Narrative:

I was the captain on a raytheon beechcraft B200. We had been vectored onto the localizer course for runway 32 at stp under VFR conditions. The ILS approach was uneventful and within parameters. The first officer made the landing and on the rollout I assumed control of the aircraft. The local controller asked where we were parking and I responded, 'FBO X.' he informed me to make a left turn at the end and according to the local controller the tape indicated that he also told me to contact ground. I acknowledged 'left turn at the end.' we cleared the runway, accomplished the after landing checks, and both switched over to the ground frequency to monitor it. Note: we frequently land and depart from this airport, sometimes we are told to contact ground, monitor ground or stay with the tower, we started our day on this part 91 cpr operation from tlh with lndgs at ues and lse prior to stp. At these 2 previous airports we were told to monitor ground and/or stay with the tower. While taxiing on taxiway a parallel to runway 32 and monitoring ground towards the FBO both of us heard and noticed a king air coming out of FBO followed by a G2 with winglets or a G3. We both commented whether it would be coming out the same taxiway that we would need to enter, but it took a right turn and followed the preceding king air. Just at that point ground issued the following transmission: 'king air Y hold short runway 27.' the king air responded 'I'm taxiing to runway 32 and not near runway 27.' at this point both of us realized that the hold short instruction was directed to us, not aircraft Y. We found ourselves crossing runway 27 or possibly had already crossed it. As a matter of habit, I believe I did take a cursory look to the left prior to crossing runway 27. I do not remember seeing any aircraft. I am now sure that an aircraft was there. After crossing the runway and continuing on the taxiway, contact was then made between the ground controller and us, I don't know who called first. As we continued to taxi we looked back towards runway 27 and saw a high wing cessna departing runway 27. I assumed that it was the traffic for which the ground controller had issued the hold short instruction. As we came onto the ramp ground instructed us to call the tower when we got in. After deplaning the passenger and securing the aircraft I called the tower. I spoke with the local controller who said that he had instructed me to contact ground. I responded that I thought we were to monitor ground. In reviewing the incident I have come to the following conclusions. 1) that a habit has been developed by myself and other crew members to comply with monitoring ground frequency when told to do so. 2) we shall no longer monitor ground frequencys without making an initial contact stating who we are. 3) that if we had done #2, we would not have had the miscoms between contact and monitor ground. 4) and, in this case, the ground controller may have, when told to hold the king air, would have utilized the correct north number. In conclusion, in my estimation, runway incursions are not intentional, they are human factor errors. In this case, at least 2 errors occurred. If either one of which had not occurred -- we would have contacted ground or the ground controller would have said aircraft X rather than aircraft Y, this incident would not have occurred. It also would not have occurred if the FAA and airport sponsor had installed some form of visual holding signage at the intersection so that the local controller could electronically give holding instructions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE200 PLT HAD A RWY INCURSION AT STP.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT ON A RAYTHEON BEECHCRAFT B200. WE HAD BEEN VECTORED ONTO THE LOC COURSE FOR RWY 32 AT STP UNDER VFR CONDITIONS. THE ILS APCH WAS UNEVENTFUL AND WITHIN PARAMETERS. THE FO MADE THE LNDG AND ON THE ROLLOUT I ASSUMED CTL OF THE ACFT. THE LCL CTLR ASKED WHERE WE WERE PARKING AND I RESPONDED, 'FBO X.' HE INFORMED ME TO MAKE A L TURN AT THE END AND ACCORDING TO THE LCL CTLR THE TAPE INDICATED THAT HE ALSO TOLD ME TO CONTACT GND. I ACKNOWLEDGED 'L TURN AT THE END.' WE CLRED THE RWY, ACCOMPLISHED THE AFTER LNDG CHKS, AND BOTH SWITCHED OVER TO THE GND FREQ TO MONITOR IT. NOTE: WE FREQUENTLY LAND AND DEPART FROM THIS ARPT, SOMETIMES WE ARE TOLD TO CONTACT GND, MONITOR GND OR STAY WITH THE TWR, WE STARTED OUR DAY ON THIS PART 91 CPR OP FROM TLH WITH LNDGS AT UES AND LSE PRIOR TO STP. AT THESE 2 PREVIOUS ARPTS WE WERE TOLD TO MONITOR GND AND/OR STAY WITH THE TWR. WHILE TAXIING ON TXWY A PARALLEL TO RWY 32 AND MONITORING GND TOWARDS THE FBO BOTH OF US HEARD AND NOTICED A KING AIR COMING OUT OF FBO FOLLOWED BY A G2 WITH WINGLETS OR A G3. WE BOTH COMMENTED WHETHER IT WOULD BE COMING OUT THE SAME TXWY THAT WE WOULD NEED TO ENTER, BUT IT TOOK A R TURN AND FOLLOWED THE PRECEDING KING AIR. JUST AT THAT POINT GND ISSUED THE FOLLOWING XMISSION: 'KING AIR Y HOLD SHORT RWY 27.' THE KING AIR RESPONDED 'I'M TAXIING TO RWY 32 AND NOT NEAR RWY 27.' AT THIS POINT BOTH OF US REALIZED THAT THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION WAS DIRECTED TO US, NOT ACFT Y. WE FOUND OURSELVES XING RWY 27 OR POSSIBLY HAD ALREADY CROSSED IT. AS A MATTER OF HABIT, I BELIEVE I DID TAKE A CURSORY LOOK TO THE L PRIOR TO XING RWY 27. I DO NOT REMEMBER SEEING ANY ACFT. I AM NOW SURE THAT AN ACFT WAS THERE. AFTER XING THE RWY AND CONTINUING ON THE TXWY, CONTACT WAS THEN MADE BTWN THE GND CTLR AND US, I DON'T KNOW WHO CALLED FIRST. AS WE CONTINUED TO TAXI WE LOOKED BACK TOWARDS RWY 27 AND SAW A HIGH WING CESSNA DEPARTING RWY 27. I ASSUMED THAT IT WAS THE TFC FOR WHICH THE GND CTLR HAD ISSUED THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION. AS WE CAME ONTO THE RAMP GND INSTRUCTED US TO CALL THE TWR WHEN WE GOT IN. AFTER DEPLANING THE PAX AND SECURING THE ACFT I CALLED THE TWR. I SPOKE WITH THE LCL CTLR WHO SAID THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO CONTACT GND. I RESPONDED THAT I THOUGHT WE WERE TO MONITOR GND. IN REVIEWING THE INCIDENT I HAVE COME TO THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS. 1) THAT A HABIT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED BY MYSELF AND OTHER CREW MEMBERS TO COMPLY WITH MONITORING GND FREQ WHEN TOLD TO DO SO. 2) WE SHALL NO LONGER MONITOR GND FREQS WITHOUT MAKING AN INITIAL CONTACT STATING WHO WE ARE. 3) THAT IF WE HAD DONE #2, WE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE MISCOMS BTWN CONTACT AND MONITOR GND. 4) AND, IN THIS CASE, THE GND CTLR MAY HAVE, WHEN TOLD TO HOLD THE KING AIR, WOULD HAVE UTILIZED THE CORRECT N NUMBER. IN CONCLUSION, IN MY ESTIMATION, RWY INCURSIONS ARE NOT INTENTIONAL, THEY ARE HUMAN FACTOR ERRORS. IN THIS CASE, AT LEAST 2 ERRORS OCCURRED. IF EITHER ONE OF WHICH HAD NOT OCCURRED -- WE WOULD HAVE CONTACTED GND OR THE GND CTLR WOULD HAVE SAID ACFT X RATHER THAN ACFT Y, THIS INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. IT ALSO WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED IF THE FAA AND ARPT SPONSOR HAD INSTALLED SOME FORM OF VISUAL HOLDING SIGNAGE AT THE INTXN SO THAT THE LCL CTLR COULD ELECTRONICALLY GIVE HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.