Narrative:

I was PF and the captain was PNF on a flight to den. Upon our arrival (via the dandd arrival gate) into the den class B airspace, approach control instructed us to fly a succession of headings (270 degrees, then 320 degrees) and cleared us for the visual approach for what I understood to be runway 35L. We had set up the ILS information in the FMGC and were joining the final approach course at 210 KTS descending through 9000 ft at about 1000 FPM just below the ILS GS, when we noticed opposite direction traffic slightly above us and converging. The TCASII TA warning sounded at first and showed the traffic 200 ft above our altitude. The autoplt was engaged and we were joining the final approach course. As the RA warning told us to descend (we were) I asked the captain if he still had the traffic in sight as my view was blocked by our attitude. We wondered out loud where the traffic was going and I asked the captain to find out. We had been xferred to a final approach controller since our approach clearance, and this controller stated that we were supposed to be on final for runway 35R, while our traffic was for runway 35L. I disengaged the autoplt and naved the aircraft over to the runway 35R final approach course as the controller was instructing us to do the same. He stated that his electronic information (given to him from our previous controller) stated that we had been cleared for runway 35R. In the confusion and the rush to change runways, avoid a traffic conflict, configure the airplane, and complete the landing checklist, we neglected to notice that we were never given a tower frequency nor instructed to contact the tower. We landed on runway 35R without being on tower frequency, without having contacted the tower, and without a landing clearance. Upon exiting the runway we realized our negligence and contacted ground control. We were issued taxi instructions and taxied to the gate without further incident and without further discussion of the events with anyone in the tower. In my opinion, several key elements contributed to our failures in this situation. 1) our preference for (and thus preflight planning and FMGC loading) runway 35L. 2) crew complacency in our familiar domicile during VMC conditions. 3) inadequate xchking and verification of approach/runway assignment between crew members. 4) miscom/omission between flight crew and ATC since we read back to them our recognized clearance for runway 35L. 5) possible miscom between approach controllers. 6) our rush to deal with a stressful circumstance in a regime of flight that is already task-saturated. I firmly believe that the distraction of the first situation (traffic encroachment due to miscommunicated clearance) led us to concentrate too much on how it happened and what actions would have to be taken after the flight. This preoccupation, along with the normal landing procedures, affected our performance such that our lack of landing clearance went unnoticed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 CREW LNDG DEN BELIEVED THEY HAD RECEIVED AN APCH CLRNC FOR RWY 35L AND SET UP TO MAKE THAT APCH. LATER, WHILE TURNING IN FOR THE APCH AND OBSERVING A B737 CLOSE BY, THEY ARE ADVISED THEY SHOULD BE ON RWY 35R.

Narrative: I WAS PF AND THE CAPT WAS PNF ON A FLT TO DEN. UPON OUR ARR (VIA THE DANDD ARR GATE) INTO THE DEN CLASS B AIRSPACE, APCH CTL INSTRUCTED US TO FLY A SUCCESSION OF HDGS (270 DEGS, THEN 320 DEGS) AND CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL APCH FOR WHAT I UNDERSTOOD TO BE RWY 35L. WE HAD SET UP THE ILS INFO IN THE FMGC AND WERE JOINING THE FINAL APCH COURSE AT 210 KTS DSNDING THROUGH 9000 FT AT ABOUT 1000 FPM JUST BELOW THE ILS GS, WHEN WE NOTICED OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC SLIGHTLY ABOVE US AND CONVERGING. THE TCASII TA WARNING SOUNDED AT FIRST AND SHOWED THE TFC 200 FT ABOVE OUR ALT. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND WE WERE JOINING THE FINAL APCH COURSE. AS THE RA WARNING TOLD US TO DSND (WE WERE) I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE STILL HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT AS MY VIEW WAS BLOCKED BY OUR ATTITUDE. WE WONDERED OUT LOUD WHERE THE TFC WAS GOING AND I ASKED THE CAPT TO FIND OUT. WE HAD BEEN XFERRED TO A FINAL APCH CTLR SINCE OUR APCH CLRNC, AND THIS CTLR STATED THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE ON FINAL FOR RWY 35R, WHILE OUR TFC WAS FOR RWY 35L. I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND NAVED THE ACFT OVER TO THE RWY 35R FINAL APCH COURSE AS THE CTLR WAS INSTRUCTING US TO DO THE SAME. HE STATED THAT HIS ELECTRONIC INFO (GIVEN TO HIM FROM OUR PREVIOUS CTLR) STATED THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR RWY 35R. IN THE CONFUSION AND THE RUSH TO CHANGE RWYS, AVOID A TFC CONFLICT, CONFIGURE THE AIRPLANE, AND COMPLETE THE LNDG CHKLIST, WE NEGLECTED TO NOTICE THAT WE WERE NEVER GIVEN A TWR FREQ NOR INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT THE TWR. WE LANDED ON RWY 35R WITHOUT BEING ON TWR FREQ, WITHOUT HAVING CONTACTED THE TWR, AND WITHOUT A LNDG CLRNC. UPON EXITING THE RWY WE REALIZED OUR NEGLIGENCE AND CONTACTED GND CTL. WE WERE ISSUED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND TAXIED TO THE GATE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT AND WITHOUT FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE EVENTS WITH ANYONE IN THE TWR. IN MY OPINION, SEVERAL KEY ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTED TO OUR FAILURES IN THIS SIT. 1) OUR PREFERENCE FOR (AND THUS PREFLT PLANNING AND FMGC LOADING) RWY 35L. 2) CREW COMPLACENCY IN OUR FAMILIAR DOMICILE DURING VMC CONDITIONS. 3) INADEQUATE XCHKING AND VERIFICATION OF APCH/RWY ASSIGNMENT BTWN CREW MEMBERS. 4) MISCOM/OMISSION BTWN FLT CREW AND ATC SINCE WE READ BACK TO THEM OUR RECOGNIZED CLRNC FOR RWY 35L. 5) POSSIBLE MISCOM BTWN APCH CTLRS. 6) OUR RUSH TO DEAL WITH A STRESSFUL CIRCUMSTANCE IN A REGIME OF FLT THAT IS ALREADY TASK-SATURATED. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE DISTR OF THE FIRST SIT (TFC ENCROACHMENT DUE TO MISCOMMUNICATED CLRNC) LED US TO CONCENTRATE TOO MUCH ON HOW IT HAPPENED AND WHAT ACTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN AFTER THE FLT. THIS PREOCCUPATION, ALONG WITH THE NORMAL LNDG PROCS, AFFECTED OUR PERFORMANCE SUCH THAT OUR LACK OF LNDG CLRNC WENT UNNOTICED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.