Narrative:

On above date and time, we were on final approach for alb. As we lowered the landing gear, we received a master caution indicating an anti-skid outboard failure. Accordingly, we executed a go around, advised ATC of the malfunction, and requested delay vectors in order to troubleshoot as per the QRH. For our landing weight, the QRH required nearly 7700 ft of runway. Alb had only 7200 ft runways. As such, I requested vectors for a diversion to bdl since bdl was nearby, had a 9510 ft runway, and based on our fuel load we would land with 1 hour 15 mins of fuel remaining. I advised alb operations to relay to dispatch that we were diverting to bdl for an anti-skid outboard failure, as we were too low for comrdo radio contact. I advised our flight attendant of the emergency items with a normal landing indicated. I contacted dispatch and maintenance and they both concurred that bdl was a good airport for our diversion. I advised our passenger of our mechanical situation and the reason for our diversion. I did not declare an emergency since there was no immediate threat to life or property, we had adequate fuel supply, ATC handling was adequate with no additional priority handling needed, and as per fom, performance data and safety margins were certain. Upon handoff to bdl approach, I verified that they knew the mechanical reason for our diversion. They advised that they did know. As a precautionary measure, and in order to increase our safety margin, I requested the fire trucks to stand by at bdl. As a further precaution, I planned for us to be towed in by bdl operations after our landing. We landed safely in bdl. After coming to a complete stop, the fire department immediately advised us that there was no indication of smoke or fire and to standby while they inspected the brakes. After their inspection, the fire department advised that all of our brakes were cool. Bdl operations towed us to the gate. Bdl fire department made 1 final inspection, after we were chocked at the gate. They again advised us that there was no evidence of smoke or fire and that the brakes were cool. Our passenger deplaned normally to the care of bdl customer service agents. According to the logbook on board the aircraft, there were 2 previous write-ups for anti-skid outboard failures.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CARJ FLT CREW DIVERT FROM ALB TO BDL FOR ITS LONGER RWYS DUE TO A MASTER CAUTION WITH AN ANTI-SKID OUTBOARD FAILURE.

Narrative: ON ABOVE DATE AND TIME, WE WERE ON FINAL APCH FOR ALB. AS WE LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR, WE RECEIVED A MASTER CAUTION INDICATING AN ANTI-SKID OUTBOARD FAILURE. ACCORDINGLY, WE EXECUTED A GAR, ADVISED ATC OF THE MALFUNCTION, AND REQUESTED DELAY VECTORS IN ORDER TO TROUBLESHOOT AS PER THE QRH. FOR OUR LNDG WT, THE QRH REQUIRED NEARLY 7700 FT OF RWY. ALB HAD ONLY 7200 FT RWYS. AS SUCH, I REQUESTED VECTORS FOR A DIVERSION TO BDL SINCE BDL WAS NEARBY, HAD A 9510 FT RWY, AND BASED ON OUR FUEL LOAD WE WOULD LAND WITH 1 HR 15 MINS OF FUEL REMAINING. I ADVISED ALB OPS TO RELAY TO DISPATCH THAT WE WERE DIVERTING TO BDL FOR AN ANTI-SKID OUTBOARD FAILURE, AS WE WERE TOO LOW FOR COMRDO RADIO CONTACT. I ADVISED OUR FLT ATTENDANT OF THE EMER ITEMS WITH A NORMAL LNDG INDICATED. I CONTACTED DISPATCH AND MAINT AND THEY BOTH CONCURRED THAT BDL WAS A GOOD ARPT FOR OUR DIVERSION. I ADVISED OUR PAX OF OUR MECHANICAL SIT AND THE REASON FOR OUR DIVERSION. I DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER SINCE THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE THREAT TO LIFE OR PROPERTY, WE HAD ADEQUATE FUEL SUPPLY, ATC HANDLING WAS ADEQUATE WITH NO ADDITIONAL PRIORITY HANDLING NEEDED, AND AS PER FOM, PERFORMANCE DATA AND SAFETY MARGINS WERE CERTAIN. UPON HDOF TO BDL APCH, I VERIFIED THAT THEY KNEW THE MECHANICAL REASON FOR OUR DIVERSION. THEY ADVISED THAT THEY DID KNOW. AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, AND IN ORDER TO INCREASE OUR SAFETY MARGIN, I REQUESTED THE FIRE TRUCKS TO STAND BY AT BDL. AS A FURTHER PRECAUTION, I PLANNED FOR US TO BE TOWED IN BY BDL OPS AFTER OUR LNDG. WE LANDED SAFELY IN BDL. AFTER COMING TO A COMPLETE STOP, THE FIRE DEPT IMMEDIATELY ADVISED US THAT THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF SMOKE OR FIRE AND TO STANDBY WHILE THEY INSPECTED THE BRAKES. AFTER THEIR INSPECTION, THE FIRE DEPT ADVISED THAT ALL OF OUR BRAKES WERE COOL. BDL OPS TOWED US TO THE GATE. BDL FIRE DEPT MADE 1 FINAL INSPECTION, AFTER WE WERE CHOCKED AT THE GATE. THEY AGAIN ADVISED US THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SMOKE OR FIRE AND THAT THE BRAKES WERE COOL. OUR PAX DEPLANED NORMALLY TO THE CARE OF BDL CUSTOMER SVC AGENTS. ACCORDING TO THE LOGBOOK ON BOARD THE ACFT, THERE WERE 2 PREVIOUS WRITE-UPS FOR ANTI-SKID OUTBOARD FAILURES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.