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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 624611 |
Time | |
Date | 200407 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-500 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : maintenance |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | maintenance : technician |
ASRS Report | 624611 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other other : 1 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : scheduled maintenance performance deficiency : installation |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA Maintenance Human Performance Chart Or Publication Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
I received an escape slide which was removed from aircraft aft service position for time change. I noticed that the latch assembly had been removed and a new latch with new hardware was loose in the shipping box. The slide which replaced this one was in our shop earlier and received the cco (engineering change order, modification) with new hardware. It was found through follow up that when the slides were swapped out, our new hardware was removed from the serviceable slide and old hardware was installed on the serviceable slide. This left our slide with old parts and cco now circumvented, yet records will still show me as the one responsible for the airworthiness directive cco being complied with.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737 DOOR ESCAPE SLIDE WAS RECEIVED IN THE SLIDE SHOP WITH MODIFIED HARDWARE LOOSE IN THE CONTAINER. LINE TECHNICIANS REMOVED THE MODIFIED HARDWARE. HARDWARE WAS ADDED TO THE SLIDES PER AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE.
Narrative: I RECEIVED AN ESCAPE SLIDE WHICH WAS REMOVED FROM ACFT AFT SVC POS FOR TIME CHANGE. I NOTICED THAT THE LATCH ASSEMBLY HAD BEEN REMOVED AND A NEW LATCH WITH NEW HARDWARE WAS LOOSE IN THE SHIPPING BOX. THE SLIDE WHICH REPLACED THIS ONE WAS IN OUR SHOP EARLIER AND RECEIVED THE CCO (ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER, MODIFICATION) WITH NEW HARDWARE. IT WAS FOUND THROUGH FOLLOW UP THAT WHEN THE SLIDES WERE SWAPPED OUT, OUR NEW HARDWARE WAS REMOVED FROM THE SERVICEABLE SLIDE AND OLD HARDWARE WAS INSTALLED ON THE SERVICEABLE SLIDE. THIS LEFT OUR SLIDE WITH OLD PARTS AND CCO NOW CIRCUMVENTED, YET RECORDS WILL STILL SHOW ME AS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE CCO BEING COMPLIED WITH.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.