Narrative:

High speed abort due to engine surging. Flight was cleared for takeoff. Captain applied power and pushed toga. Autothrottle set reduced power by 80 KIAS at which time I (the first officer, PNF) called '80 KTS, thrust set.' I noticed right as I was making 80 KTS call, that the #2 engine N1 was increasing 1%-2% over the reduced takeoff power setting. I was concerned with the fact that I thought the autothrottle was incorrectly setting takeoff thrust, and that I knew the maximum power setting was only about 1% above reduced setting. I was ready to pull back the engine thrust, but the N1 immediately started decreasing. Continuing to monitor the engine, I began to realize that it was an engine problem, that it was surging (N1 fluctuating) and that the captain had noticed also. He immediately began the aborted takeoff procedure by pulling the throttles to idle. Monitoring the procedure, I noticed the speed brakes were still down and I reached over and pulled them up to the deployed position. Either the captain said something about telling tower, on I remembered myself and made a call to tower. Possibly the first call to tower was not heard, and then when they did hear they said 'what?' and I repeated the abort call (telling them runway 34R) and they acknowledged my call and told us to pull off and contact ground. We pulled off, taxied to the deice pad and I confirmed the brake energy and cooling time required. Captain followed hot brakes procedures (no parking brake, and shutdown #2 engine to reduce brake requirements). We contacted operations for a gate, maintenance and dispatch for coordination. Subsequently taxied to gate uneventfully.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 FLT CREW ABORT TKOF NOTICING ENG #2 N1 FLUCTUATIONS AT DEN.

Narrative: HIGH SPD ABORT DUE TO ENG SURGING. FLT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. CAPT APPLIED PWR AND PUSHED TOGA. AUTOTHROTTLE SET REDUCED PWR BY 80 KIAS AT WHICH TIME I (THE FO, PNF) CALLED '80 KTS, THRUST SET.' I NOTICED RIGHT AS I WAS MAKING 80 KTS CALL, THAT THE #2 ENG N1 WAS INCREASING 1%-2% OVER THE REDUCED TKOF PWR SETTING. I WAS CONCERNED WITH THE FACT THAT I THOUGHT THE AUTOTHROTTLE WAS INCORRECTLY SETTING TKOF THRUST, AND THAT I KNEW THE MAX PWR SETTING WAS ONLY ABOUT 1% ABOVE REDUCED SETTING. I WAS READY TO PULL BACK THE ENG THRUST, BUT THE N1 IMMEDIATELY STARTED DECREASING. CONTINUING TO MONITOR THE ENG, I BEGAN TO REALIZE THAT IT WAS AN ENG PROB, THAT IT WAS SURGING (N1 FLUCTUATING) AND THAT THE CAPT HAD NOTICED ALSO. HE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN THE ABORTED TKOF PROC BY PULLING THE THROTTLES TO IDLE. MONITORING THE PROC, I NOTICED THE SPD BRAKES WERE STILL DOWN AND I REACHED OVER AND PULLED THEM UP TO THE DEPLOYED POS. EITHER THE CAPT SAID SOMETHING ABOUT TELLING TWR, ON I REMEMBERED MYSELF AND MADE A CALL TO TWR. POSSIBLY THE FIRST CALL TO TWR WAS NOT HEARD, AND THEN WHEN THEY DID HEAR THEY SAID 'WHAT?' AND I REPEATED THE ABORT CALL (TELLING THEM RWY 34R) AND THEY ACKNOWLEDGED MY CALL AND TOLD US TO PULL OFF AND CONTACT GND. WE PULLED OFF, TAXIED TO THE DEICE PAD AND I CONFIRMED THE BRAKE ENERGY AND COOLING TIME REQUIRED. CAPT FOLLOWED HOT BRAKES PROCS (NO PARKING BRAKE, AND SHUTDOWN #2 ENG TO REDUCE BRAKE REQUIREMENTS). WE CONTACTED OPS FOR A GATE, MAINT AND DISPATCH FOR COORD. SUBSEQUENTLY TAXIED TO GATE UNEVENTFULLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.