Narrative:

Departed without performing all mandated procedures (checklists). Aircraft had not flown all day. In addition to procedures followed prior to every flight, company procedures require additional checks be performed prior to aircraft first flight of the day. This was the first flight of the day for the aircraft, but we did not perform first flight of the day checks. One item involved in these checks is a test of the fire warning and suppression system. If this check of fire warning and suppression system had been properly performed we would have noted a failure of the suppression system to test properly. The fire suppression system had been deactivated by maintenance, presumably in conjunction with maintenance procedures performed earlier. (None of the discrepancies in the maintenance log involved any fire system.) the fire suppression system had been deactivated by pulling (and collaring) all circuit breakers associated with the system. Testing of the fire warning and suppression is only done as a part of the first flight of the day checks. Omitting the first flight of the day checks (which were required to be done in this case) resulted in no test of the fire suppression system being performed. This resulted in operating an entire flight with no operable fire suppression system. The main factor was that this flight has a scheduled departure time of XI23 and it is rare to have the need for performing first flight of day checks at that time of day. (Not regular routine.) second most important factor was lack of communication. Normal flow of events usually results in captain performing first flight of day checks while first officer is performing exterior visual inspection (walkaround). After I completed walkaround I did not inquire of the captain if first flight of day checks had been completed in my absence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AT72 CAPT DID NOT CHK THE FIRE WARNING AND SUPPRESSION SYS AS INDICATED ON THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY CHKLIST. THERE WERE NO LOG ENTRIES REGARDING MAINT AND OR DEFERRAL OF ANY ASPECT OF THE ENG FIRE SUPPRESSION SYS.

Narrative: DEPARTED WITHOUT PERFORMING ALL MANDATED PROCS (CHKLISTS). ACFT HAD NOT FLOWN ALL DAY. IN ADDITION TO PROCS FOLLOWED PRIOR TO EVERY FLT, COMPANY PROCS REQUIRE ADDITIONAL CHKS BE PERFORMED PRIOR TO ACFT FIRST FLT OF THE DAY. THIS WAS THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY FOR THE ACFT, BUT WE DID NOT PERFORM FIRST FLT OF THE DAY CHKS. ONE ITEM INVOLVED IN THESE CHKS IS A TEST OF THE FIRE WARNING AND SUPPRESSION SYS. IF THIS CHK OF FIRE WARNING AND SUPPRESSION SYS HAD BEEN PROPERLY PERFORMED WE WOULD HAVE NOTED A FAILURE OF THE SUPPRESSION SYS TO TEST PROPERLY. THE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYS HAD BEEN DEACTIVATED BY MAINT, PRESUMABLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH MAINT PROCS PERFORMED EARLIER. (NONE OF THE DISCREPANCIES IN THE MAINT LOG INVOLVED ANY FIRE SYS.) THE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYS HAD BEEN DEACTIVATED BY PULLING (AND COLLARING) ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SYS. TESTING OF THE FIRE WARNING AND SUPPRESSION IS ONLY DONE AS A PART OF THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY CHKS. OMITTING THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY CHKS (WHICH WERE REQUIRED TO BE DONE IN THIS CASE) RESULTED IN NO TEST OF THE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYS BEING PERFORMED. THIS RESULTED IN OPERATING AN ENTIRE FLT WITH NO OPERABLE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYS. THE MAIN FACTOR WAS THAT THIS FLT HAS A SCHEDULED DEP TIME OF XI23 AND IT IS RARE TO HAVE THE NEED FOR PERFORMING FIRST FLT OF DAY CHKS AT THAT TIME OF DAY. (NOT REGULAR ROUTINE.) SECOND MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR WAS LACK OF COM. NORMAL FLOW OF EVENTS USUALLY RESULTS IN CAPT PERFORMING FIRST FLT OF DAY CHKS WHILE FO IS PERFORMING EXTERIOR VISUAL INSPECTION (WALKAROUND). AFTER I COMPLETED WALKAROUND I DID NOT INQUIRE OF THE CAPT IF FIRST FLT OF DAY CHKS HAD BEEN COMPLETED IN MY ABSENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.