Narrative:

The flight was cleared to land on runway 30 in lgb with no lahso instructions. Lahso operations are not authority/authorized for our flts. Before landing, I had consulted my lgb taxiway chart and had planned on a left turn off of the runway. I had not decided if we would use the full length or plan on a turnoff near the taxiway K/taxiway B runway 25R area. During rollout, the lgb tower told us to turn left or right onto taxiway K and to contact ground control. My copilot immediately acknowledged that we would make a left turn without first consulting me as to whether or not we could make the turnoff. At that point I began looking for the taxiway sign for taxiway I. I slowed the aircraft and began a left turn onto what turned out to be runway 25R, thinking that I was turning onto taxiway K. After realizing what I was doing, I began to tell my copilot to ask for permission to use runway 25R but the tower frequency became congested. I wanted to exit runway 25R as soon as possible and did so turning onto taxiway D. Upon reaching our parking spot the ground controller gave us a phone number to call due to a possible pilot deviation. During the landing rollout, when I was trying to locate the sign for taxiway K, I observed numerous sand bags and plastic blaze-orange barricades laying in close proximity to txwys B and K. There are 2 sand bags placed next to each taxiway light at that intersection. There are also dismantled blaze-orange barricades measuring approximately 12 inches by 6 ft lying within the 'island' areas around these intxns. I saw this construction equipment in this area during my decision making time. I also saw an obstruction across a taxiway, which turned out to be taxiway K, that appeared to be a series of metallic X's that were reflecting in the sunlight. These appeared to me at the time to resemble the tire shredders that are installed at different locations around the country. I was trying to decide why such a device would be installed at an airport even during construction activities. I wasn't sure why they were there, but I knew that I did not want to taxi my aircraft across them. I was thinking that the controller could not possibly mean for me to use that taxiway. Txwys B, K, and runway 25R are all in close proximity to one another in this area. These events and thought processes were all transpiring during the last stage of the landing rollout. After taxiing to our parking area I called the lgb tower on a cell phone. I told the person that I saw an obstruction across taxiway K and related what I had seen. He looked through his binoculars and stated that he saw no obstruction at that time. I later rode in a pickup truck to the intersection to see for myself what was in the intersection. The only plausible explanation for the 'tire shredders' that I saw were heat waves that were shimmering across the intersection. I perceived these to be some sort of obstruction and decided not to turn onto that intersection. I later learned that runway 30 is closed on the wkends and at night for construction purposes and the items I saw were indeed related to this work. The blaze-orange barricades lying on the ground are there to delineate electrical work that is being done. I later talked to the tower supervisor, and he stated that this area is a problem area for the lgb airport. He told me that the local controllers know of this area and there have been other airliners that have done exactly what I had done. I asked why this is not an airport 'hot spot' and he had no explanation. I also asked why there is nothing on the ATIS and he stated that they have a problem with pilots complaining about there already being too much information on the ATIS broadcast. Supplemental information from acn 627875: I was the first officer and the PNF on a flight from ord to lgb. The flight was a repositioning flight conducted under part 91. The aircraft was empty except for crew members and was light. After landing on runway 30 at lgb the tower controller instructed us to 'turn left or right on taxiway K, your discretion, ground control on 133.0.' because we were tentatively scheduled to park somewhere in the southwest corner of the airport I responded 'we will turn left on taxiway K, ground on 133.0.' I saw that the captain was drifting toward taxiway K and the aircraft was decelerating nicely to easily make the turnoff at taxiway K so I looked down to dial in 133.0 in the standby window of the #1 VHF communication radio. I felt the aircraft stop decelerating and looked up to see us passing the taxiway K exit off of runway 30. I don't know why the captain decided not to turn although there was some evidence of construction work like sandbags and barricades near the taxiway but the taxiway itself looked clear to me. I looked down again, this time to look on the airport diagram to find the next suitable exit off the runway when I felt the aircraft turning to the left. I immediately looked up to see the aircraft turning left onto runway 25R. I said 'this is a runway' assuming (perhaps mistakenly) that the captain didn't realize he was turning onto a runway. When he continued to turn and failed to stop, I immediately looked over my right shoulder to ensure no traffic was on approach to runway 25R or was actually on runway 25R. Seeing it was clear I reported that fact to him. Had he stopped at this point he would have fouled runway 25R and possibly runway 30 as well. The captain continued his left turn onto runway 25R and immediately onto taxiway D. When we were clear, I switched to ground control who cleared us to taxi sebound on taxiway D. They then gave us a local phone number to call regarding a pilot deviation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 LNDG LGB ON RWY 30 INSTRUCTED TO TURN OFF ON TXWY K, BUT CAPT FLYING BECAME CONFUSED AND TURNED OFF ON RWY 25R.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 30 IN LGB WITH NO LAHSO INSTRUCTIONS. LAHSO OPS ARE NOT AUTH FOR OUR FLTS. BEFORE LNDG, I HAD CONSULTED MY LGB TXWY CHART AND HAD PLANNED ON A L TURN OFF OF THE RWY. I HAD NOT DECIDED IF WE WOULD USE THE FULL LENGTH OR PLAN ON A TURNOFF NEAR THE TXWY K/TXWY B RWY 25R AREA. DURING ROLLOUT, THE LGB TWR TOLD US TO TURN L OR R ONTO TXWY K AND TO CONTACT GND CTL. MY COPLT IMMEDIATELY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE WOULD MAKE A L TURN WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING ME AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WE COULD MAKE THE TURNOFF. AT THAT POINT I BEGAN LOOKING FOR THE TXWY SIGN FOR TXWY I. I SLOWED THE ACFT AND BEGAN A L TURN ONTO WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE RWY 25R, THINKING THAT I WAS TURNING ONTO TXWY K. AFTER REALIZING WHAT I WAS DOING, I BEGAN TO TELL MY COPLT TO ASK FOR PERMISSION TO USE RWY 25R BUT THE TWR FREQ BECAME CONGESTED. I WANTED TO EXIT RWY 25R ASAP AND DID SO TURNING ONTO TXWY D. UPON REACHING OUR PARKING SPOT THE GND CTLR GAVE US A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL DUE TO A POSSIBLE PLTDEV. DURING THE LNDG ROLLOUT, WHEN I WAS TRYING TO LOCATE THE SIGN FOR TXWY K, I OBSERVED NUMEROUS SAND BAGS AND PLASTIC BLAZE-ORANGE BARRICADES LAYING IN CLOSE PROX TO TXWYS B AND K. THERE ARE 2 SAND BAGS PLACED NEXT TO EACH TXWY LIGHT AT THAT INTXN. THERE ARE ALSO DISMANTLED BLAZE-ORANGE BARRICADES MEASURING APPROX 12 INCHES BY 6 FT LYING WITHIN THE 'ISLAND' AREAS AROUND THESE INTXNS. I SAW THIS CONSTRUCTION EQUIP IN THIS AREA DURING MY DECISION MAKING TIME. I ALSO SAW AN OBSTRUCTION ACROSS A TXWY, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE TXWY K, THAT APPEARED TO BE A SERIES OF METALLIC X'S THAT WERE REFLECTING IN THE SUNLIGHT. THESE APPEARED TO ME AT THE TIME TO RESEMBLE THE TIRE SHREDDERS THAT ARE INSTALLED AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS AROUND THE COUNTRY. I WAS TRYING TO DECIDE WHY SUCH A DEVICE WOULD BE INSTALLED AT AN ARPT EVEN DURING CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES. I WASN'T SURE WHY THEY WERE THERE, BUT I KNEW THAT I DID NOT WANT TO TAXI MY ACFT ACROSS THEM. I WAS THINKING THAT THE CTLR COULD NOT POSSIBLY MEAN FOR ME TO USE THAT TXWY. TXWYS B, K, AND RWY 25R ARE ALL IN CLOSE PROX TO ONE ANOTHER IN THIS AREA. THESE EVENTS AND THOUGHT PROCESSES WERE ALL TRANSPIRING DURING THE LAST STAGE OF THE LNDG ROLLOUT. AFTER TAXIING TO OUR PARKING AREA I CALLED THE LGB TWR ON A CELL PHONE. I TOLD THE PERSON THAT I SAW AN OBSTRUCTION ACROSS TXWY K AND RELATED WHAT I HAD SEEN. HE LOOKED THROUGH HIS BINOCULARS AND STATED THAT HE SAW NO OBSTRUCTION AT THAT TIME. I LATER RODE IN A PICKUP TRUCK TO THE INTXN TO SEE FOR MYSELF WHAT WAS IN THE INTXN. THE ONLY PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE 'TIRE SHREDDERS' THAT I SAW WERE HEAT WAVES THAT WERE SHIMMERING ACROSS THE INTXN. I PERCEIVED THESE TO BE SOME SORT OF OBSTRUCTION AND DECIDED NOT TO TURN ONTO THAT INTXN. I LATER LEARNED THAT RWY 30 IS CLOSED ON THE WKENDS AND AT NIGHT FOR CONSTRUCTION PURPOSES AND THE ITEMS I SAW WERE INDEED RELATED TO THIS WORK. THE BLAZE-ORANGE BARRICADES LYING ON THE GND ARE THERE TO DELINEATE ELECTRICAL WORK THAT IS BEING DONE. I LATER TALKED TO THE TWR SUPVR, AND HE STATED THAT THIS AREA IS A PROB AREA FOR THE LGB ARPT. HE TOLD ME THAT THE LCL CTLRS KNOW OF THIS AREA AND THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER AIRLINERS THAT HAVE DONE EXACTLY WHAT I HAD DONE. I ASKED WHY THIS IS NOT AN ARPT 'HOT SPOT' AND HE HAD NO EXPLANATION. I ALSO ASKED WHY THERE IS NOTHING ON THE ATIS AND HE STATED THAT THEY HAVE A PROB WITH PLTS COMPLAINING ABOUT THERE ALREADY BEING TOO MUCH INFO ON THE ATIS BROADCAST. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 627875: I WAS THE FO AND THE PNF ON A FLT FROM ORD TO LGB. THE FLT WAS A REPOSITIONING FLT CONDUCTED UNDER PART 91. THE ACFT WAS EMPTY EXCEPT FOR CREW MEMBERS AND WAS LIGHT. AFTER LNDG ON RWY 30 AT LGB THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO 'TURN L OR R ON TXWY K, YOUR DISCRETION, GND CTL ON 133.0.' BECAUSE WE WERE TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO PARK SOMEWHERE IN THE SW CORNER OF THE ARPT I RESPONDED 'WE WILL TURN L ON TXWY K, GND ON 133.0.' I SAW THAT THE CAPT WAS DRIFTING TOWARD TXWY K AND THE ACFT WAS DECELERATING NICELY TO EASILY MAKE THE TURNOFF AT TXWY K SO I LOOKED DOWN TO DIAL IN 133.0 IN THE STANDBY WINDOW OF THE #1 VHF COM RADIO. I FELT THE ACFT STOP DECELERATING AND LOOKED UP TO SEE US PASSING THE TXWY K EXIT OFF OF RWY 30. I DON'T KNOW WHY THE CAPT DECIDED NOT TO TURN ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE OF CONSTRUCTION WORK LIKE SANDBAGS AND BARRICADES NEAR THE TXWY BUT THE TXWY ITSELF LOOKED CLR TO ME. I LOOKED DOWN AGAIN, THIS TIME TO LOOK ON THE ARPT DIAGRAM TO FIND THE NEXT SUITABLE EXIT OFF THE RWY WHEN I FELT THE ACFT TURNING TO THE L. I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED UP TO SEE THE ACFT TURNING L ONTO RWY 25R. I SAID 'THIS IS A RWY' ASSUMING (PERHAPS MISTAKENLY) THAT THE CAPT DIDN'T REALIZE HE WAS TURNING ONTO A RWY. WHEN HE CONTINUED TO TURN AND FAILED TO STOP, I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED OVER MY R SHOULDER TO ENSURE NO TFC WAS ON APCH TO RWY 25R OR WAS ACTUALLY ON RWY 25R. SEEING IT WAS CLR I RPTED THAT FACT TO HIM. HAD HE STOPPED AT THIS POINT HE WOULD HAVE FOULED RWY 25R AND POSSIBLY RWY 30 AS WELL. THE CAPT CONTINUED HIS L TURN ONTO RWY 25R AND IMMEDIATELY ONTO TXWY D. WHEN WE WERE CLR, I SWITCHED TO GND CTL WHO CLRED US TO TAXI SEBOUND ON TXWY D. THEY THEN GAVE US A LCL PHONE NUMBER TO CALL REGARDING A PLTDEV.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.