us back on course at 12000 ft and we eventually got an ILS approach to runway 35R. I have no idea who the other aircraft was except that the captain was sure it was another MD80. I also have no idea where he came from. It was not the aircraft the center controller was getting us behind as we were approaching ukw. I don't remember seeing the other aircraft on TCASII until just before starting our speed and rate of descent reduction approaching 11000 ft. Considering the 'what if's' is scary! If I hadn't been concerned about our distance to the aircraft in front of us, I wouldn't have slowed our rate of descent and airspeed approaching dagle and the leveloff. If the captain hadn't commanded a leveloff and a turn away, we would have been right on top of the other aircraft. If we had been in the aircraft I flew just the day prior, our TCASII would have been inoperative. With just those few circumstances alone, I'm not sure the outcome would have been the same! A high rate of descent, coupled with no TCASII on one of the 2 aircraft, the possible delay of execution for an RA at 11000 ft ('descend, descend now') from the lower of the 2 aircraft, and the unexpected direction of conflict resolution could have resulted in a completely different chain of events.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A DELAYED DSCNT SPONSORED BY A TASK SATURATED ZFW CTLR TRIGGERS A POTENTIAL CONFLICT BTWN 2 MD80 ACFT WITH LATE PREVENTIVE ACTION FROM D10 APCH CTLR.
Narrative: AFTER HOLDING FOR OVER 1 HR, WE WERE ABOUT 4TH OR 5TH ON THE UKW8 ARR INTO DFW. THE CTR (JUST BEFORE HANDING OFF TO APCH CTL) CTLR WAS VERY TASK SATURATED. ONE OF THE MISTAKES I DISTINCTLY REMEMBER CTLR MAKING WAS CLRING US DIRECT TO A FIX THAT WE HAD JUST PASSED. CTLR KEPT US HIGH ON THE ARR TO THE POINT THE CAPT ASKED FOR A DSCNT TO MAKE THE ALT RESTR. WE WERE HOLDING AT, AND STARTED THE ARR AT, FL240. CTLR STEPPED US DOWN A COUPLE OF TIMES TO ABOUT FL190 AND GAVE US A VECTOR TO GET SOMEONE IN AHEAD OF US. CTLR FINALLY CLRED US DIRECT TO BAMBE, THEN TOLD US TO PASS KAGLE AT 11000 FT AND 250 KTS. THE ALT RESTR WAS GOING TO BE CLOSE EVEN WITH FULL SPD BRAKES (WE WERE ALSO LIMITED TO 280 KTS IN THE DSCNT). WHEN HANDED OFF TO APCH CTL, THE CAPT CHKED IN WITH THE ALT WE WERE CLRED TO (11000 FT), AND THE APCH CTLR SAID NOTHING OF A POTENTIAL CONFLICT. WE WERE VERY TIGHT ON THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US, SO I INDICATED TO THE CAPT THAT I THOUGHT THE SPD WAS GOING TO BE MORE CRITICAL THAN THE ALT AND THAT HE SHOULD PROBABLY TELL APCH CTL WE WERE PROBABLY NOT GOING TO MAKE THE ALT RESTR, WHICH HE DID. JUST ABOUT THE TIME THE CAPT WAS TELLING APCH WE WEREN'T GOING TO MAKE THE RESTR (13000 FT, WITH ABOUT 4 MI TO GO), AND THE RATE OF DSCNT SLOWED CONSIDERABLY FROM WHAT IT HAD BEEN, WE RECEIVED A TA. THE TFC WAS INDICATING DIRECTLY BELOW US AT 11000 FT. THE CAPT LOOKED OUT HIS WINDOW, AND EVEN THOUGH IN THIN CLOUDS, COULD SEE THE ACFT, AND TOLD ME TO LEVEL OFF AND TURN AWAY. WE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED AN RA BECAUSE OF THE DECREASED RATE OF DSCNT APPARENTLY. I LEVELED OFF AT 12000 FT AND TURNED ABOUT 30 DEGS OFF HDG. THE CAPT PROMPTLY GOT ON THE RADIO AND INFORMED THE CTLR WHO SEEMINGLY STILL HAD NOT NOTICED THE CONFLICT. WHEN FIRST INFORMED OF THE PROB, THE CTLR ACTED LIKE WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT 11000 FT AND WAS CONFUSED ABOUT WHY WE WERE AT 12000 FT AND TURNING AWAY. I THINK IT WAS AT THE POINT THAT THE 'BLIPS' BEGAN TO DIVERGE THAT HE FINALLY BECAME AWARE THAT THERE WAS A PROB. HE CLRED US BACK ON COURSE AT 12000 FT AND WE EVENTUALLY GOT AN ILS APCH TO RWY 35R. I HAVE NO IDEA WHO THE OTHER ACFT WAS EXCEPT THAT THE CAPT WAS SURE IT WAS ANOTHER MD80. I ALSO HAVE NO IDEA WHERE HE CAME FROM. IT WAS NOT THE ACFT THE CTR CTLR WAS GETTING US BEHIND AS WE WERE APCHING UKW. I DON'T REMEMBER SEEING THE OTHER ACFT ON TCASII UNTIL JUST BEFORE STARTING OUR SPD AND RATE OF DSCNT REDUCTION APCHING 11000 FT. CONSIDERING THE 'WHAT IF'S' IS SCARY! IF I HADN'T BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT OUR DISTANCE TO THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US, I WOULDN'T HAVE SLOWED OUR RATE OF DSCNT AND AIRSPD APCHING DAGLE AND THE LEVELOFF. IF THE CAPT HADN'T COMMANDED A LEVELOFF AND A TURN AWAY, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN RIGHT ON TOP OF THE OTHER ACFT. IF WE HAD BEEN IN THE ACFT I FLEW JUST THE DAY PRIOR, OUR TCASII WOULD HAVE BEEN INOP. WITH JUST THOSE FEW CIRCUMSTANCES ALONE, I'M NOT SURE THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SAME! A HIGH RATE OF DSCNT, COUPLED WITH NO TCASII ON ONE OF THE 2 ACFT, THE POSSIBLE DELAY OF EXECUTION FOR AN RA AT 11000 FT ('DSND, DSND NOW') FROM THE LOWER OF THE 2 ACFT, AND THE UNEXPECTED DIRECTION OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT CHAIN OF EVENTS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.