Narrative:

Murphy's law overcomes 80+ yrs of professional flying experience. Received release and entered information into opc. Heard clicking noise that neither of us could identify. Captain called for pushback checklist, which was started and interrupted by inoperative pushback crew's headset. Distraction while they retrieved replacement and by warning horn sounding for inoperative cooling fan. Selected alternate position, (light and horn went out) then read and ran QRH. Found circuit breaker out which reset and restored normal operation for equipment cooling. Decided the clicking was when ground crew disconnected ground power and which caused circuit breaker to pop. Restarted checklist and had ground control interrupt us with a request to use runway 16L instead of the anticipated runway 25R. Looked up information in opc and found out with confign change and bleeds off takeoff we could accept this runway. Continued with pushback and before taxi checklists. Taxied out to runway 19L and saw that we would be #1 at the end, so we started our before takeoff flows at which time the captain inadvertently shut down the APU. I told him that I thought that the runway change required the APU for takeoff. He said 'that's right, but let's double check.' inspection of opc confirmed bleeds off with 5 degrees of flaps. Restarted APU and confirmed flap setting. Cleared for takeoff and ran before takeoff checklist. As captain advanced power for takeoff, horn sounded. Turned left off runway immediately after telling tower. We reran all checklist and found pitch trim to be the culprit. Numerous interruptions at the 2 places this item is checked were just enough distrs to cause both of us to either miss the item in the checklist, look and not see, or not look at all. My recommendation is to enter the throttle advance by the captain to check the takeoff confign warning horn into the checklist and not just as a takeoff flow. That way it is done at a specific time, and both crewmembers sure that it has been done. This only caused about a 2 min delay and did not affect any other planes as we were the only ones out there, but it was a very embarrassing thing for 2 'old heads,' and one that I plan to never let happen again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDED WHEN THE THRUST LEVERS WERE ADVANCED FOR TKOF. THE CREW REJECTED THE TKOF AND FOUND THE PITCH TRIM OUT OF THE GREEN BAND. RESET TRIM.

Narrative: MURPHY'S LAW OVERCOMES 80+ YRS OF PROFESSIONAL FLYING EXPERIENCE. RECEIVED RELEASE AND ENTERED INFO INTO OPC. HEARD CLICKING NOISE THAT NEITHER OF US COULD IDENT. CAPT CALLED FOR PUSHBACK CHKLIST, WHICH WAS STARTED AND INTERRUPTED BY INOP PUSHBACK CREW'S HEADSET. DISTR WHILE THEY RETRIEVED REPLACEMENT AND BY WARNING HORN SOUNDING FOR INOP COOLING FAN. SELECTED ALTERNATE POS, (LIGHT AND HORN WENT OUT) THEN READ AND RAN QRH. FOUND CIRCUIT BREAKER OUT WHICH RESET AND RESTORED NORMAL OP FOR EQUIP COOLING. DECIDED THE CLICKING WAS WHEN GND CREW DISCONNECTED GND PWR AND WHICH CAUSED CIRCUIT BREAKER TO POP. RESTARTED CHKLIST AND HAD GND CTL INTERRUPT US WITH A REQUEST TO USE RWY 16L INSTEAD OF THE ANTICIPATED RWY 25R. LOOKED UP INFO IN OPC AND FOUND OUT WITH CONFIGN CHANGE AND BLEEDS OFF TKOF WE COULD ACCEPT THIS RWY. CONTINUED WITH PUSHBACK AND BEFORE TAXI CHKLISTS. TAXIED OUT TO RWY 19L AND SAW THAT WE WOULD BE #1 AT THE END, SO WE STARTED OUR BEFORE TKOF FLOWS AT WHICH TIME THE CAPT INADVERTENTLY SHUT DOWN THE APU. I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT THAT THE RWY CHANGE REQUIRED THE APU FOR TKOF. HE SAID 'THAT'S RIGHT, BUT LET'S DOUBLE CHK.' INSPECTION OF OPC CONFIRMED BLEEDS OFF WITH 5 DEGS OF FLAPS. RESTARTED APU AND CONFIRMED FLAP SETTING. CLRED FOR TKOF AND RAN BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. AS CAPT ADVANCED PWR FOR TKOF, HORN SOUNDED. TURNED L OFF RWY IMMEDIATELY AFTER TELLING TWR. WE RERAN ALL CHKLIST AND FOUND PITCH TRIM TO BE THE CULPRIT. NUMEROUS INTERRUPTIONS AT THE 2 PLACES THIS ITEM IS CHKED WERE JUST ENOUGH DISTRS TO CAUSE BOTH OF US TO EITHER MISS THE ITEM IN THE CHKLIST, LOOK AND NOT SEE, OR NOT LOOK AT ALL. MY RECOMMENDATION IS TO ENTER THE THROTTLE ADVANCE BY THE CAPT TO CHK THE TKOF CONFIGN WARNING HORN INTO THE CHKLIST AND NOT JUST AS A TKOF FLOW. THAT WAY IT IS DONE AT A SPECIFIC TIME, AND BOTH CREWMEMBERS SURE THAT IT HAS BEEN DONE. THIS ONLY CAUSED ABOUT A 2 MIN DELAY AND DID NOT AFFECT ANY OTHER PLANES AS WE WERE THE ONLY ONES OUT THERE, BUT IT WAS A VERY EMBARRASSING THING FOR 2 'OLD HEADS,' AND ONE THAT I PLAN TO NEVER LET HAPPEN AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.