Narrative:

On taxi out, ATC gave us a complete route change including a new departure. The departure changed from the logan departure to the wylyy departure. We pulled over on a taxiway to confirm new route and change FMC route. I read the route to PIC and reconfirmed everything with ground control. Holding short, we had to realign the IRU's per message, and as we were doing so, tower tried to get us off as soon as possible. We said we had to realign IRU's, then they said if a logan departure would help, we can take off immediately. Takeoff clearance was given and cancelled, then told into position and hold. This is an example of how fast things were happening. On the runway, PIC said it will be inay at 400 ft. I ordered that. Somewhere in the confusion, and possibly due to the fact that the only departure that comes up in the FMC, is the wylyy departure (apparently the wylyy was the only departure on the screen, but did not have 'act' next to it, as in activated), it led us to believe in the confusion that the wylyy was activated, but it obviously was not. When inay was selected, it caused us to turn southwest directly to lucas, instead of the correct west bearing outbound. Tower said nothing and handed us off to departure control. Departure control immediately said we were on the wrong departure and turned us west. I rogered the wylyy departure was our departure but they said that it is outbound west before turning south. They said it was not a problem since there were no inbounds to runway 33, but we need to 'check it out,' as to what happened. We confirmed apparently everything on the route on the pink highway except the departure in the confusion for takeoff and rework of the FMC. There was no raw data backup since it was an RNAV departure. Supplemental information from acn 620148: the first officer went to the FMC to find the departure. He found and acknowledged that he had the wylyy departure in the FMC. Unfortunately the first officer had failed to select and execute the SID. I was reviewing the SID and failed to catch the omission. We taxied to runway 27. Tower cleared us into position prior to our reaching the runway. I instructed the first officer to tell tower that we needed to hold in position for at least 1 min to update our position as required for the wylyy RNAV 5 SID. Bos tower immediately changed our departure to different SID for an immediate departure. We told tower that we would need time to reprogram our departure. Tower then reclred us for the wylyy RNAV 5, to taxi into position and hold, and to call when ready. We taxied into position and called for takeoff clearance. Departure control noted that we must be following a different SID, however, we had not caused a conflict with arrs and were to continue on vectors to course. I would like to say that I take full responsibility for the departure deviation. The airport was busy, we had a reroute, we had multiple departure clrncs, we had pressure from tower to depart, we were anxious to meet schedule. These are all normal problems and pressures of the job. However, there is one factor that I feel contributed to the deviation that should not be part of the daily line operations. That factor is the pairing of international pilots with domestic line operations in an attempt to maintain landing currency. I have flown many pairings with international pilots and find that the large majority of international pilots are very weak on normal procedures, cockpit management, and flying skills. This situation triples the workload of the domestic line captain. The captain has to do his job, follow-up and check every action of the first officer, and correct the omissions and deviations resulting from a lack of operational experience. I am not a check airman or instructor. I expect to have competent, qualified assistance in the cockpit. Such assistance provides shared workload and backup. I believe that air carrier's current methods of maintaining landing currency for their international pilots jeopardizes the safety of domestic operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HDG TRACK DEV ON DEP BY A B757-200 FLT CREW WHEN FAILING TO ACTIVATE THEIR FMS TO A NEW SID PRIOR TO TKOF FROM BOS, MA.

Narrative: ON TAXI OUT, ATC GAVE US A COMPLETE RTE CHANGE INCLUDING A NEW DEP. THE DEP CHANGED FROM THE LOGAN DEP TO THE WYLYY DEP. WE PULLED OVER ON A TXWY TO CONFIRM NEW RTE AND CHANGE FMC RTE. I READ THE RTE TO PIC AND RECONFIRMED EVERYTHING WITH GND CTL. HOLDING SHORT, WE HAD TO REALIGN THE IRU'S PER MESSAGE, AND AS WE WERE DOING SO, TWR TRIED TO GET US OFF ASAP. WE SAID WE HAD TO REALIGN IRU'S, THEN THEY SAID IF A LOGAN DEP WOULD HELP, WE CAN TAKE OFF IMMEDIATELY. TKOF CLRNC WAS GIVEN AND CANCELLED, THEN TOLD INTO POS AND HOLD. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW FAST THINGS WERE HAPPENING. ON THE RWY, PIC SAID IT WILL BE INAY AT 400 FT. I ORDERED THAT. SOMEWHERE IN THE CONFUSION, AND POSSIBLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE ONLY DEP THAT COMES UP IN THE FMC, IS THE WYLYY DEP (APPARENTLY THE WYLYY WAS THE ONLY DEP ON THE SCREEN, BUT DID NOT HAVE 'ACT' NEXT TO IT, AS IN ACTIVATED), IT LED US TO BELIEVE IN THE CONFUSION THAT THE WYLYY WAS ACTIVATED, BUT IT OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT. WHEN INAY WAS SELECTED, IT CAUSED US TO TURN SW DIRECTLY TO LUCAS, INSTEAD OF THE CORRECT W BEARING OUTBOUND. TWR SAID NOTHING AND HANDED US OFF TO DEP CTL. DEP CTL IMMEDIATELY SAID WE WERE ON THE WRONG DEP AND TURNED US W. I ROGERED THE WYLYY DEP WAS OUR DEP BUT THEY SAID THAT IT IS OUTBOUND W BEFORE TURNING S. THEY SAID IT WAS NOT A PROB SINCE THERE WERE NO INBOUNDS TO RWY 33, BUT WE NEED TO 'CHK IT OUT,' AS TO WHAT HAPPENED. WE CONFIRMED APPARENTLY EVERYTHING ON THE RTE ON THE PINK HWY EXCEPT THE DEP IN THE CONFUSION FOR TKOF AND REWORK OF THE FMC. THERE WAS NO RAW DATA BACKUP SINCE IT WAS AN RNAV DEP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 620148: THE FO WENT TO THE FMC TO FIND THE DEP. HE FOUND AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD THE WYLYY DEP IN THE FMC. UNFORTUNATELY THE FO HAD FAILED TO SELECT AND EXECUTE THE SID. I WAS REVIEWING THE SID AND FAILED TO CATCH THE OMISSION. WE TAXIED TO RWY 27. TWR CLRED US INTO POS PRIOR TO OUR REACHING THE RWY. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO TELL TWR THAT WE NEEDED TO HOLD IN POS FOR AT LEAST 1 MIN TO UPDATE OUR POS AS REQUIRED FOR THE WYLYY RNAV 5 SID. BOS TWR IMMEDIATELY CHANGED OUR DEP TO DIFFERENT SID FOR AN IMMEDIATE DEP. WE TOLD TWR THAT WE WOULD NEED TIME TO REPROGRAM OUR DEP. TWR THEN RECLRED US FOR THE WYLYY RNAV 5, TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD, AND TO CALL WHEN READY. WE TAXIED INTO POS AND CALLED FOR TKOF CLRNC. DEP CTL NOTED THAT WE MUST BE FOLLOWING A DIFFERENT SID, HOWEVER, WE HAD NOT CAUSED A CONFLICT WITH ARRS AND WERE TO CONTINUE ON VECTORS TO COURSE. I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEP DEV. THE ARPT WAS BUSY, WE HAD A REROUTE, WE HAD MULTIPLE DEP CLRNCS, WE HAD PRESSURE FROM TWR TO DEPART, WE WERE ANXIOUS TO MEET SCHEDULE. THESE ARE ALL NORMAL PROBS AND PRESSURES OF THE JOB. HOWEVER, THERE IS ONE FACTOR THAT I FEEL CONTRIBUTED TO THE DEV THAT SHOULD NOT BE PART OF THE DAILY LINE OPS. THAT FACTOR IS THE PAIRING OF INTL PLTS WITH DOMESTIC LINE OPS IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN LNDG CURRENCY. I HAVE FLOWN MANY PAIRINGS WITH INTL PLTS AND FIND THAT THE LARGE MAJORITY OF INTL PLTS ARE VERY WEAK ON NORMAL PROCS, COCKPIT MGMNT, AND FLYING SKILLS. THIS SIT TRIPLES THE WORKLOAD OF THE DOMESTIC LINE CAPT. THE CAPT HAS TO DO HIS JOB, FOLLOW-UP AND CHK EVERY ACTION OF THE FO, AND CORRECT THE OMISSIONS AND DEVS RESULTING FROM A LACK OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE. I AM NOT A CHK AIRMAN OR INSTRUCTOR. I EXPECT TO HAVE COMPETENT, QUALIFIED ASSISTANCE IN THE COCKPIT. SUCH ASSISTANCE PROVIDES SHARED WORKLOAD AND BACKUP. I BELIEVE THAT ACR'S CURRENT METHODS OF MAINTAINING LNDG CURRENCY FOR THEIR INTL PLTS JEOPARDIZES THE SAFETY OF DOMESTIC OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.