Narrative:

On jul/fri/04, we were departing bfl early in the morning on a flight bound to phx. For some reason, the captain commenced the engine start procedure without having read any of the 3 previous checklists (before start, clear to push/start above the line and clear to push/start below the line). At the same time he was starting the engines, he asked me to read all 3 checklists. We taxied to the runway and were cleared for takeoff. He was the PF and after he called 'adjust takeoff thrust,' I made the fine adjustment to the takeoff thrust setting and called 'thrust set' and later '80 KTS.' by this time my hands were off the throttle levers and he had not yet placed his hand on the throttles per SOP. I pointed to the levers with my left index and said 'your hand?' to which I obtained no response. By 100 KTS while scanning the engine and flight instruments, he still had both hands at the control wheel, so I said 'you are supposed to put your hand on the throttle levers' to which he answered, 'you do your job and don't tell me what to do, you are supposed to be watching the instruments.' by this time we were reaching 120-130 KTS and the throttle levers were unattended. I called V1, vr, and V2 and everything else thereafter and we ended the takeoff roll with nobody ever touching the thrust levers after the initial setting before 80 KTS. I did not want to argue about this since flying the airplane was the first priority, and so we continued our climb out. At approximately 17700 ft, the altimeter setting in the pfd started flashing and since he did not call 'FL180,' I called it. He ignored my call and kept quiet. A few seconds later, I insisted '29.92' and again he stayed quiet and turned his face left looking outside the left windshield. When I called the third time, 'altimeters 29.92' he answered 'I know' and did nothing else until a while after that when my altimeter showed passing FL230, only then he adjusted his to 29.92. Once we leveled off I wanted to know what this was all about and so I asked the captain. I told him that I had never seen a 'hands off the throttle' takeoff, and I needed to understand why he did it that way. All he answered was 'uhh, it's going to be a long month' since we were paired on our schedule for the rest of the month. I replied 'it doesn't have to, you can call it off or I can call it off.' he stayed quiet. The rest of this flight was silent. I was trying to understand what was going on and was confused while trying to find something that could have triggered this behavior by the captain. So, I stayed quiet because I did not want to make a bigger problem in-flight, and tried to concentrate on doing my job. I decided to wait until we were on the ground. After landing and deplaning the passenger, he stepped out of the cockpit, and I followed him out and asked him what he wanted to do. I said that I was trying to do my job the best I can and I considered it my duty to call out whatever I saw that was not normal, and I would as well welcome any observation from his part over my performance. I said he appeared to be a good guy and I was surprised at his reaction, and I would not have any problem to fly with him the rest of the month, but I needed the assurance that any time I saw something unusual, I would be heard and taken into consideration. I told him the importance of this for me was paramount. We had a short conversation and later he said 'it is going to be alright.' I remembered we even shook hands. The flts immediately after this one were uneventful, and at the beginning he tried to make me feel like I was taken into consideration in things like avoiding WX along the route even when he was the PF. He was quiet pretty much all the time, but that was ok, it is part of his personality, I thought, and that was fine. For some reason, little by little, things started to deteriorate, and little things started to show again. By the middle of the month, we were, for example, flying the buntr 1 arrival into phx following a B747 on the same arrival. Shortly after 'homr' position, we were given a vector to land on runway 26 and instructed to reduce the speed from 250 KTS to 210 KTS. We had the B747 in sight and we were told about his position. After about 30-40 seconds from this ATC command, we were still flying at 240 KTS, and the speed trend showed no variation, so I called his attention to this, 'he wants us 210 KTS.' his answer, 'I know' and did not do anything for the next several seconds until the next call from ATC was 'reduce speed to 170 KTS.' on the last day I flew with him, some things happened that compelled me to write this report. We were on a flight to phx leaving the gate at XA25Z. The arriving crew alerted us of bad WX along the route. The radar was showing echoes starting in between publication and ALS vors and along our route to gup. ATC told us about deviations taken by other aircraft along the route and cleared us to deviation at our own discretion. Every center controller along the route would give us a clearance to fly direct to a point along our route after we cleared the WX, and so it happened that ZAB cleared us direct to gup after we cleared the cumulo nimbus. I read back clearly 'roger, when clear of the WX, we are clear direct gup.' at this very time the captain line selected gup on the FMS keyboard and executed a direct track and, although this track showed the line right in the middle of a 3 cell line oriented perpendicular to our path, he changed the roll mode from heading to FMS. We were at this time about 90 mi wide and 8-10 mi deep, and embedded on it were 3 red cells with a diameter of about 5 mi each. I thought that when we would be closer, he (the PF) would deviation left or right, since either area was clear completely. He alternated the range on the mfd between 160-80 mi and never went below that range, even when the echoes were within 40 mi. At about this distance from the echoes, since he did not seem committed to change course, I asked him, 'are you going to go through that?' he calmly said 'yes.' I thought he knew what he was doing because he told me before he had been in the company 7 yrs (I, being relatively new on my 4TH month flying this crj) and since different radar on different airplanes operate slightly differently, I trusted his decision. We ended up with one of the worst shakes I have ever had. The ambient light went darker and the sound of the ice hitting the windshields and wind drafts were amazing. The speed and ivsi indications were all over the place and it lasted for about 40 seconds. There was ample room either left or right to avoid this because, again, there was nothing on the radar on either side and we had ATC clearance to maneuver at our discretion around this. Again, I considered prudent not to start a discussion until after landing. His explanation was 'I misjudged the cloud, I thought there was room to pass.' I must say, he never selected the mfd range below 80 mi to check if there was actually room. Anyway, I thought it was good that he realized his mistake and that it probably would not happen again. I flew the second leg and he flew the last leg of the 4 day trip. On that last leg, the 'hands off the throttle levers' takeoff scenario happened again. Off runway 25 at sba, a 6049 ft long runway. After adjusting the thrust, I called the speed to compare indicators, and at 100 KTS his hand was not there yet: V1 was 137 KTS and although I pointed my left finger to the levers and said 'your hand?' at 100 KTS, he never even reacted. After landing, I did the postflt walkaround and came back to inform that everything was ok, and before I could say anything again, the captain said 'bye.' I have filed an occurrence report at my company, directed to the vp of flight operations, and the vp of safety and regulatory compliance in accordance with my general operations manual. I also contacted the chairman of the pro-standards committee in the pilot union office, and finally sent a copy of this report to my domicile chief pilot. Unfortunately, I was not able to find a way to make communications and crew integration work with this captain. It is beyond my understanding what makes this person act like this and sadly I have to look for a way to step down from the cockpit and stop this situation on the ground before something regrettable happens in-flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO ON CRJ RPTS THAT HIS CAPT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH COMPANY SOP AND IS UNRESPONSIVE TO HIS ATTEMPTS TO ENCOURAGE COMPLIANCE.

Narrative: ON JUL/FRI/04, WE WERE DEPARTING BFL EARLY IN THE MORNING ON A FLT BOUND TO PHX. FOR SOME REASON, THE CAPT COMMENCED THE ENG START PROC WITHOUT HAVING READ ANY OF THE 3 PREVIOUS CHKLISTS (BEFORE START, CLR TO PUSH/START ABOVE THE LINE AND CLR TO PUSH/START BELOW THE LINE). AT THE SAME TIME HE WAS STARTING THE ENGS, HE ASKED ME TO READ ALL 3 CHKLISTS. WE TAXIED TO THE RWY AND WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. HE WAS THE PF AND AFTER HE CALLED 'ADJUST TKOF THRUST,' I MADE THE FINE ADJUSTMENT TO THE TKOF THRUST SETTING AND CALLED 'THRUST SET' AND LATER '80 KTS.' BY THIS TIME MY HANDS WERE OFF THE THROTTLE LEVERS AND HE HAD NOT YET PLACED HIS HAND ON THE THROTTLES PER SOP. I POINTED TO THE LEVERS WITH MY L INDEX AND SAID 'YOUR HAND?' TO WHICH I OBTAINED NO RESPONSE. BY 100 KTS WHILE SCANNING THE ENG AND FLT INSTS, HE STILL HAD BOTH HANDS AT THE CTL WHEEL, SO I SAID 'YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO PUT YOUR HAND ON THE THROTTLE LEVERS' TO WHICH HE ANSWERED, 'YOU DO YOUR JOB AND DON'T TELL ME WHAT TO DO, YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO BE WATCHING THE INSTS.' BY THIS TIME WE WERE REACHING 120-130 KTS AND THE THROTTLE LEVERS WERE UNATTENDED. I CALLED V1, VR, AND V2 AND EVERYTHING ELSE THEREAFTER AND WE ENDED THE TKOF ROLL WITH NOBODY EVER TOUCHING THE THRUST LEVERS AFTER THE INITIAL SETTING BEFORE 80 KTS. I DID NOT WANT TO ARGUE ABOUT THIS SINCE FLYING THE AIRPLANE WAS THE FIRST PRIORITY, AND SO WE CONTINUED OUR CLBOUT. AT APPROX 17700 FT, THE ALTIMETER SETTING IN THE PFD STARTED FLASHING AND SINCE HE DID NOT CALL 'FL180,' I CALLED IT. HE IGNORED MY CALL AND KEPT QUIET. A FEW SECONDS LATER, I INSISTED '29.92' AND AGAIN HE STAYED QUIET AND TURNED HIS FACE L LOOKING OUTSIDE THE L WINDSHIELD. WHEN I CALLED THE THIRD TIME, 'ALTIMETERS 29.92' HE ANSWERED 'I KNOW' AND DID NOTHING ELSE UNTIL A WHILE AFTER THAT WHEN MY ALTIMETER SHOWED PASSING FL230, ONLY THEN HE ADJUSTED HIS TO 29.92. ONCE WE LEVELED OFF I WANTED TO KNOW WHAT THIS WAS ALL ABOUT AND SO I ASKED THE CAPT. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD NEVER SEEN A 'HANDS OFF THE THROTTLE' TKOF, AND I NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND WHY HE DID IT THAT WAY. ALL HE ANSWERED WAS 'UHH, IT'S GOING TO BE A LONG MONTH' SINCE WE WERE PAIRED ON OUR SCHEDULE FOR THE REST OF THE MONTH. I REPLIED 'IT DOESN'T HAVE TO, YOU CAN CALL IT OFF OR I CAN CALL IT OFF.' HE STAYED QUIET. THE REST OF THIS FLT WAS SILENT. I WAS TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS GOING ON AND WAS CONFUSED WHILE TRYING TO FIND SOMETHING THAT COULD HAVE TRIGGERED THIS BEHAVIOR BY THE CAPT. SO, I STAYED QUIET BECAUSE I DID NOT WANT TO MAKE A BIGGER PROB INFLT, AND TRIED TO CONCENTRATE ON DOING MY JOB. I DECIDED TO WAIT UNTIL WE WERE ON THE GND. AFTER LNDG AND DEPLANING THE PAX, HE STEPPED OUT OF THE COCKPIT, AND I FOLLOWED HIM OUT AND ASKED HIM WHAT HE WANTED TO DO. I SAID THAT I WAS TRYING TO DO MY JOB THE BEST I CAN AND I CONSIDERED IT MY DUTY TO CALL OUT WHATEVER I SAW THAT WAS NOT NORMAL, AND I WOULD AS WELL WELCOME ANY OBSERVATION FROM HIS PART OVER MY PERFORMANCE. I SAID HE APPEARED TO BE A GOOD GUY AND I WAS SURPRISED AT HIS REACTION, AND I WOULD NOT HAVE ANY PROB TO FLY WITH HIM THE REST OF THE MONTH, BUT I NEEDED THE ASSURANCE THAT ANY TIME I SAW SOMETHING UNUSUAL, I WOULD BE HEARD AND TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. I TOLD HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS FOR ME WAS PARAMOUNT. WE HAD A SHORT CONVERSATION AND LATER HE SAID 'IT IS GOING TO BE ALRIGHT.' I REMEMBERED WE EVEN SHOOK HANDS. THE FLTS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS ONE WERE UNEVENTFUL, AND AT THE BEGINNING HE TRIED TO MAKE ME FEEL LIKE I WAS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN THINGS LIKE AVOIDING WX ALONG THE RTE EVEN WHEN HE WAS THE PF. HE WAS QUIET PRETTY MUCH ALL THE TIME, BUT THAT WAS OK, IT IS PART OF HIS PERSONALITY, I THOUGHT, AND THAT WAS FINE. FOR SOME REASON, LITTLE BY LITTLE, THINGS STARTED TO DETERIORATE, AND LITTLE THINGS STARTED TO SHOW AGAIN. BY THE MIDDLE OF THE MONTH, WE WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, FLYING THE BUNTR 1 ARR INTO PHX FOLLOWING A B747 ON THE SAME ARR. SHORTLY AFTER 'HOMR' POS, WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR TO LAND ON RWY 26 AND INSTRUCTED TO REDUCE THE SPD FROM 250 KTS TO 210 KTS. WE HAD THE B747 IN SIGHT AND WE WERE TOLD ABOUT HIS POS. AFTER ABOUT 30-40 SECONDS FROM THIS ATC COMMAND, WE WERE STILL FLYING AT 240 KTS, AND THE SPD TREND SHOWED NO VARIATION, SO I CALLED HIS ATTN TO THIS, 'HE WANTS US 210 KTS.' HIS ANSWER, 'I KNOW' AND DID NOT DO ANYTHING FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL SECONDS UNTIL THE NEXT CALL FROM ATC WAS 'REDUCE SPD TO 170 KTS.' ON THE LAST DAY I FLEW WITH HIM, SOME THINGS HAPPENED THAT COMPELLED ME TO WRITE THIS RPT. WE WERE ON A FLT TO PHX LEAVING THE GATE AT XA25Z. THE ARRIVING CREW ALERTED US OF BAD WX ALONG THE RTE. THE RADAR WAS SHOWING ECHOES STARTING IN BTWN PUB AND ALS VORS AND ALONG OUR RTE TO GUP. ATC TOLD US ABOUT DEVS TAKEN BY OTHER ACFT ALONG THE RTE AND CLRED US TO DEV AT OUR OWN DISCRETION. EVERY CTR CTLR ALONG THE RTE WOULD GIVE US A CLRNC TO FLY DIRECT TO A POINT ALONG OUR RTE AFTER WE CLRED THE WX, AND SO IT HAPPENED THAT ZAB CLRED US DIRECT TO GUP AFTER WE CLRED THE CUMULO NIMBUS. I READ BACK CLRLY 'ROGER, WHEN CLR OF THE WX, WE ARE CLR DIRECT GUP.' AT THIS VERY TIME THE CAPT LINE SELECTED GUP ON THE FMS KEYBOARD AND EXECUTED A DIRECT TRACK AND, ALTHOUGH THIS TRACK SHOWED THE LINE RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF A 3 CELL LINE ORIENTED PERPENDICULAR TO OUR PATH, HE CHANGED THE ROLL MODE FROM HDG TO FMS. WE WERE AT THIS TIME ABOUT 90 MI WIDE AND 8-10 MI DEEP, AND EMBEDDED ON IT WERE 3 RED CELLS WITH A DIAMETER OF ABOUT 5 MI EACH. I THOUGHT THAT WHEN WE WOULD BE CLOSER, HE (THE PF) WOULD DEV L OR R, SINCE EITHER AREA WAS CLR COMPLETELY. HE ALTERNATED THE RANGE ON THE MFD BTWN 160-80 MI AND NEVER WENT BELOW THAT RANGE, EVEN WHEN THE ECHOES WERE WITHIN 40 MI. AT ABOUT THIS DISTANCE FROM THE ECHOES, SINCE HE DID NOT SEEM COMMITTED TO CHANGE COURSE, I ASKED HIM, 'ARE YOU GOING TO GO THROUGH THAT?' HE CALMLY SAID 'YES.' I THOUGHT HE KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING BECAUSE HE TOLD ME BEFORE HE HAD BEEN IN THE COMPANY 7 YRS (I, BEING RELATIVELY NEW ON MY 4TH MONTH FLYING THIS CRJ) AND SINCE DIFFERENT RADAR ON DIFFERENT AIRPLANES OPERATE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENTLY, I TRUSTED HIS DECISION. WE ENDED UP WITH ONE OF THE WORST SHAKES I HAVE EVER HAD. THE AMBIENT LIGHT WENT DARKER AND THE SOUND OF THE ICE HITTING THE WINDSHIELDS AND WIND DRAFTS WERE AMAZING. THE SPD AND IVSI INDICATIONS WERE ALL OVER THE PLACE AND IT LASTED FOR ABOUT 40 SECONDS. THERE WAS AMPLE ROOM EITHER L OR R TO AVOID THIS BECAUSE, AGAIN, THERE WAS NOTHING ON THE RADAR ON EITHER SIDE AND WE HAD ATC CLRNC TO MANEUVER AT OUR DISCRETION AROUND THIS. AGAIN, I CONSIDERED PRUDENT NOT TO START A DISCUSSION UNTIL AFTER LNDG. HIS EXPLANATION WAS 'I MISJUDGED THE CLOUD, I THOUGHT THERE WAS ROOM TO PASS.' I MUST SAY, HE NEVER SELECTED THE MFD RANGE BELOW 80 MI TO CHK IF THERE WAS ACTUALLY ROOM. ANYWAY, I THOUGHT IT WAS GOOD THAT HE REALIZED HIS MISTAKE AND THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. I FLEW THE SECOND LEG AND HE FLEW THE LAST LEG OF THE 4 DAY TRIP. ON THAT LAST LEG, THE 'HANDS OFF THE THROTTLE LEVERS' TKOF SCENARIO HAPPENED AGAIN. OFF RWY 25 AT SBA, A 6049 FT LONG RWY. AFTER ADJUSTING THE THRUST, I CALLED THE SPD TO COMPARE INDICATORS, AND AT 100 KTS HIS HAND WAS NOT THERE YET: V1 WAS 137 KTS AND ALTHOUGH I POINTED MY L FINGER TO THE LEVERS AND SAID 'YOUR HAND?' AT 100 KTS, HE NEVER EVEN REACTED. AFTER LNDG, I DID THE POSTFLT WALKAROUND AND CAME BACK TO INFORM THAT EVERYTHING WAS OK, AND BEFORE I COULD SAY ANYTHING AGAIN, THE CAPT SAID 'BYE.' I HAVE FILED AN OCCURRENCE RPT AT MY COMPANY, DIRECTED TO THE VP OF FLT OPS, AND THE VP OF SAFETY AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY GENERAL OPS MANUAL. I ALSO CONTACTED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRO-STANDARDS COMMITTEE IN THE PLT UNION OFFICE, AND FINALLY SENT A COPY OF THIS RPT TO MY DOMICILE CHIEF PLT. UNFORTUNATELY, I WAS NOT ABLE TO FIND A WAY TO MAKE COMS AND CREW INTEGRATION WORK WITH THIS CAPT. IT IS BEYOND MY UNDERSTANDING WHAT MAKES THIS PERSON ACT LIKE THIS AND SADLY I HAVE TO LOOK FOR A WAY TO STEP DOWN FROM THE COCKPIT AND STOP THIS SIT ON THE GND BEFORE SOMETHING REGRETTABLE HAPPENS INFLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.