Narrative:

My copilot and I had flown several approachs to runway 2 at ida and were completing another one. We were dealing with several issues as a crew: minor fatigue, traffic avoidance, improper anticipation of a clearance on my part, and massive changes to our cockpit flows, procedures and checklists. We had flown into ida before to runway 2 and were well aware of the area. We were descending for a visual approach to ida but were still quite high (approximately 10000 ft). As center talked with my first officer about cessna traffic, we could see on TCASII but not visually. As center cleared us for a visual approach, I had to work hard to get down to pattern altitude and configure for landing, all the while flying across and above our TCASII traffic. My first officer talked with tower, received a landing clearance, and continued to look for the cessna. Meanwhile, we both had our manuals out as we attempted to figure out our new procedures. As I was calling for the last portion of our landing checklist, ida tower called us, telling us tersely that he had cleared us to land on runway 20, not runway 2, and then cleared us to land on runway 2. After landing, I called the tower and learned the controller was sequencing the cessna in behind us for runway 20, that there was no conflict, and that he was very surprised to see us on short final for the wrong runway. Naturally I was just as surprised, and expressed my apologies! Our company issues many bulletins and revisions for our fom and flight standards manuals. Our pilots call this 'training by bulletin.' recently the company has issued 2 revisions (entire section changes) to its fom and 2 revisions to the fsm for my aircraft. All were effective around jul/xa/04. One fsm revision completely changed all cockpit flows and checklists. This captain with 4 yrs of dash 8 experience and my first officer with 2 yrs dash 8 flying were having trouble 'unlearning' our old procedures and instituting the new ones, especially as we had no training. Consequently we each had our fsm's out as we were learning the 'new way' on our first flight since the effective date of the change. Our struggle to relearn how to fly an airplane we had been flying for yrs diverted our attention from other matters, and rendered us less spatially aware. The company has a safety officer to whom pilots can theoretically report safety concerns with anonymity and immunity. I do not have faith in our program. I know of pilots who have reported fatigue inducing trips, only to receive counseling from management. Our safety officer publishes a safety hotline that has very little safety content, and lots of operational information. Fatigue inducing trips are seen as items of little consequence, and a culture of intimidation exists, with little advocacy from our named safety officer. I am hesitant to report the incident I am reporting on this form to our safety officer. My belief that training by bulletin is at the very least distracting (reference our mistake) and on a massive scale such as this, dangerous. Will probably elicit no response from our officer, and I may well receive punitive action from management.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF DH8 INADVERTENTLY MAKE APCH TO RWY 2 VICE RWY 20 AT IDA. THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT SIGNIFICANT DISTRS FROM NEWLY ACTIVATED COCKPIT PROCS, ALLEGEDLY WITHOUT BENEFIT OF TRAINING BY THE COMPANY, CONTRIBUTED TO THEIR ERROR.

Narrative: MY COPLT AND I HAD FLOWN SEVERAL APCHS TO RWY 2 AT IDA AND WERE COMPLETING ANOTHER ONE. WE WERE DEALING WITH SEVERAL ISSUES AS A CREW: MINOR FATIGUE, TFC AVOIDANCE, IMPROPER ANTICIPATION OF A CLRNC ON MY PART, AND MASSIVE CHANGES TO OUR COCKPIT FLOWS, PROCS AND CHKLISTS. WE HAD FLOWN INTO IDA BEFORE TO RWY 2 AND WERE WELL AWARE OF THE AREA. WE WERE DSNDING FOR A VISUAL APCH TO IDA BUT WERE STILL QUITE HIGH (APPROX 10000 FT). AS CTR TALKED WITH MY FO ABOUT CESSNA TFC, WE COULD SEE ON TCASII BUT NOT VISUALLY. AS CTR CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH, I HAD TO WORK HARD TO GET DOWN TO PATTERN ALT AND CONFIGURE FOR LNDG, ALL THE WHILE FLYING ACROSS AND ABOVE OUR TCASII TFC. MY FO TALKED WITH TWR, RECEIVED A LNDG CLRNC, AND CONTINUED TO LOOK FOR THE CESSNA. MEANWHILE, WE BOTH HAD OUR MANUALS OUT AS WE ATTEMPTED TO FIGURE OUT OUR NEW PROCS. AS I WAS CALLING FOR THE LAST PORTION OF OUR LNDG CHKLIST, IDA TWR CALLED US, TELLING US TERSELY THAT HE HAD CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 20, NOT RWY 2, AND THEN CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 2. AFTER LNDG, I CALLED THE TWR AND LEARNED THE CTLR WAS SEQUENCING THE CESSNA IN BEHIND US FOR RWY 20, THAT THERE WAS NO CONFLICT, AND THAT HE WAS VERY SURPRISED TO SEE US ON SHORT FINAL FOR THE WRONG RWY. NATURALLY I WAS JUST AS SURPRISED, AND EXPRESSED MY APOLOGIES! OUR COMPANY ISSUES MANY BULLETINS AND REVISIONS FOR OUR FOM AND FLT STANDARDS MANUALS. OUR PLTS CALL THIS 'TRAINING BY BULLETIN.' RECENTLY THE COMPANY HAS ISSUED 2 REVISIONS (ENTIRE SECTION CHANGES) TO ITS FOM AND 2 REVISIONS TO THE FSM FOR MY ACFT. ALL WERE EFFECTIVE AROUND JUL/XA/04. ONE FSM REVISION COMPLETELY CHANGED ALL COCKPIT FLOWS AND CHKLISTS. THIS CAPT WITH 4 YRS OF DASH 8 EXPERIENCE AND MY FO WITH 2 YRS DASH 8 FLYING WERE HAVING TROUBLE 'UNLEARNING' OUR OLD PROCS AND INSTITUTING THE NEW ONES, ESPECIALLY AS WE HAD NO TRAINING. CONSEQUENTLY WE EACH HAD OUR FSM'S OUT AS WE WERE LEARNING THE 'NEW WAY' ON OUR FIRST FLT SINCE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE CHANGE. OUR STRUGGLE TO RELEARN HOW TO FLY AN AIRPLANE WE HAD BEEN FLYING FOR YRS DIVERTED OUR ATTN FROM OTHER MATTERS, AND RENDERED US LESS SPATIALLY AWARE. THE COMPANY HAS A SAFETY OFFICER TO WHOM PLTS CAN THEORETICALLY RPT SAFETY CONCERNS WITH ANONYMITY AND IMMUNITY. I DO NOT HAVE FAITH IN OUR PROGRAM. I KNOW OF PLTS WHO HAVE RPTED FATIGUE INDUCING TRIPS, ONLY TO RECEIVE COUNSELING FROM MGMNT. OUR SAFETY OFFICER PUBLISHES A SAFETY HOTLINE THAT HAS VERY LITTLE SAFETY CONTENT, AND LOTS OF OPERATIONAL INFO. FATIGUE INDUCING TRIPS ARE SEEN AS ITEMS OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE, AND A CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION EXISTS, WITH LITTLE ADVOCACY FROM OUR NAMED SAFETY OFFICER. I AM HESITANT TO RPT THE INCIDENT I AM RPTING ON THIS FORM TO OUR SAFETY OFFICER. MY BELIEF THAT TRAINING BY BULLETIN IS AT THE VERY LEAST DISTRACTING (REF OUR MISTAKE) AND ON A MASSIVE SCALE SUCH AS THIS, DANGEROUS. WILL PROBABLY ELICIT NO RESPONSE FROM OUR OFFICER, AND I MAY WELL RECEIVE PUNITIVE ACTION FROM MGMNT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.