Narrative:

Aircraft #1, B737. At B-10, holding short of runway. Aircraft #2, citabria, at A-10, holding short of runway opposite side. Aircraft #3 (me), C172-sp, at A-9, holding short of runway. The runway in discussion is 10001 ft. B-10 is full length. A-10 is less approximately 2000 ft, and A-9 is approximately 4000 ft less than full length (estimated conservatively). I called tower #3, after the B737 and citabria, stating 'ready to go runway 31L, A-9, holding short.' we all held for the long landing lear who touched down approximately 1000 ft beyond (upwind) of me. I stated to my student that the winds were moving any wake turbulence concerns away from us. Then the B737 was instructed position and hold, the citabria was instructed position and hold and then I was instructed position and hold. I responded 'position and hold,' however, I rolled into position and then expedited my departure without a takeoff clearance. My VFR departure procedure consisted of an early left turn at 600 ft AGL. The grievance filed against me is regarding aircraft separation due to the lear that was exiting the active at A-1, a straight line distance greater than 5280 ft from my position and hold and taxiway A-1. Contributing factors: 1) situational pressure due to being positioned #1 of 3 aircraft on the active runway (in position and hold), one of which was a B737 that was holding short ready, long before my takeoff request. This contributed to my pre clearance launch. 2) I announced in the cockpit on the roll to position and hold the expected 'expedited departure clearance,' and believe that this callout in the cockpit dictated my expedited behavior. 3) the final and most important contributing factor may have been pilot fatigue. I proceeded with this flight early morning after a longer than expected night flight. I have no other explanation why I would make such a critical error. Pilot fatigue: 5 hours sleep, and the pressure of the morning flight. Exigency of the situation in the above mentioned active operating environment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 DEP FROM BFI INITIATES TKOF PRIOR TO ATC CLRNC AND PREVIOUS LNDG ACFT EXITING RWY.

Narrative: ACFT #1, B737. AT B-10, HOLDING SHORT OF RWY. ACFT #2, CITABRIA, AT A-10, HOLDING SHORT OF RWY OPPOSITE SIDE. ACFT #3 (ME), C172-SP, AT A-9, HOLDING SHORT OF RWY. THE RWY IN DISCUSSION IS 10001 FT. B-10 IS FULL LENGTH. A-10 IS LESS APPROX 2000 FT, AND A-9 IS APPROX 4000 FT LESS THAN FULL LENGTH (ESTIMATED CONSERVATIVELY). I CALLED TWR #3, AFTER THE B737 AND CITABRIA, STATING 'READY TO GO RWY 31L, A-9, HOLDING SHORT.' WE ALL HELD FOR THE LONG LNDG LEAR WHO TOUCHED DOWN APPROX 1000 FT BEYOND (UPWIND) OF ME. I STATED TO MY STUDENT THAT THE WINDS WERE MOVING ANY WAKE TURB CONCERNS AWAY FROM US. THEN THE B737 WAS INSTRUCTED POS AND HOLD, THE CITABRIA WAS INSTRUCTED POS AND HOLD AND THEN I WAS INSTRUCTED POS AND HOLD. I RESPONDED 'POS AND HOLD,' HOWEVER, I ROLLED INTO POS AND THEN EXPEDITED MY DEP WITHOUT A TKOF CLRNC. MY VFR DEP PROC CONSISTED OF AN EARLY L TURN AT 600 FT AGL. THE GRIEVANCE FILED AGAINST ME IS REGARDING ACFT SEPARATION DUE TO THE LEAR THAT WAS EXITING THE ACTIVE AT A-1, A STRAIGHT LINE DISTANCE GREATER THAN 5280 FT FROM MY POS AND HOLD AND TXWY A-1. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) SITUATIONAL PRESSURE DUE TO BEING POSITIONED #1 OF 3 ACFT ON THE ACTIVE RWY (IN POS AND HOLD), ONE OF WHICH WAS A B737 THAT WAS HOLDING SHORT READY, LONG BEFORE MY TKOF REQUEST. THIS CONTRIBUTED TO MY PRE CLRNC LAUNCH. 2) I ANNOUNCED IN THE COCKPIT ON THE ROLL TO POS AND HOLD THE EXPECTED 'EXPEDITED DEP CLRNC,' AND BELIEVE THAT THIS CALLOUT IN THE COCKPIT DICTATED MY EXPEDITED BEHAVIOR. 3) THE FINAL AND MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTING FACTOR MAY HAVE BEEN PLT FATIGUE. I PROCEEDED WITH THIS FLT EARLY MORNING AFTER A LONGER THAN EXPECTED NIGHT FLT. I HAVE NO OTHER EXPLANATION WHY I WOULD MAKE SUCH A CRITICAL ERROR. PLT FATIGUE: 5 HRS SLEEP, AND THE PRESSURE OF THE MORNING FLT. EXIGENCY OF THE SIT IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED ACTIVE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.