Narrative:

I departed aircraft X with a left turn to 120 degrees. I then position and hold aircraft Y. I observed the aircraft X depart and initial turn. I then departed aircraft Y. I instructed aircraft X to tighten up the turn and go fast for 5 mi. He acknowledged. I observed aircraft Y roll and start his turn. I cleared an aircraft to land on the same runway. I observed aircraft Y was a bare 3 mi behind the rj. I asked aircraft Y if he had the rj in sight he said 'no.' I then told aircraft Y to maintain 3000 ft. The tmc came over and said approach was not getting the strips. I told them they had all mine (he observed that) then he told me about a sequence at the runway change and a new release time. I observed aircraft Y just outside the 5 mi radar ring and shipped him to approach. Local assist position was just briefed and open. The tmc and I were conferring on the scope of work and each other's responsibilities under the brand new policy. I felt that all had been briefed and that I would just roll airplanes and insure intrail restrs. He felt otherwise. Local control assistant wasn't sure either as we debated the subject while on position. The 'afdps' keyboard has just recently been relocated in an awkward spot, so as to spread the position (work station) out considerably (ucr's are on file) and I feel that the operations manager on duty at the time strongly disagreed with the manager's implementation, indoctrination, training and familiarization with this new position. I feel that he used this situation to push/further his objections.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ORD LCL CTLR ALLOWED A DEPARTING B737 TO OVERTAKE A REGIONAL JET RESULTING IN A LOSS OF SEPARATION.

Narrative: I DEPARTED ACFT X WITH A L TURN TO 120 DEGS. I THEN POS AND HOLD ACFT Y. I OBSERVED THE ACFT X DEPART AND INITIAL TURN. I THEN DEPARTED ACFT Y. I INSTRUCTED ACFT X TO TIGHTEN UP THE TURN AND GO FAST FOR 5 MI. HE ACKNOWLEDGED. I OBSERVED ACFT Y ROLL AND START HIS TURN. I CLRED AN ACFT TO LAND ON THE SAME RWY. I OBSERVED ACFT Y WAS A BARE 3 MI BEHIND THE RJ. I ASKED ACFT Y IF HE HAD THE RJ IN SIGHT HE SAID 'NO.' I THEN TOLD ACFT Y TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT. THE TMC CAME OVER AND SAID APCH WAS NOT GETTING THE STRIPS. I TOLD THEM THEY HAD ALL MINE (HE OBSERVED THAT) THEN HE TOLD ME ABOUT A SEQUENCE AT THE RWY CHANGE AND A NEW RELEASE TIME. I OBSERVED ACFT Y JUST OUTSIDE THE 5 MI RADAR RING AND SHIPPED HIM TO APCH. LCL ASSIST POS WAS JUST BRIEFED AND OPEN. THE TMC AND I WERE CONFERRING ON THE SCOPE OF WORK AND EACH OTHER'S RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE BRAND NEW POLICY. I FELT THAT ALL HAD BEEN BRIEFED AND THAT I WOULD JUST ROLL AIRPLANES AND INSURE INTRAIL RESTRS. HE FELT OTHERWISE. LCL CTL ASSISTANT WASN'T SURE EITHER AS WE DEBATED THE SUBJECT WHILE ON POS. THE 'AFDPS' KEYBOARD HAS JUST RECENTLY BEEN RELOCATED IN AN AWKWARD SPOT, SO AS TO SPREAD THE POS (WORK STATION) OUT CONSIDERABLY (UCR'S ARE ON FILE) AND I FEEL THAT THE OPS MGR ON DUTY AT THE TIME STRONGLY DISAGREED WITH THE MGR'S IMPLEMENTATION, INDOCTRINATION, TRAINING AND FAMILIARIZATION WITH THIS NEW POS. I FEEL THAT HE USED THIS SIT TO PUSH/FURTHER HIS OBJECTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.