Narrative:

The bosox radar position (position 47 right) was being operated by a newly certified en route controller qualified at 2 of 6 radar position within their ZBW area of specialty. The controller is new to the agency without any previous ATC experience. I was at the bosox sector position 47 RA, the radar associate position. The radar controller appeared to be attentive to traffic, however, their operational application had included a number of modified and rescinded clrncs necessary to ensure standard separation between traffic within their area of jurisdiction, these modified clrncs indicated a lack of traffic awareness and preplanning. The 2 aircraft prompting this report were boston departures being handled normally by boston departure control (now bct, boston consolidated TRACON). At the time of the event my attention as an associate controller had been on an A320 en route to jfk via an amended routing that placed the aircraft in opposite direction traffic sits with various sector traffic flows, as well as, requiring observation and coordination with the sector above bosox for sequencing with other jfk traffic. Planning the A320 sequencing required that I momentarily stand and observe position R46 (boston), a sector to our right, and physically look at their traffic, since asking the 47 radar controller to quick look position 46 would have been too distracting at that moment, and sector 46 was too busy to discuss or view the A320's present position and projected course. Sector 47 received a voice call from boston departure asking 'are you alright with those two?' (or words to that effect), my attention was then redirected to the traffic west of boston at position R47. The 2 aircraft prompting this report, an air carrier Y and air carrier Z were west of boston in relative close vertical proximity with approximately 5 NM separation with what appeared to be an overtaking situation from behind (the section in which the 2 aircraft were located is single-site adapted, therefore, 3 NM separation is the minimum when aircraft are wake-turbulence compatible). I directed the radar controller's attention to the situation, the radar controller then issued instructions that were vague, confusing and ineffective, the pilot of air carrier Z aircraft questioned the clearance and appeared to question the proximity of the traffic advised by the radar controller to which it became necessary for me to intervene and instruct the radar controller to tell air carrier Y to 'stop climb.' the oedp apparently detected less than 5 NM between the subject aircraft, though my observations are that at no time did separation diminish to less than 3 NM. Regrettably, the observed performance of recently certified personnel is all too similar to this event. On various occasions this newly certified controller has required the oversight and intervention of other controllers to ensure standard separation was maintained, in addition, critical elements such as routine holding and metering have become too complex for the controller to handle resulting in disorganized and dangerous traffic sits. Another newly certified controller in the same area of specialty has had one operational error as a result of controller error, and has also required the intervention of other personnel to maintain order and separation during routine traffic sits. Training programs are becoming less effective when time-frames for familiarization and instruction are shortened, as-well-as, en route facility staffing levels are dropping as personnel retire, this appears to be pressuring certifying personnel to restaff the facilities on an accelerated time schedule at the cost of effective training and fully certified controllers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZBW CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING TRAINING, EXPERIENCE AND COMPETENCE OF FELLOW CTLRS AND RECOUNTS EXAMPLE.

Narrative: THE BOSOX RADAR POS (POS 47 R) WAS BEING OPERATED BY A NEWLY CERTIFIED ENRTE CTLR QUALIFIED AT 2 OF 6 RADAR POS WITHIN THEIR ZBW AREA OF SPECIALTY. THE CTLR IS NEW TO THE AGENCY WITHOUT ANY PREVIOUS ATC EXPERIENCE. I WAS AT THE BOSOX SECTOR POS 47 RA, THE RADAR ASSOCIATE POS. THE RADAR CTLR APPEARED TO BE ATTENTIVE TO TFC, HOWEVER, THEIR OPERATIONAL APPLICATION HAD INCLUDED A NUMBER OF MODIFIED AND RESCINDED CLRNCS NECESSARY TO ENSURE STANDARD SEPARATION BTWN TFC WITHIN THEIR AREA OF JURISDICTION, THESE MODIFIED CLRNCS INDICATED A LACK OF TFC AWARENESS AND PREPLANNING. THE 2 ACFT PROMPTING THIS RPT WERE BOSTON DEPS BEING HANDLED NORMALLY BY BOSTON DEP CTL (NOW BCT, BOSTON CONSOLIDATED TRACON). AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT MY ATTN AS AN ASSOCIATE CTLR HAD BEEN ON AN A320 ENRTE TO JFK VIA AN AMENDED ROUTING THAT PLACED THE ACFT IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC SITS WITH VARIOUS SECTOR TFC FLOWS, AS WELL AS, REQUIRING OBSERVATION AND COORD WITH THE SECTOR ABOVE BOSOX FOR SEQUENCING WITH OTHER JFK TFC. PLANNING THE A320 SEQUENCING REQUIRED THAT I MOMENTARILY STAND AND OBSERVE POS R46 (BOSTON), A SECTOR TO OUR R, AND PHYSICALLY LOOK AT THEIR TFC, SINCE ASKING THE 47 RADAR CTLR TO QUICK LOOK POS 46 WOULD HAVE BEEN TOO DISTRACTING AT THAT MOMENT, AND SECTOR 46 WAS TOO BUSY TO DISCUSS OR VIEW THE A320'S PRESENT POS AND PROJECTED COURSE. SECTOR 47 RECEIVED A VOICE CALL FROM BOSTON DEP ASKING 'ARE YOU ALRIGHT WITH THOSE TWO?' (OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT), MY ATTN WAS THEN REDIRECTED TO THE TFC W OF BOSTON AT POS R47. THE 2 ACFT PROMPTING THIS RPT, AN ACR Y AND ACR Z WERE W OF BOSTON IN RELATIVE CLOSE VERT PROX WITH APPROX 5 NM SEPARATION WITH WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN OVERTAKING SIT FROM BEHIND (THE SECTION IN WHICH THE 2 ACFT WERE LOCATED IS SINGLE-SITE ADAPTED, THEREFORE, 3 NM SEPARATION IS THE MINIMUM WHEN ACFT ARE WAKE-TURB COMPATIBLE). I DIRECTED THE RADAR CTLR'S ATTN TO THE SIT, THE RADAR CTLR THEN ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE VAGUE, CONFUSING AND INEFFECTIVE, THE PLT OF ACR Z ACFT QUESTIONED THE CLRNC AND APPEARED TO QUESTION THE PROX OF THE TFC ADVISED BY THE RADAR CTLR TO WHICH IT BECAME NECESSARY FOR ME TO INTERVENE AND INSTRUCT THE RADAR CTLR TO TELL ACR Y TO 'STOP CLB.' THE OEDP APPARENTLY DETECTED LESS THAN 5 NM BTWN THE SUBJECT ACFT, THOUGH MY OBSERVATIONS ARE THAT AT NO TIME DID SEPARATION DIMINISH TO LESS THAN 3 NM. REGRETTABLY, THE OBSERVED PERFORMANCE OF RECENTLY CERTIFIED PERSONNEL IS ALL TOO SIMILAR TO THIS EVENT. ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS THIS NEWLY CERTIFIED CTLR HAS REQUIRED THE OVERSIGHT AND INTERVENTION OF OTHER CTLRS TO ENSURE STANDARD SEPARATION WAS MAINTAINED, IN ADDITION, CRITICAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS ROUTINE HOLDING AND METERING HAVE BECOME TOO COMPLEX FOR THE CTLR TO HANDLE RESULTING IN DISORGANIZED AND DANGEROUS TFC SITS. ANOTHER NEWLY CERTIFIED CTLR IN THE SAME AREA OF SPECIALTY HAS HAD ONE OPERROR AS A RESULT OF CTLR ERROR, AND HAS ALSO REQUIRED THE INTERVENTION OF OTHER PERSONNEL TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND SEPARATION DURING ROUTINE TFC SITS. TRAINING PROGRAMS ARE BECOMING LESS EFFECTIVE WHEN TIME-FRAMES FOR FAMILIARIZATION AND INSTRUCTION ARE SHORTENED, AS-WELL-AS, ENRTE FACILITY STAFFING LEVELS ARE DROPPING AS PERSONNEL RETIRE, THIS APPEARS TO BE PRESSURING CERTIFYING PERSONNEL TO RESTAFF THE FACILITIES ON AN ACCELERATED TIME SCHEDULE AT THE COST OF EFFECTIVE TRAINING AND FULLY CERTIFIED CTLRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.