Narrative:

We had been told to call dispatch when we arrived at aircraft. He informed us that the approachs were out at daytona but that the WX was improving and they would be trying to land aircraft with circles and visuals. The marginal WX and no instruments made us a little leery but off we went. On contact with dab approach, we were told we would get a visual to runway 7L. We were in the WX at this time. As they set us up on a downwind north of the field, approach informed us the winds were gusting from the south at the aircraft limits. She then suggested runway 16 which though short would have strong winds down the runway. We decided this would work and told approach we could take runway 16. She immediately gave us a descent to 3000 ft, a turn to line us up, and told us we would be a visual approach to runway 16. At this point, I allowed myself to be rushed. We had briefed runway 7L but now we were being vectored to a runway I had never landed on. But being told it would be a 'visual' gave me a false sense of security and I did not set up and brief adequately. Now things happened real fast. We were still in the WX at 3000 ft so we were cleared to 2000 ft. Still in the WX, we were cleared to 1400 ft. At that point we could see some ground. Approach said runway was at our 12 O'clock position and as we looked ahead, a break in the clouds showed a properly lined up runway at our 12 O'clock position. We looked a little high but not too bad and I began a descent to get on the PAPI. We configured, ran checklists, and were switched to tower who cleared us to land. At this point I had 'target fixation' trying to fly a perfect approach in very gusty conditions in order to make a safe landing on a short runway. All of this happened very quickly when you consider we started seeing ground at 1400 ft. As all this went on, I still felt something wasn't right and then realized we were approaching ormond beach runway 17, not runway 16 at dab 7 mi further on. We went around and informed tower who reclred us to land on runway 16 which we did. This happened because I allowed myself to be rushed into an unfamiliar situation in MVFR conditions. Supplemental information from acn 630693: we feel there were a number of contributing factors to our error: 1) our flight track to dab took us directly over omn. Both have a similar runway layout, and we were at a low altitude in relatively poor visibility (5-7 mi). Our airline has a cautionary note regarding the proximity of omn to dab, but though the captain had read it, he did not consider it during the approach. 2) we were lulled into an expectation of seeing the airport at a particular place based on repeated communications from daytona approach. 3) before starting the flight, the dispatcher told the captain that 'all navaids are out at dab -- you're on your own.' we, therefore, did not tune in any electronic navaids as a backup. The only NAVAID we could have used for runway 16 was the omn VOR. I do not recall if the omn VOR was functional. (After the captain's initial conversation with the dispatcher, he sent us a message saying the localizer to runway 7L at dab was back up. The ATIS for dab noted the ILS for runway 7L was out. There was, therefore, some confusion as to what navaids were available for runway 7L.) 4) once we thought we had dab in sight, we did not xchk our position with the course line on the FMS since we were concentrating on stabilizing the approach, configuring the airplane for landing, and getting the required ATC clrncs. 5) daytona tower cleared us to land. There was, therefore, little cause to question our choice of runway/airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD88 CREW MADE AN APCH TO OMN VERSUS DAB.

Narrative: WE HAD BEEN TOLD TO CALL DISPATCH WHEN WE ARRIVED AT ACFT. HE INFORMED US THAT THE APCHS WERE OUT AT DAYTONA BUT THAT THE WX WAS IMPROVING AND THEY WOULD BE TRYING TO LAND ACFT WITH CIRCLES AND VISUALS. THE MARGINAL WX AND NO INSTS MADE US A LITTLE LEERY BUT OFF WE WENT. ON CONTACT WITH DAB APCH, WE WERE TOLD WE WOULD GET A VISUAL TO RWY 7L. WE WERE IN THE WX AT THIS TIME. AS THEY SET US UP ON A DOWNWIND N OF THE FIELD, APCH INFORMED US THE WINDS WERE GUSTING FROM THE S AT THE ACFT LIMITS. SHE THEN SUGGESTED RWY 16 WHICH THOUGH SHORT WOULD HAVE STRONG WINDS DOWN THE RWY. WE DECIDED THIS WOULD WORK AND TOLD APCH WE COULD TAKE RWY 16. SHE IMMEDIATELY GAVE US A DSCNT TO 3000 FT, A TURN TO LINE US UP, AND TOLD US WE WOULD BE A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 16. AT THIS POINT, I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BE RUSHED. WE HAD BRIEFED RWY 7L BUT NOW WE WERE BEING VECTORED TO A RWY I HAD NEVER LANDED ON. BUT BEING TOLD IT WOULD BE A 'VISUAL' GAVE ME A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY AND I DID NOT SET UP AND BRIEF ADEQUATELY. NOW THINGS HAPPENED REAL FAST. WE WERE STILL IN THE WX AT 3000 FT SO WE WERE CLRED TO 2000 FT. STILL IN THE WX, WE WERE CLRED TO 1400 FT. AT THAT POINT WE COULD SEE SOME GND. APCH SAID RWY WAS AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS AND AS WE LOOKED AHEAD, A BREAK IN THE CLOUDS SHOWED A PROPERLY LINED UP RWY AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS. WE LOOKED A LITTLE HIGH BUT NOT TOO BAD AND I BEGAN A DSCNT TO GET ON THE PAPI. WE CONFIGURED, RAN CHKLISTS, AND WERE SWITCHED TO TWR WHO CLRED US TO LAND. AT THIS POINT I HAD 'TARGET FIXATION' TRYING TO FLY A PERFECT APCH IN VERY GUSTY CONDITIONS IN ORDER TO MAKE A SAFE LNDG ON A SHORT RWY. ALL OF THIS HAPPENED VERY QUICKLY WHEN YOU CONSIDER WE STARTED SEEING GND AT 1400 FT. AS ALL THIS WENT ON, I STILL FELT SOMETHING WASN'T RIGHT AND THEN REALIZED WE WERE APCHING ORMOND BEACH RWY 17, NOT RWY 16 AT DAB 7 MI FURTHER ON. WE WENT AROUND AND INFORMED TWR WHO RECLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 16 WHICH WE DID. THIS HAPPENED BECAUSE I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BE RUSHED INTO AN UNFAMILIAR SIT IN MVFR CONDITIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 630693: WE FEEL THERE WERE A NUMBER OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO OUR ERROR: 1) OUR FLT TRACK TO DAB TOOK US DIRECTLY OVER OMN. BOTH HAVE A SIMILAR RWY LAYOUT, AND WE WERE AT A LOW ALT IN RELATIVELY POOR VISIBILITY (5-7 MI). OUR AIRLINE HAS A CAUTIONARY NOTE REGARDING THE PROX OF OMN TO DAB, BUT THOUGH THE CAPT HAD READ IT, HE DID NOT CONSIDER IT DURING THE APCH. 2) WE WERE LULLED INTO AN EXPECTATION OF SEEING THE ARPT AT A PARTICULAR PLACE BASED ON REPEATED COMS FROM DAYTONA APCH. 3) BEFORE STARTING THE FLT, THE DISPATCHER TOLD THE CAPT THAT 'ALL NAVAIDS ARE OUT AT DAB -- YOU'RE ON YOUR OWN.' WE, THEREFORE, DID NOT TUNE IN ANY ELECTRONIC NAVAIDS AS A BACKUP. THE ONLY NAVAID WE COULD HAVE USED FOR RWY 16 WAS THE OMN VOR. I DO NOT RECALL IF THE OMN VOR WAS FUNCTIONAL. (AFTER THE CAPT'S INITIAL CONVERSATION WITH THE DISPATCHER, HE SENT US A MESSAGE SAYING THE LOC TO RWY 7L AT DAB WAS BACK UP. THE ATIS FOR DAB NOTED THE ILS FOR RWY 7L WAS OUT. THERE WAS, THEREFORE, SOME CONFUSION AS TO WHAT NAVAIDS WERE AVAILABLE FOR RWY 7L.) 4) ONCE WE THOUGHT WE HAD DAB IN SIGHT, WE DID NOT XCHK OUR POS WITH THE COURSE LINE ON THE FMS SINCE WE WERE CONCENTRATING ON STABILIZING THE APCH, CONFIGURING THE AIRPLANE FOR LNDG, AND GETTING THE REQUIRED ATC CLRNCS. 5) DAYTONA TWR CLRED US TO LAND. THERE WAS, THEREFORE, LITTLE CAUSE TO QUESTION OUR CHOICE OF RWY/ARPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.