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The PF silences a takeoff warning horn in a B737-700 by adding more flaps without coordination with the PNF. An erroneous warning problem had been worked on before departure.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 627930 |
| Time | |
| Date | 200408 |
| Day | Tue |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : tpa.airport |
| State Reference | FL |
| Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 1500 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight Night |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | B737-700 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff climbout : initial ground : takeoff roll |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 8000 flight time type : 3000 |
| ASRS Report | 627930 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : non compliance with mel non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies |
| Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : takeoff warning other flight crewa other flight crewb |
| Resolutory Action | flight crew : overrode automation flight crew : overcame equipment problem other |
| Consequence | other Other |
| Factors | |
| Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : repair performance deficiency : fault isolation |
| Supplementary | |
| Problem Areas | Maintenance Human Performance Aircraft Flight Crew Human Performance |
| Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
On takeoff roll we received a takeoff warning (flaps) even though the flaps were in the proper (5 degrees) position. The captain and I knew the flap position was correct as a mechanic had been working the issue at the gate and had corrected the problem, but it was intermittent. The captain had been operating the flap handle on the taxi and I assumed he had a plan regarding the light and how we're going to deal with the problem if we got the light again. We did on the takeoff roll and he selected flaps 10 degrees. The light went out and a flaps 10 degree takeoff was performed. En route the light remained intermittent and I called for the 'leading edge device in transit checklist.' we ran the checklist and the opc, and operated the aircraft per the MEL while the light was on. Dispatch was contacted and we deferred the item in sat. En route I discussed my discomfort with what had happened on the takeoff roll as I felt somewhat out of the loop. I told the PIC I thought we needed to fill out an as soon as possible form and also to get the as soon as possible teams to take on the issue. I take full responsibility for not making a bigger issue on the takeoff roll, but my judgement led me to believe this was not the time to get into a tug of war over the operation of the aircraft. It was the captain's leg, I knew the aircraft would fly, and safety was not a factor. (We both knew the light was erroneous.) I also knew we were deviating from company procedures.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: THE PF SILENCES A TKOF WARNING HORN IN A B737-700 BY ADDING MORE FLAPS WITHOUT COORD WITH THE PNF. AN ERRONEOUS WARNING PROB HAD BEEN WORKED ON BEFORE DEP.
Narrative: ON TKOF ROLL WE RECEIVED A TKOF WARNING (FLAPS) EVEN THOUGH THE FLAPS WERE IN THE PROPER (5 DEGS) POS. THE CAPT AND I KNEW THE FLAP POS WAS CORRECT AS A MECH HAD BEEN WORKING THE ISSUE AT THE GATE AND HAD CORRECTED THE PROB, BUT IT WAS INTERMITTENT. THE CAPT HAD BEEN OPERATING THE FLAP HANDLE ON THE TAXI AND I ASSUMED HE HAD A PLAN REGARDING THE LIGHT AND HOW WE'RE GOING TO DEAL WITH THE PROB IF WE GOT THE LIGHT AGAIN. WE DID ON THE TKOF ROLL AND HE SELECTED FLAPS 10 DEGS. THE LIGHT WENT OUT AND A FLAPS 10 DEG TKOF WAS PERFORMED. ENRTE THE LIGHT REMAINED INTERMITTENT AND I CALLED FOR THE 'LEADING EDGE DEVICE IN TRANSIT CHKLIST.' WE RAN THE CHKLIST AND THE OPC, AND OPERATED THE ACFT PER THE MEL WHILE THE LIGHT WAS ON. DISPATCH WAS CONTACTED AND WE DEFERRED THE ITEM IN SAT. ENRTE I DISCUSSED MY DISCOMFORT WITH WHAT HAD HAPPENED ON THE TKOF ROLL AS I FELT SOMEWHAT OUT OF THE LOOP. I TOLD THE PIC I THOUGHT WE NEEDED TO FILL OUT AN ASAP FORM AND ALSO TO GET THE ASAP TEAMS TO TAKE ON THE ISSUE. I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOT MAKING A BIGGER ISSUE ON THE TKOF ROLL, BUT MY JUDGEMENT LED ME TO BELIEVE THIS WAS NOT THE TIME TO GET INTO A TUG OF WAR OVER THE OP OF THE ACFT. IT WAS THE CAPT'S LEG, I KNEW THE ACFT WOULD FLY, AND SAFETY WAS NOT A FACTOR. (WE BOTH KNEW THE LIGHT WAS ERRONEOUS.) I ALSO KNEW WE WERE DEVIATING FROM COMPANY PROCS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.