Narrative:

During the first officer's walkaround preflight procedures on our aircraft before departure, he noticed the right aileron had numerous dents in it. He showed it to a mechanic nearby who was fueling our aircraft, and advised myself as well. We proceeded to write this up in the maintenance log, and finished our preflight preparations. The mechanic went inside the ramp office to look this up in the maintenance manual, and returned to the aircraft to show us documentation that downed the aircraft because no dents were allowed in the aft portion of the aileron which was made of a composite material. Another aircraft taxied in next to us from ZZZZ and it was decided we would move the freight to this aircraft that just arrived, as engineering could not get an engineering variation authority/authorized for the first aircraft and proceeded to load our bags as the ramp folks moved the freight to this aircraft. The crew that flew in this second aircraft would situation with the first aircraft until it was fixed. The first officer then preflted the second aircraft, and found dents in the aft portion of the left aileron. He showed this to me as well, and this was also entered in the maintenance log, and was also downed by maintenance. When the second aircraft was downed, I advised the duty officer and the head of flight standards, with a concern this may be a fleet-wide problem. The first officer called our union, and kept in touch with maintenance, as we worked the problem -- he with maintenance and the union, and myself with the duty officer and head of flight standards. We, the flight crew, felt there was both an aerodynamic problem due to the dents, and a potential structural problem, as there was no paint missing on the outside, which led to a concern of potential structural failure down the road. We wanted a 'tap' test done to see if the aileron was structurally sound, and an epoxy approved by the aircraft manufacturer, before we would accept the aircraft to fly. The aircraft passed the tap test, and engineering and maintenance wanted to use an epoxy unapproved by the manufacturer. (One of the mechanics said that 'all epoxy is the same'.) to allow our airline to use this in-house epoxy, an engineering variation authority/authorized was used by the engineering department, and faxed to our ramp. We were concerned as a crew that there was no FAA signature on engineering variation authority/authorized with the engineer who wrote this. The response from the engineer was that this was a 'minor repair' based on a decision tree we the crew had no access to. We felt that an aileron is a flight control needed for safe flight and is not a minor repair -- this is not just putting putty on something minor. Cutting to the chase, though we weren't 100% comfortable with a 'tap' test to ensure structural integrity, we gave engineering and maintenance the benefit of the doubt, but wanted an epoxy approved by the manufacturer, which would arrive with another aircraft about 5 hours later. I called the duty officer and the head of flight standards of our decision, while the first officer stayed with the maintenance folks, and called the union for their input. The union suggested we don't fly unless the duty officer, and head of standards, with the local maintenance put their names on the engineering variation authority/authorized and facsimile it to us. The duty officer and head of standards felt the engineering variation authority/authorized was enough, and we disagreed for the reasons stated above, and we left for crew rest at the hotel. We also had the feeling maintenance, engineering, the duty officer, and the head of flight standards wanted to move the aircraft regardless of what concerns we as a flight crew had. At the hotel, the head of standards called myself and said the chief pilot told him either we fly the aircraft with the fix on the engineering variation authority/authorized as chief pilot felt the engineering variation authority/authorized was safe and legal, or we would 'have a hearing with the chief pilot' -- in effect we would be fired. After consulting with the union, we were advised to do as directed by the chief pilot, and flew the aircraft as ordered to by the chief pilot. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the captain inspected all aircraft he has flown since this incident. He has found many other aircraft with dented ailerons in the same place. The captain had the distinct impression that all air carrier employees he interacted with only wanted the aircraft out of town. The captain is apprehensive of being idented since the chief pilot threatened to fire him.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 CREW WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN UNSIGNED ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH 'EVA.'

Narrative: DURING THE FO'S WALKAROUND PREFLT PROCS ON OUR ACFT BEFORE DEP, HE NOTICED THE R AILERON HAD NUMEROUS DENTS IN IT. HE SHOWED IT TO A MECH NEARBY WHO WAS FUELING OUR ACFT, AND ADVISED MYSELF AS WELL. WE PROCEEDED TO WRITE THIS UP IN THE MAINT LOG, AND FINISHED OUR PREFLT PREPARATIONS. THE MECH WENT INSIDE THE RAMP OFFICE TO LOOK THIS UP IN THE MAINT MANUAL, AND RETURNED TO THE ACFT TO SHOW US DOCUMENTATION THAT DOWNED THE ACFT BECAUSE NO DENTS WERE ALLOWED IN THE AFT PORTION OF THE AILERON WHICH WAS MADE OF A COMPOSITE MATERIAL. ANOTHER ACFT TAXIED IN NEXT TO US FROM ZZZZ AND IT WAS DECIDED WE WOULD MOVE THE FREIGHT TO THIS ACFT THAT JUST ARRIVED, AS ENGINEERING COULD NOT GET AN ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH FOR THE FIRST ACFT AND PROCEEDED TO LOAD OUR BAGS AS THE RAMP FOLKS MOVED THE FREIGHT TO THIS ACFT. THE CREW THAT FLEW IN THIS SECOND ACFT WOULD SIT WITH THE FIRST ACFT UNTIL IT WAS FIXED. THE FO THEN PREFLTED THE SECOND ACFT, AND FOUND DENTS IN THE AFT PORTION OF THE L AILERON. HE SHOWED THIS TO ME AS WELL, AND THIS WAS ALSO ENTERED IN THE MAINT LOG, AND WAS ALSO DOWNED BY MAINT. WHEN THE SECOND ACFT WAS DOWNED, I ADVISED THE DUTY OFFICER AND THE HEAD OF FLT STANDARDS, WITH A CONCERN THIS MAY BE A FLEET-WIDE PROB. THE FO CALLED OUR UNION, AND KEPT IN TOUCH WITH MAINT, AS WE WORKED THE PROB -- HE WITH MAINT AND THE UNION, AND MYSELF WITH THE DUTY OFFICER AND HEAD OF FLT STANDARDS. WE, THE FLT CREW, FELT THERE WAS BOTH AN AERODYNAMIC PROB DUE TO THE DENTS, AND A POTENTIAL STRUCTURAL PROB, AS THERE WAS NO PAINT MISSING ON THE OUTSIDE, WHICH LED TO A CONCERN OF POTENTIAL STRUCTURAL FAILURE DOWN THE ROAD. WE WANTED A 'TAP' TEST DONE TO SEE IF THE AILERON WAS STRUCTURALLY SOUND, AND AN EPOXY APPROVED BY THE ACFT MANUFACTURER, BEFORE WE WOULD ACCEPT THE ACFT TO FLY. THE ACFT PASSED THE TAP TEST, AND ENGINEERING AND MAINT WANTED TO USE AN EPOXY UNAPPROVED BY THE MANUFACTURER. (ONE OF THE MECHS SAID THAT 'ALL EPOXY IS THE SAME'.) TO ALLOW OUR AIRLINE TO USE THIS IN-HOUSE EPOXY, AN ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH WAS USED BY THE ENGINEERING DEPT, AND FAXED TO OUR RAMP. WE WERE CONCERNED AS A CREW THAT THERE WAS NO FAA SIGNATURE ON ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH WITH THE ENGINEER WHO WROTE THIS. THE RESPONSE FROM THE ENGINEER WAS THAT THIS WAS A 'MINOR REPAIR' BASED ON A DECISION TREE WE THE CREW HAD NO ACCESS TO. WE FELT THAT AN AILERON IS A FLT CTL NEEDED FOR SAFE FLT AND IS NOT A MINOR REPAIR -- THIS IS NOT JUST PUTTING PUTTY ON SOMETHING MINOR. CUTTING TO THE CHASE, THOUGH WE WEREN'T 100% COMFORTABLE WITH A 'TAP' TEST TO ENSURE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY, WE GAVE ENGINEERING AND MAINT THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT, BUT WANTED AN EPOXY APPROVED BY THE MANUFACTURER, WHICH WOULD ARRIVE WITH ANOTHER ACFT ABOUT 5 HRS LATER. I CALLED THE DUTY OFFICER AND THE HEAD OF FLT STANDARDS OF OUR DECISION, WHILE THE FO STAYED WITH THE MAINT FOLKS, AND CALLED THE UNION FOR THEIR INPUT. THE UNION SUGGESTED WE DON'T FLY UNLESS THE DUTY OFFICER, AND HEAD OF STANDARDS, WITH THE LCL MAINT PUT THEIR NAMES ON THE ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH AND FAX IT TO US. THE DUTY OFFICER AND HEAD OF STANDARDS FELT THE ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH WAS ENOUGH, AND WE DISAGREED FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE, AND WE LEFT FOR CREW REST AT THE HOTEL. WE ALSO HAD THE FEELING MAINT, ENGINEERING, THE DUTY OFFICER, AND THE HEAD OF FLT STANDARDS WANTED TO MOVE THE ACFT REGARDLESS OF WHAT CONCERNS WE AS A FLT CREW HAD. AT THE HOTEL, THE HEAD OF STANDARDS CALLED MYSELF AND SAID THE CHIEF PLT TOLD HIM EITHER WE FLY THE ACFT WITH THE FIX ON THE ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH AS CHIEF PLT FELT THE ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH WAS SAFE AND LEGAL, OR WE WOULD 'HAVE A HEARING WITH THE CHIEF PLT' -- IN EFFECT WE WOULD BE FIRED. AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE UNION, WE WERE ADVISED TO DO AS DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF PLT, AND FLEW THE ACFT AS ORDERED TO BY THE CHIEF PLT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT INSPECTED ALL ACFT HE HAS FLOWN SINCE THIS INCIDENT. HE HAS FOUND MANY OTHER ACFT WITH DENTED AILERONS IN THE SAME PLACE. THE CAPT HAD THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT ALL ACR EMPLOYEES HE INTERACTED WITH ONLY WANTED THE ACFT OUT OF TOWN. THE CAPT IS APPREHENSIVE OF BEING IDENTED SINCE THE CHIEF PLT THREATENED TO FIRE HIM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.