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Attributes | |
ACN | 625938 |
Time | |
Date | 200407 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lax.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B777-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : lax.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B747-400 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 129 |
Flight Phase | ground : holding |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 48 flight time total : 12500 flight time type : 775 |
ASRS Report | 625938 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 7500 flight time type : 2200 |
ASRS Report | 625934 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other controllerb other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Airport Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Situations | |
Airport | design : lax.airport procedure or policy : lax.airport |
Narrative:
We landed at lax on runway 25L without incident and because of congestion on earlier high-speed txwys, were asked to roll to the high speed at taxiway T. As we did so, we were cleared to cross runway 25R and to contact ground. We were starting to turn east on taxiway B but were instructed to take taxiway C. We then turned on taxiway C and were told to taxi eastbound to the gate. No other communication from tower such as hold short instructions, caution, give way, etc, other than clearance to taxi to the gate was received. As we approached international gates, we observed a foreign B747-400 and noticed that it wasn't in the blocks and appeared to be shut down and waiting for something. Both crew members observed that the spacing looked close, but since our nose was on the centerline of the taxiway and no other guidance was received by ground or other indications of clearance problems, we proceeded to taxi past the B747-400. When abeam the tail of the B-400, we felt a thump that we thought at first was like a pothole in the pavement. We proceeded to the gate. We were advised by ground to call tower upon arrival. We did so and were informed that our left wing made contact with the left winglet of the B747-400. All passenger disembarked normally with no problems. We observed through the jet bridge, a dent in the leading edge of the left wing of the B777 and were informed of the damage to the winglet of the B-400. Supplemental information from acn 625934: realizing that separation criteria were met by being on centerline and taking another look at what we felt was sufficient wingtip clearance, we proceeded on. After some time passed we felt a rumble that resembled the nose gear running over a rough spot in the taxiway. Callback conversation with reporter of acn 625938 revealed the following information: reporter advised that discussions with company pilot mgrs produced a reasonable suggestion to prevent further incidents in this area. The airport is clearly aware of the potential for collisions in this area as witnessed by several cautions on the airport page. Per those cautions, aircraft are not allowed to taxi into gate XXX but are required to stop at a point on the lead-in line that is angled toward taxiway C. The reporter feels this stop point is far enough into the gate to make it appear as though passage is 'close but possible' for aircraft on taxiway C. He suggests that a surer means of insuring aircraft safety would be to place the stop point on the lead-in line far enough back that it becomes obvious that passing would not be possible. Thus, even if ground control fails to advise caution or restr traffic on taxiway C to hold short until the gate XXX traffic advises 'chocks in,' an accident would not happen because the clearance would obviously be inadequate for passage and the taxiway C traffic would stop of its own volition.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B777-200 FLT CREW, THINKING CLRNC WAS GUARANTEED BY BEING ON CTRLINE OF TXWY C AT LAX, CONTACTS L WINGLET OF B747-400 WAITING TO PARK AT GATE.
Narrative: WE LANDED AT LAX ON RWY 25L WITHOUT INCIDENT AND BECAUSE OF CONGESTION ON EARLIER HIGH-SPD TXWYS, WERE ASKED TO ROLL TO THE HIGH SPD AT TXWY T. AS WE DID SO, WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 25R AND TO CONTACT GND. WE WERE STARTING TO TURN E ON TXWY B BUT WERE INSTRUCTED TO TAKE TXWY C. WE THEN TURNED ON TXWY C AND WERE TOLD TO TAXI EBOUND TO THE GATE. NO OTHER COM FROM TWR SUCH AS HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS, CAUTION, GIVE WAY, ETC, OTHER THAN CLRNC TO TAXI TO THE GATE WAS RECEIVED. AS WE APCHED INTL GATES, WE OBSERVED A FOREIGN B747-400 AND NOTICED THAT IT WASN'T IN THE BLOCKS AND APPEARED TO BE SHUT DOWN AND WAITING FOR SOMETHING. BOTH CREW MEMBERS OBSERVED THAT THE SPACING LOOKED CLOSE, BUT SINCE OUR NOSE WAS ON THE CTRLINE OF THE TXWY AND NO OTHER GUIDANCE WAS RECEIVED BY GND OR OTHER INDICATIONS OF CLRNC PROBS, WE PROCEEDED TO TAXI PAST THE B747-400. WHEN ABEAM THE TAIL OF THE B-400, WE FELT A THUMP THAT WE THOUGHT AT FIRST WAS LIKE A POTHOLE IN THE PAVEMENT. WE PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. WE WERE ADVISED BY GND TO CALL TWR UPON ARR. WE DID SO AND WERE INFORMED THAT OUR L WING MADE CONTACT WITH THE L WINGLET OF THE B747-400. ALL PAX DISEMBARKED NORMALLY WITH NO PROBS. WE OBSERVED THROUGH THE JET BRIDGE, A DENT IN THE LEADING EDGE OF THE L WING OF THE B777 AND WERE INFORMED OF THE DAMAGE TO THE WINGLET OF THE B-400. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 625934: REALIZING THAT SEPARATION CRITERIA WERE MET BY BEING ON CTRLINE AND TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT WHAT WE FELT WAS SUFFICIENT WINGTIP CLRNC, WE PROCEEDED ON. AFTER SOME TIME PASSED WE FELT A RUMBLE THAT RESEMBLED THE NOSE GEAR RUNNING OVER A ROUGH SPOT IN THE TXWY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF ACN 625938 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH COMPANY PLT MGRS PRODUCED A REASONABLE SUGGESTION TO PREVENT FURTHER INCIDENTS IN THIS AREA. THE ARPT IS CLRLY AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL FOR COLLISIONS IN THIS AREA AS WITNESSED BY SEVERAL CAUTIONS ON THE ARPT PAGE. PER THOSE CAUTIONS, ACFT ARE NOT ALLOWED TO TAXI INTO GATE XXX BUT ARE REQUIRED TO STOP AT A POINT ON THE LEAD-IN LINE THAT IS ANGLED TOWARD TXWY C. THE RPTR FEELS THIS STOP POINT IS FAR ENOUGH INTO THE GATE TO MAKE IT APPEAR AS THOUGH PASSAGE IS 'CLOSE BUT POSSIBLE' FOR ACFT ON TXWY C. HE SUGGESTS THAT A SURER MEANS OF INSURING ACFT SAFETY WOULD BE TO PLACE THE STOP POINT ON THE LEAD-IN LINE FAR ENOUGH BACK THAT IT BECOMES OBVIOUS THAT PASSING WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. THUS, EVEN IF GND CTL FAILS TO ADVISE CAUTION OR RESTR TFC ON TXWY C TO HOLD SHORT UNTIL THE GATE XXX TFC ADVISES 'CHOCKS IN,' AN ACCIDENT WOULD NOT HAPPEN BECAUSE THE CLRNC WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INADEQUATE FOR PASSAGE AND THE TXWY C TFC WOULD STOP OF ITS OWN VOLITION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.