Narrative:

On air carrier aircraft X (an airbus A319) I was approached by maintenance for an ok to close a panel that covers the overwing slide bottles. The mechanic stated that the panels were closed on another work card (the panels were already closed). I went ahead and gave the ok to close. At the gate the problem was discovered and corrected. Air carrier paperwork is redundant having several work cards issued on c-check to open and close panels as well as non-routines for the same items. Supplemental information from acn 623963: during 'C' check operations at a 121 station, a situation occurred that caused a safety problem. The safety lock out pins were left in the operating head of the inflation reservoirs during flight (revenue), leaving the over wing slides 'unarmed'. A common occurrence or practice is to complete a card and generate non routines to accomplish further work at a later date, which causes a paperwork mess and more confusion than is necessary later on. It seems that production control tries to take too many (short cuts) to get nowhere. My mistake was trusting a mechanic's word on what took place, when I personally should have asked to see the non routine. The problem was discovered as a result of a complaint from a passenger that noise was coming from around exit hatch (possible excessive air leak), while in flight. Mechanic discovered pins installed while researching noise problem. Callback conversation with reporter acn 623122 revealed the following information: the reporter stated the production management is to blame for this maintenance discrepancy. The reporter said in the interest of cutting paperwork on the 'C' checks, the production management has introduced a new policy of anything not finished on a job card leave the signoff block blank. The reporter stated the industry standard was always that any job not finished on the job card had a non routine write up to cover the work not accomplished. The reporter said this incident is the result of this new and unworkable policy and is most likely in violation of the company's own general maintenance procedures manual.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OVER WING ESCAPE SLIDE PRESSURE BOTTLES PINNED AND INOPERATIVE.

Narrative: ON ACR ACFT X (AN AIRBUS A319) I WAS APCHED BY MAINT FOR AN OK TO CLOSE A PANEL THAT COVERS THE OVERWING SLIDE BOTTLES. THE MECHANIC STATED THAT THE PANELS WERE CLOSED ON ANOTHER WORK CARD (THE PANELS WERE ALREADY CLOSED). I WENT AHEAD AND GAVE THE OK TO CLOSE. AT THE GATE THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED AND CORRECTED. ACR PAPERWORK IS REDUNDANT HAVING SEVERAL WORK CARDS ISSUED ON C-CHECK TO OPEN AND CLOSE PANELS AS WELL AS NON-ROUTINES FOR THE SAME ITEMS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 623963: DURING 'C' CHECK OPERATIONS AT A 121 STATION, A SIT OCCURRED THAT CAUSED A SAFETY PROB. THE SAFETY LOCK OUT PINS WERE LEFT IN THE OPERATING HEAD OF THE INFLATION RESERVOIRS DURING FLT (REVENUE), LEAVING THE OVER WING SLIDES 'UNARMED'. A COMMON OCCURRENCE OR PRACTICE IS TO COMPLETE A CARD AND GENERATE NON ROUTINES TO ACCOMPLISH FURTHER WORK AT A LATER DATE, WHICH CAUSES A PAPERWORK MESS AND MORE CONFUSION THAN IS NECESSARY LATER ON. IT SEEMS THAT PRODUCTION CTL TRIES TO TAKE TOO MANY (SHORT CUTS) TO GET NOWHERE. MY MISTAKE WAS TRUSTING A MECHANIC'S WORD ON WHAT TOOK PLACE, WHEN I PERSONALLY SHOULD HAVE ASKED TO SEE THE NON ROUTINE. THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF A COMPLAINT FROM A PAX THAT NOISE WAS COMING FROM AROUND EXIT HATCH (POSSIBLE EXCESSIVE AIR LEAK), WHILE IN FLT. MECHANIC DISCOVERED PINS INSTALLED WHILE RESEARCHING NOISE PROB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 623122 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT IS TO BLAME FOR THIS MAINT DISCREPANCY. THE RPTR SAID IN THE INTEREST OF CUTTING PAPERWORK ON THE 'C' CHECKS, THE PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT HAS INTRODUCED A NEW POLICY OF ANYTHING NOT FINISHED ON A JOB CARD LEAVE THE SIGNOFF BLOCK BLANK. THE RPTR STATED THE INDUSTRY STANDARD WAS ALWAYS THAT ANY JOB NOT FINISHED ON THE JOB CARD HAD A NON ROUTINE WRITE UP TO COVER THE WORK NOT ACCOMPLISHED. THE RPTR SAID THIS INCIDENT IS THE RESULT OF THIS NEW AND UNWORKABLE POLICY AND IS MOST LIKELY IN VIOLATION OF THE COMPANY'S OWN GENERAL MAINT PROCEDURES MANUAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.