Narrative:

I went down to operations in ZZZ and checked my paperwork for the trip to sea. I noticed that no alternate airports were listed due to the fact that it was clear and forecasted to remain that way for the remainder of the day. My dispatcher added an extra 1200 pounds. Tfr's in the seattle area were due to take effect later in the day but did not warrant to add more fuel. I agreed with his numbers and signed the release for 17800 pounds of fuel which was the minimum for this flight. After running the 'after start checklist,' we ran the 'taxi checklist.' on the 'recall' item, the l-hand pack light illuminated. We ran the abnormal checklist and came to the conclusion that we probably had a controller failure. Sna ground control, by this time, wanted us to move to accommodate other aircraft into their gates. We proceeded to the southern part of the field to work on a resolution while staying out of everyone's way. We called maintenance control and told them of our problem. They confirmed our suspicion and asked that we do an en route MEL with MEL 21-32 l-hand pack primary controller inoperative. I agreed with their judgement and proceeded with the procedure. While I was talking to maintenance control, ground control told us to contact clearance delivery because we had a new routing. After being done with the corrective action in the logbook and getting an amended release, my first officer and I both listened to the new routing from clearance delivery. The clearance was: channel 1 rzs transition J-88 sns direct btg the OLM5 to sea. I called back dispatch, read him the new routing and asked to verify that we had sufficient fuel for this routing. Dispatch came back to us, saying that we were within a couple hundred pounds of the initial routing and that we were good to go. We took off and proceeded to climb straight to FL350 since we had the performance parameters to safely do it. Once up there, lax asked us if we could speed up. We told them that we were unable. My arrival fuel in sea on the FMC was showing 3.7 and I did not want to burn any more fuel than I had to. We put the abeam points of ducke and lmt on our new route along with the winds at these points to have a better picture of our arrival fuel in sea. Between rbl and lmt, I sent an ACARS message to dispatch asking if we could expect ATC delays into sea and that the FMC was showing 3.2 on the arrival fuel. A few mins went by and dispatch replied that he had talked to tmu and that they (tmu) would 'take care of us.' I do not know this acronym but reasoned that it must be ATC. My first officer and I felt pretty confident that all the proper auths had been made aware of our situation and that we would be given priority handling. My assumption was incorrect. Abeam roseburg VOR, ATC asked that we descend to FL310 for traffic. We told them that we were unable due to our fuel burn. We remained at FL350. Abeam sle, ATC gave us a 30 degree vector to the left. Shortly after that request, I saw an A320 pass us from left to right at FL310. I asked ATC how long we could expect to be on this vector. He replied 2-3 mins. A min went by and we requested a heading back to btg now and that we were declaring minimum fuel. He asked if we were declaring an emergency. I told him no but if we kept going on this vector any longer, I would be forced to. He then cleared us directly to btg. A little while later, center gave us a clearance to cross btg at FL240. We complied with the clearance and put the new parameters in the FMC. The current winds were stronger than what the flight plan showed and by accepting this clearance I felt it would help expedite our flight and was still convinced that ATC would give us some sort of priority. As you have read in the text above, ATC was made aware of our sits multiple times and via different channels. I had no reason to believe they would not give us preferential treatment. Now the FMC showed 2.4 on the arrival fuel. We sent an ACARS message to dispatch with that information. We did not get a reply. After btg, we were cleared to 12000 ft. As we approached olm we were told to slow to 250 KTS. A dash 8-200 was slightly ahead of us at 10000 ft and company aircraft a few mi ahead of him at 12000 ft. Considering our fuel situation and that we were probably going to be behind these 2 airplanes at the very least, we declared an emergency and requested an immediate heading towards lorie intersection. At this point, it became very clear ATC was not going to provide any preferential treatment to this aircraft and crew and that I had to exercise this emergency authority/authorized. Approach control cleared us directly to the airport initially but then gave us a 030 degree heading. Approach control cleared us for runway 34R and requested remaining fuel and the number of souls on board. At no time did we request the fire trucks. ATC took it upon itself to call them for our arrival. The landing was uneventful and we taxied on our own to our gate. We told ground control that we did not require any further assistance and that the fire trucks did not need to follow us. We shut the electric hydraulic pumps off per their limitations once off the runway. Once at the gate, a firefighter, in full dress, came up to the cockpit to ask what was the nature of our emergency. I told him and he seemed somewhat puzzled and then left. Once everyone had cleared the airplane I gathered the flight attendants and gave them a quick debriefing of the event. The final fuel at the gate was 3.0. It seems to me that the information, regarding our fuel status, was never sent forward to the appropriate ATC sectors. Even the firefighters were not aware of the cause of the emergency. I feel that we did everything we could to alert the proper auths well in advance. It seems that a lack of good communication at the FAA is the culprit in this situation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following situation: it was interesting to note that the reporter had later talked with the dispatcher who said he had talked with ZSE controller in the traffic management section and had been assured of no delay situation for the flight. Reporter had mentioned to ATC several times, abeam rbl, rbg and salem, that the fuel burn was a concern and no delays could be taken. At the gate in sea the TRACON supervisor talked with PIC and left after accepting the scenario. Later in the week the reporter had a full debrief with the local poi and a company union safety representative. Poi advised them both that unless the flight declares an emergency, no minimum fuel advisory was going to be honored. Both pilots were concerned with this remark. Union representative said he was going to take this issue to the union headquarters and on to washington, dc, for clarification. Reporter agreed with the analyst that when fuel burn and fuel remaining is a concern, that every frequency change would require a new request for minimum fuel handling. Reporter felt that ATC intrafac and interfacility coordination was sadly lacking.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMER DECLARED AFTER A B737-400 PIC MAKES SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR PRIORITY HANDLING, STATING MINIMUM FUEL AS REASON WHEN S OF AND LNDG AT SEA.

Narrative: I WENT DOWN TO OPS IN ZZZ AND CHKED MY PAPERWORK FOR THE TRIP TO SEA. I NOTICED THAT NO ALTERNATE ARPTS WERE LISTED DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT WAS CLR AND FORECASTED TO REMAIN THAT WAY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY. MY DISPATCHER ADDED AN EXTRA 1200 LBS. TFR'S IN THE SEATTLE AREA WERE DUE TO TAKE EFFECT LATER IN THE DAY BUT DID NOT WARRANT TO ADD MORE FUEL. I AGREED WITH HIS NUMBERS AND SIGNED THE RELEASE FOR 17800 LBS OF FUEL WHICH WAS THE MINIMUM FOR THIS FLT. AFTER RUNNING THE 'AFTER START CHKLIST,' WE RAN THE 'TAXI CHKLIST.' ON THE 'RECALL' ITEM, THE L-HAND PACK LIGHT ILLUMINATED. WE RAN THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST AND CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE PROBABLY HAD A CTLR FAILURE. SNA GND CTL, BY THIS TIME, WANTED US TO MOVE TO ACCOMMODATE OTHER ACFT INTO THEIR GATES. WE PROCEEDED TO THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE FIELD TO WORK ON A RESOLUTION WHILE STAYING OUT OF EVERYONE'S WAY. WE CALLED MAINT CTL AND TOLD THEM OF OUR PROB. THEY CONFIRMED OUR SUSPICION AND ASKED THAT WE DO AN ENRTE MEL WITH MEL 21-32 L-HAND PACK PRIMARY CTLR INOP. I AGREED WITH THEIR JUDGEMENT AND PROCEEDED WITH THE PROC. WHILE I WAS TALKING TO MAINT CTL, GND CTL TOLD US TO CONTACT CLRNC DELIVERY BECAUSE WE HAD A NEW ROUTING. AFTER BEING DONE WITH THE CORRECTIVE ACTION IN THE LOGBOOK AND GETTING AN AMENDED RELEASE, MY FO AND I BOTH LISTENED TO THE NEW ROUTING FROM CLRNC DELIVERY. THE CLRNC WAS: CHANNEL 1 RZS TRANSITION J-88 SNS DIRECT BTG THE OLM5 TO SEA. I CALLED BACK DISPATCH, READ HIM THE NEW ROUTING AND ASKED TO VERIFY THAT WE HAD SUFFICIENT FUEL FOR THIS ROUTING. DISPATCH CAME BACK TO US, SAYING THAT WE WERE WITHIN A COUPLE HUNDRED LBS OF THE INITIAL ROUTING AND THAT WE WERE GOOD TO GO. WE TOOK OFF AND PROCEEDED TO CLB STRAIGHT TO FL350 SINCE WE HAD THE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS TO SAFELY DO IT. ONCE UP THERE, LAX ASKED US IF WE COULD SPEED UP. WE TOLD THEM THAT WE WERE UNABLE. MY ARR FUEL IN SEA ON THE FMC WAS SHOWING 3.7 AND I DID NOT WANT TO BURN ANY MORE FUEL THAN I HAD TO. WE PUT THE ABEAM POINTS OF DUCKE AND LMT ON OUR NEW RTE ALONG WITH THE WINDS AT THESE POINTS TO HAVE A BETTER PICTURE OF OUR ARR FUEL IN SEA. BTWN RBL AND LMT, I SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH ASKING IF WE COULD EXPECT ATC DELAYS INTO SEA AND THAT THE FMC WAS SHOWING 3.2 ON THE ARR FUEL. A FEW MINS WENT BY AND DISPATCH REPLIED THAT HE HAD TALKED TO TMU AND THAT THEY (TMU) WOULD 'TAKE CARE OF US.' I DO NOT KNOW THIS ACRONYM BUT REASONED THAT IT MUST BE ATC. MY FO AND I FELT PRETTY CONFIDENT THAT ALL THE PROPER AUTHS HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF OUR SIT AND THAT WE WOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY HANDLING. MY ASSUMPTION WAS INCORRECT. ABEAM ROSEBURG VOR, ATC ASKED THAT WE DSND TO FL310 FOR TFC. WE TOLD THEM THAT WE WERE UNABLE DUE TO OUR FUEL BURN. WE REMAINED AT FL350. ABEAM SLE, ATC GAVE US A 30 DEG VECTOR TO THE L. SHORTLY AFTER THAT REQUEST, I SAW AN A320 PASS US FROM L TO R AT FL310. I ASKED ATC HOW LONG WE COULD EXPECT TO BE ON THIS VECTOR. HE REPLIED 2-3 MINS. A MIN WENT BY AND WE REQUESTED A HDG BACK TO BTG NOW AND THAT WE WERE DECLARING MINIMUM FUEL. HE ASKED IF WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER. I TOLD HIM NO BUT IF WE KEPT GOING ON THIS VECTOR ANY LONGER, I WOULD BE FORCED TO. HE THEN CLRED US DIRECTLY TO BTG. A LITTLE WHILE LATER, CTR GAVE US A CLRNC TO CROSS BTG AT FL240. WE COMPLIED WITH THE CLRNC AND PUT THE NEW PARAMETERS IN THE FMC. THE CURRENT WINDS WERE STRONGER THAN WHAT THE FLT PLAN SHOWED AND BY ACCEPTING THIS CLRNC I FELT IT WOULD HELP EXPEDITE OUR FLT AND WAS STILL CONVINCED THAT ATC WOULD GIVE US SOME SORT OF PRIORITY. AS YOU HAVE READ IN THE TEXT ABOVE, ATC WAS MADE AWARE OF OUR SITS MULTIPLE TIMES AND VIA DIFFERENT CHANNELS. I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THEY WOULD NOT GIVE US PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT. NOW THE FMC SHOWED 2.4 ON THE ARR FUEL. WE SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH WITH THAT INFO. WE DID NOT GET A REPLY. AFTER BTG, WE WERE CLRED TO 12000 FT. AS WE APCHED OLM WE WERE TOLD TO SLOW TO 250 KTS. A DASH 8-200 WAS SLIGHTLY AHEAD OF US AT 10000 FT AND COMPANY ACFT A FEW MI AHEAD OF HIM AT 12000 FT. CONSIDERING OUR FUEL SIT AND THAT WE WERE PROBABLY GOING TO BE BEHIND THESE 2 AIRPLANES AT THE VERY LEAST, WE DECLARED AN EMER AND REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE HDG TOWARDS LORIE INTXN. AT THIS POINT, IT BECAME VERY CLR ATC WAS NOT GOING TO PROVIDE ANY PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO THIS ACFT AND CREW AND THAT I HAD TO EXERCISE THIS EMER AUTH. APCH CTL CLRED US DIRECTLY TO THE ARPT INITIALLY BUT THEN GAVE US A 030 DEG HDG. APCH CTL CLRED US FOR RWY 34R AND REQUESTED REMAINING FUEL AND THE NUMBER OF SOULS ON BOARD. AT NO TIME DID WE REQUEST THE FIRE TRUCKS. ATC TOOK IT UPON ITSELF TO CALL THEM FOR OUR ARR. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL AND WE TAXIED ON OUR OWN TO OUR GATE. WE TOLD GND CTL THAT WE DID NOT REQUIRE ANY FURTHER ASSISTANCE AND THAT THE FIRE TRUCKS DID NOT NEED TO FOLLOW US. WE SHUT THE ELECTRIC HYD PUMPS OFF PER THEIR LIMITATIONS ONCE OFF THE RWY. ONCE AT THE GATE, A FIREFIGHTER, IN FULL DRESS, CAME UP TO THE COCKPIT TO ASK WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF OUR EMER. I TOLD HIM AND HE SEEMED SOMEWHAT PUZZLED AND THEN LEFT. ONCE EVERYONE HAD CLRED THE AIRPLANE I GATHERED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND GAVE THEM A QUICK DEBRIEFING OF THE EVENT. THE FINAL FUEL AT THE GATE WAS 3.0. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE INFO, REGARDING OUR FUEL STATUS, WAS NEVER SENT FORWARD TO THE APPROPRIATE ATC SECTORS. EVEN THE FIREFIGHTERS WERE NOT AWARE OF THE CAUSE OF THE EMER. I FEEL THAT WE DID EVERYTHING WE COULD TO ALERT THE PROPER AUTHS WELL IN ADVANCE. IT SEEMS THAT A LACK OF GOOD COM AT THE FAA IS THE CULPRIT IN THIS SIT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING SIT: IT WAS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE RPTR HAD LATER TALKED WITH THE DISPATCHER WHO SAID HE HAD TALKED WITH ZSE CTLR IN THE TFC MGMNT SECTION AND HAD BEEN ASSURED OF NO DELAY SIT FOR THE FLT. RPTR HAD MENTIONED TO ATC SEVERAL TIMES, ABEAM RBL, RBG AND SALEM, THAT THE FUEL BURN WAS A CONCERN AND NO DELAYS COULD BE TAKEN. AT THE GATE IN SEA THE TRACON SUPVR TALKED WITH PIC AND LEFT AFTER ACCEPTING THE SCENARIO. LATER IN THE WK THE RPTR HAD A FULL DEBRIEF WITH THE LCL POI AND A COMPANY UNION SAFETY REPRESENTATIVE. POI ADVISED THEM BOTH THAT UNLESS THE FLT DECLARES AN EMER, NO MINIMUM FUEL ADVISORY WAS GOING TO BE HONORED. BOTH PLTS WERE CONCERNED WITH THIS REMARK. UNION REPRESENTATIVE SAID HE WAS GOING TO TAKE THIS ISSUE TO THE UNION HEADQUARTERS AND ON TO WASHINGTON, DC, FOR CLARIFICATION. RPTR AGREED WITH THE ANALYST THAT WHEN FUEL BURN AND FUEL REMAINING IS A CONCERN, THAT EVERY FREQ CHANGE WOULD REQUIRE A NEW REQUEST FOR MINIMUM FUEL HANDLING. RPTR FELT THAT ATC INTRAFAC AND INTERFAC COORD WAS SADLY LACKING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.