Narrative:

Our aircraft was configured for takeoff and 'before takeoff' checklist was completed as we were cleared for takeoff on runway 8 at abq. As the captain advanced the thrust levers to takeoff thrust, the yellow 'master caution' light illuminated. We both quickly scanned the cockpit for the associated system. No system indication was present. After approximately 2-3 seconds, with the light still illuminated, the captain called for the abort. As this occurred so quickly, and we were still really slow, I failed to check the exact ground speed. However, the captain noted it was 45 KTS. I did not touch the brakes and I felt the aircraft roll out with no brakes being applied by the captain until we reached taxiway A5, approximately 2000 ft down the runway. After informing ATC of the abort, we exited the runway and stopped the aircraft. I did not check the opc (operations manual) for brake cooling. However, the captain checked, and it revealed no brake cooling necessary. We scanned the cockpit for quite a while, dumbfounded as to what had caused this. The caution reset after showing nothing on the recall, still no system indication. During this time, we informed the flight attendants as to what had occurred, and we then both agreed to attempt another takeoff. We completed the before takeoff checklist again and were cleared for a second takeoff. The captain slowly advanced the thrust levers, the caution light did not illuminate. He then called for takeoff thrust and just as I was setting the power, the caution light illuminated again. We both scanned the entire cockpit, again no system illuminated. At this point, the captain called for an abort, airspeed at the time of the abort was approximately 100 KTS. The autobrakes stopped the aircraft quickly and we exited the runway. I notified ATC of the abort and the captain informed the flight attendants to remain seated. I referenced the opc (operations manual) for brake cooling recommendations. It stated that the fuse plugs will melt and not to approach the gate area for approximately 1 hour. The captain then called for the fire department to monitor the brakes. As we waited approximately 30 mins on the taxiway for the brakes to cool, the fuse plugs melted and all 4 tires deflated. As I look back on this, I understand that aborting for master caution above 80 KTS is not normal procedure. However, since this was occurring for the second time, I feel the captain's decision to abort the takeoff was justified. I also realize now that attempting a second takeoff for a non-specific caution that we were not able to identify, was not the appropriate decision -- even though I had no reservations about it at the time. In the future, given this situation, I will return the aircraft to the gate after the first attempt. Supplemental information from acn 621818: crash crew inspected for hot brakes and they confirmed the brakes were hot and that the airplane should not be moved. The crash crew SOP called for another brake inspection after 30 mins before the aircraft could be moved. After 30 mins, the crash crew inspected the brakes again and told us that the fuse plugs had melted and that all 4 tires were flat. Coordinated with operations, dispatch and maintenance control and the decision was made not to tow the airplane. Operations sent airstairs and buses, all passenger were deplaned. The aircraft was secured. Made logbook entries. Rejected takeoff parameters: speed 110 KIAS, weight 122800 pounds, OAT (outside air temperature) 26 degrees C, light winds.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B737-300 ABORT TKOF TWICE AT ABQ DUE TO MASTER CAUTION LIGHT WITH NO ACCOMPANYING SYS FAULT MESSAGE.

Narrative: OUR ACFT WAS CONFIGURED FOR TKOF AND 'BEFORE TKOF' CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AS WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 8 AT ABQ. AS THE CAPT ADVANCED THE THRUST LEVERS TO TKOF THRUST, THE YELLOW 'MASTER CAUTION' LIGHT ILLUMINATED. WE BOTH QUICKLY SCANNED THE COCKPIT FOR THE ASSOCIATED SYS. NO SYS INDICATION WAS PRESENT. AFTER APPROX 2-3 SECONDS, WITH THE LIGHT STILL ILLUMINATED, THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE ABORT. AS THIS OCCURRED SO QUICKLY, AND WE WERE STILL REALLY SLOW, I FAILED TO CHK THE EXACT GND SPD. HOWEVER, THE CAPT NOTED IT WAS 45 KTS. I DID NOT TOUCH THE BRAKES AND I FELT THE ACFT ROLL OUT WITH NO BRAKES BEING APPLIED BY THE CAPT UNTIL WE REACHED TXWY A5, APPROX 2000 FT DOWN THE RWY. AFTER INFORMING ATC OF THE ABORT, WE EXITED THE RWY AND STOPPED THE ACFT. I DID NOT CHK THE OPC (OPS MANUAL) FOR BRAKE COOLING. HOWEVER, THE CAPT CHKED, AND IT REVEALED NO BRAKE COOLING NECESSARY. WE SCANNED THE COCKPIT FOR QUITE A WHILE, DUMBFOUNDED AS TO WHAT HAD CAUSED THIS. THE CAUTION RESET AFTER SHOWING NOTHING ON THE RECALL, STILL NO SYS INDICATION. DURING THIS TIME, WE INFORMED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AS TO WHAT HAD OCCURRED, AND WE THEN BOTH AGREED TO ATTEMPT ANOTHER TKOF. WE COMPLETED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AGAIN AND WERE CLRED FOR A SECOND TKOF. THE CAPT SLOWLY ADVANCED THE THRUST LEVERS, THE CAUTION LIGHT DID NOT ILLUMINATE. HE THEN CALLED FOR TKOF THRUST AND JUST AS I WAS SETTING THE PWR, THE CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED AGAIN. WE BOTH SCANNED THE ENTIRE COCKPIT, AGAIN NO SYS ILLUMINATED. AT THIS POINT, THE CAPT CALLED FOR AN ABORT, AIRSPD AT THE TIME OF THE ABORT WAS APPROX 100 KTS. THE AUTOBRAKES STOPPED THE ACFT QUICKLY AND WE EXITED THE RWY. I NOTIFIED ATC OF THE ABORT AND THE CAPT INFORMED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO REMAIN SEATED. I REFED THE OPC (OPS MANUAL) FOR BRAKE COOLING RECOMMENDATIONS. IT STATED THAT THE FUSE PLUGS WILL MELT AND NOT TO APCH THE GATE AREA FOR APPROX 1 HR. THE CAPT THEN CALLED FOR THE FIRE DEPT TO MONITOR THE BRAKES. AS WE WAITED APPROX 30 MINS ON THE TXWY FOR THE BRAKES TO COOL, THE FUSE PLUGS MELTED AND ALL 4 TIRES DEFLATED. AS I LOOK BACK ON THIS, I UNDERSTAND THAT ABORTING FOR MASTER CAUTION ABOVE 80 KTS IS NOT NORMAL PROC. HOWEVER, SINCE THIS WAS OCCURRING FOR THE SECOND TIME, I FEEL THE CAPT'S DECISION TO ABORT THE TKOF WAS JUSTIFIED. I ALSO REALIZE NOW THAT ATTEMPTING A SECOND TKOF FOR A NON-SPECIFIC CAUTION THAT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO IDENT, WAS NOT THE APPROPRIATE DECISION -- EVEN THOUGH I HAD NO RESERVATIONS ABOUT IT AT THE TIME. IN THE FUTURE, GIVEN THIS SIT, I WILL RETURN THE ACFT TO THE GATE AFTER THE FIRST ATTEMPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 621818: CRASH CREW INSPECTED FOR HOT BRAKES AND THEY CONFIRMED THE BRAKES WERE HOT AND THAT THE AIRPLANE SHOULD NOT BE MOVED. THE CRASH CREW SOP CALLED FOR ANOTHER BRAKE INSPECTION AFTER 30 MINS BEFORE THE ACFT COULD BE MOVED. AFTER 30 MINS, THE CRASH CREW INSPECTED THE BRAKES AGAIN AND TOLD US THAT THE FUSE PLUGS HAD MELTED AND THAT ALL 4 TIRES WERE FLAT. COORDINATED WITH OPS, DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL AND THE DECISION WAS MADE NOT TO TOW THE AIRPLANE. OPS SENT AIRSTAIRS AND BUSES, ALL PAX WERE DEPLANED. THE ACFT WAS SECURED. MADE LOGBOOK ENTRIES. RTO PARAMETERS: SPD 110 KIAS, WT 122800 LBS, OAT (OUTSIDE AIR TEMP) 26 DEGS C, LIGHT WINDS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.