Narrative:

On rhythm arrival to msy, delayed clearance to descend with direction to cross rhythm at 11000 ft necessitated a steep descent profile. About 4 mi prior to rhythm, we were handed off to msy approach and that clear issued a heading with instructions to intercept the localizer runway 19 and descend to 2000 ft. At this point, we were still above 250 KTS and had about 28 mi to lose a little over 9000 ft, and slow for stabilized approach criteria. We had been given no airspeed instructions nor sequencing information, so I relayed to the captain my plan to level off, slow, configure the jet and then descend. Once I had done so and we were established on a good profile to comply with the clearance, the controller called us and asked, obviously angered, 'is there any reason why you slowed to final approach airspeed 24 mi from the field?' the captain replied, 'yes, we're very high.' a few moments later, the controller called another carrier flight and told him to expect a vector across final for a company aircraft ahead that's slowed to 140 KTS across the ground. About 30 seconds after that, another company flight checked on the frequency with, 'how you doing?' to which the controller replied, 'I was doing okay until your company slowed to final approach airspeed 24 mi from the field.' each of these xmissions was made with an extreme amount of emotion and clearly the controller was very agitated. Nothing else was said until we were just outside the FAF where the controller abruptly broke us out to the west and began vectoring the other company flight and company in front of us. He boxed us back to final, issued a caution for the now tight spacing we had on company ahead, and sent us to tower. Prior to our being broken out, there had been no other calls to the other carrier referencing spacing, and even after our box pattern the company aircraft ahead was still on a dogleg to final. I'm filing this as soon as possible under the general safety category. No far's were violated and safety was never compromised, but we clearly had a situation where this controller became upset to a point where his professionalism broke down. There are many techniques for descent and our choice must be tailored to each individual situation. Appropriately, our new cockpit procedures stress communication of the plan between the PF and pm. My experience with this flight shows that there are times when bringing the controller into that loop might be helpful as well. While I believe this approach controller's reactions were unusual, letting him know we were slowing to comply with his clearance may have resulted in his issuing an alternative direction that would have better fit into the big picture as he saw it. Supplemental information from acn 619220: the first officer (PF) started down at idle and speed brakes. He decided that confign would not work. He stated he would dirty up to flaps 15 degrees and slow to help the descent. We slowed to 160 KTS indicated. We continued inbound. At approximately 15 DME, we were still very high. The first officer went to flaps 30 degrees and slowed to 140 KTS. 1 mi from the final approach fix, the controller said he was going to pull us out and re-sequence us. We went from 10 mins early to 5 mins late. We can debate the merits of how to descend, ie, maybe gear down and 250 KTS, but I have never been verbally belittled by a controller before. I feel that pulling us out at the final approach fix to allow other aircraft to proceed ahead of us was an act of retaliation for causing his flow to be interrupted. This whole episode was unprofessional and uncalled for.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 ARR TO MSY EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH TRACON HANDLING DURING SPD REDUCTIONS AND ATTEMPTS TO DSND ON FINAL APCH.

Narrative: ON RHYTHM ARR TO MSY, DELAYED CLRNC TO DSND WITH DIRECTION TO CROSS RHYTHM AT 11000 FT NECESSITATED A STEEP DSCNT PROFILE. ABOUT 4 MI PRIOR TO RHYTHM, WE WERE HANDED OFF TO MSY APCH AND THAT CLR ISSUED A HDG WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC RWY 19 AND DSND TO 2000 FT. AT THIS POINT, WE WERE STILL ABOVE 250 KTS AND HAD ABOUT 28 MI TO LOSE A LITTLE OVER 9000 FT, AND SLOW FOR STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA. WE HAD BEEN GIVEN NO AIRSPD INSTRUCTIONS NOR SEQUENCING INFO, SO I RELAYED TO THE CAPT MY PLAN TO LEVEL OFF, SLOW, CONFIGURE THE JET AND THEN DSND. ONCE I HAD DONE SO AND WE WERE ESTABLISHED ON A GOOD PROFILE TO COMPLY WITH THE CLRNC, THE CTLR CALLED US AND ASKED, OBVIOUSLY ANGERED, 'IS THERE ANY REASON WHY YOU SLOWED TO FINAL APCH AIRSPD 24 MI FROM THE FIELD?' THE CAPT REPLIED, 'YES, WE'RE VERY HIGH.' A FEW MOMENTS LATER, THE CTLR CALLED ANOTHER CARRIER FLT AND TOLD HIM TO EXPECT A VECTOR ACROSS FINAL FOR A COMPANY ACFT AHEAD THAT'S SLOWED TO 140 KTS ACROSS THE GND. ABOUT 30 SECONDS AFTER THAT, ANOTHER COMPANY FLT CHKED ON THE FREQ WITH, 'HOW YOU DOING?' TO WHICH THE CTLR REPLIED, 'I WAS DOING OKAY UNTIL YOUR COMPANY SLOWED TO FINAL APCH AIRSPD 24 MI FROM THE FIELD.' EACH OF THESE XMISSIONS WAS MADE WITH AN EXTREME AMOUNT OF EMOTION AND CLRLY THE CTLR WAS VERY AGITATED. NOTHING ELSE WAS SAID UNTIL WE WERE JUST OUTSIDE THE FAF WHERE THE CTLR ABRUPTLY BROKE US OUT TO THE W AND BEGAN VECTORING THE OTHER COMPANY FLT AND COMPANY IN FRONT OF US. HE BOXED US BACK TO FINAL, ISSUED A CAUTION FOR THE NOW TIGHT SPACING WE HAD ON COMPANY AHEAD, AND SENT US TO TWR. PRIOR TO OUR BEING BROKEN OUT, THERE HAD BEEN NO OTHER CALLS TO THE OTHER CARRIER REFING SPACING, AND EVEN AFTER OUR BOX PATTERN THE COMPANY ACFT AHEAD WAS STILL ON A DOGLEG TO FINAL. I'M FILING THIS ASAP UNDER THE GENERAL SAFETY CATEGORY. NO FAR'S WERE VIOLATED AND SAFETY WAS NEVER COMPROMISED, BUT WE CLRLY HAD A SIT WHERE THIS CTLR BECAME UPSET TO A POINT WHERE HIS PROFESSIONALISM BROKE DOWN. THERE ARE MANY TECHNIQUES FOR DSCNT AND OUR CHOICE MUST BE TAILORED TO EACH INDIVIDUAL SIT. APPROPRIATELY, OUR NEW COCKPIT PROCS STRESS COM OF THE PLAN BTWN THE PF AND PM. MY EXPERIENCE WITH THIS FLT SHOWS THAT THERE ARE TIMES WHEN BRINGING THE CTLR INTO THAT LOOP MIGHT BE HELPFUL AS WELL. WHILE I BELIEVE THIS APCH CTLR'S REACTIONS WERE UNUSUAL, LETTING HIM KNOW WE WERE SLOWING TO COMPLY WITH HIS CLRNC MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS ISSUING AN ALTERNATIVE DIRECTION THAT WOULD HAVE BETTER FIT INTO THE BIG PICTURE AS HE SAW IT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 619220: THE FO (PF) STARTED DOWN AT IDLE AND SPD BRAKES. HE DECIDED THAT CONFIGN WOULD NOT WORK. HE STATED HE WOULD DIRTY UP TO FLAPS 15 DEGS AND SLOW TO HELP THE DSCNT. WE SLOWED TO 160 KTS INDICATED. WE CONTINUED INBOUND. AT APPROX 15 DME, WE WERE STILL VERY HIGH. THE FO WENT TO FLAPS 30 DEGS AND SLOWED TO 140 KTS. 1 MI FROM THE FINAL APCH FIX, THE CTLR SAID HE WAS GOING TO PULL US OUT AND RE-SEQUENCE US. WE WENT FROM 10 MINS EARLY TO 5 MINS LATE. WE CAN DEBATE THE MERITS OF HOW TO DSND, IE, MAYBE GEAR DOWN AND 250 KTS, BUT I HAVE NEVER BEEN VERBALLY BELITTLED BY A CTLR BEFORE. I FEEL THAT PULLING US OUT AT THE FINAL APCH FIX TO ALLOW OTHER ACFT TO PROCEED AHEAD OF US WAS AN ACT OF RETALIATION FOR CAUSING HIS FLOW TO BE INTERRUPTED. THIS WHOLE EPISODE WAS UNPROFESSIONAL AND UNCALLED FOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.