Narrative:

Operating flight from dfw to oak, and we were receiving a company line check by a management captain. I was the first officer, and the captain was taxiing. The error made was one during taxi out, and critical to the mistake was the fact that the check airman repeatedly was interrupting us during taxi out, asking for commercial charts, performance paperwork, speed cards, quizzing the captain about his taxi speed being slow, and several other interruptions. This was extremely distracting, and additionally, I believe the situation had the captain somewhat intimidated, although I believe he would not agree. Anyhow, he chose not to ask for the check airman to be quiet during this critical phase of flight. I started to do so myself, but I felt this captain would not have taken kindly to me overriding him regarding how to handle the situation. In retrospect, I wish I had spoken up. When I later asked my captain why he did not say anything, he indicated that he felt the management check airman might be 'gunning for us' if we offended him. In this case, we are in the midst of contract negotiations, and the fact that the check airman was a management pilot further contributed to the possible intimidation which obviously was occurring. Anyhow, the following script details our mistake in not properly complying with a taxi instruction: we had briefed the expected taxi route prior to engine start, and the taxi clearance we ultimately received matched the taxi brief. As we began our taxi off the company ramp, we were cleared to taxi to runway 36L, intersection a, via taxiway C. We were taxiing south on taxiway C towards taxiway a, and being interrupted constantly by the check airman, who neither of us knew, or knew anything about for that matter. Once the captain reached taxiway B, he incorrectly turned left. I immediately told him this was wrong, but by the time he comprehended what I said and stopped, he had gone too far to correct back onto taxiway C until reaching the left turn at taxiway a. Immediately, the dfw ground controller came on the radio scolding us, and I responded back that we were aware of the mistake. (I was getting ready to tell the controller, but he beat me to the transmission.) of course, tension rose quickly, as we were being line checked by a management pilot, and I quickly became frustrated and less focused, now wondering what this management check airman would eventually do regarding the mistake. Because of this, I initially incorrectly read back the ground controller's correcting instructions, further causing embarrassment and frustration. The controller corrected me regarding the readback, but we obviously appeared very unprofessional during this moment. The controller did get us straight, and we then departed the airport without further issue. There were never any traffic conflicts or imminent runway incursions during this event. The check airman continued to interrupt and quiz us throughout the flight, including during critical areas of flight. It is my assessment that he was not just testing us to see if we would speak up, but that he was just blind to the fact that his actions were very distracting. During descent for arrival, and upon reentering another critical phase of flight, I finally made a gesture to him to not bother us right now, to which he did not fully comply. I strongly believe this situation set up a classic catch 22. Damned if you don't say something about the distraction, and damned if you do. I further strongly believe that to remedy this type of situation, it should be emphasized by company policy, and the FAA regulation, that the quiet concept during critical phases of flight should be strictly complied with. Furthermore, while under the supervision of a check airman, he should not critique in any way, or otherwise say anything, unless there is a major mistake which is about to occur which may cause a dangerous or critical error. Accordingly, any issues which arrive during the flight which would be prudent to discuss, should be discussed during a debrief after the flight is complete. This is a key recommendation in my view.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767-300 FO RPT ON A TAXI ERROR THAT MAY HAVE BEEN INDUCED BY THE PRESENCE OF AND INTERFERENCE BY A MGMNT PLT PERFORMING AN ANNUAL LINE CHK OF THE CREW AT DFW.

Narrative: OPERATING FLT FROM DFW TO OAK, AND WE WERE RECEIVING A COMPANY LINE CHK BY A MGMNT CAPT. I WAS THE FO, AND THE CAPT WAS TAXIING. THE ERROR MADE WAS ONE DURING TAXI OUT, AND CRITICAL TO THE MISTAKE WAS THE FACT THAT THE CHK AIRMAN REPEATEDLY WAS INTERRUPTING US DURING TAXI OUT, ASKING FOR COMMERCIAL CHARTS, PERFORMANCE PAPERWORK, SPD CARDS, QUIZZING THE CAPT ABOUT HIS TAXI SPD BEING SLOW, AND SEVERAL OTHER INTERRUPTIONS. THIS WAS EXTREMELY DISTRACTING, AND ADDITIONALLY, I BELIEVE THE SIT HAD THE CAPT SOMEWHAT INTIMIDATED, ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE HE WOULD NOT AGREE. ANYHOW, HE CHOSE NOT TO ASK FOR THE CHK AIRMAN TO BE QUIET DURING THIS CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. I STARTED TO DO SO MYSELF, BUT I FELT THIS CAPT WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN KINDLY TO ME OVERRIDING HIM REGARDING HOW TO HANDLE THE SIT. IN RETROSPECT, I WISH I HAD SPOKEN UP. WHEN I LATER ASKED MY CAPT WHY HE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING, HE INDICATED THAT HE FELT THE MGMNT CHK AIRMAN MIGHT BE 'GUNNING FOR US' IF WE OFFENDED HIM. IN THIS CASE, WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE FACT THAT THE CHK AIRMAN WAS A MGMNT PLT FURTHER CONTRIBUTED TO THE POSSIBLE INTIMIDATION WHICH OBVIOUSLY WAS OCCURRING. ANYHOW, THE FOLLOWING SCRIPT DETAILS OUR MISTAKE IN NOT PROPERLY COMPLYING WITH A TAXI INSTRUCTION: WE HAD BRIEFED THE EXPECTED TAXI RTE PRIOR TO ENG START, AND THE TAXI CLRNC WE ULTIMATELY RECEIVED MATCHED THE TAXI BRIEF. AS WE BEGAN OUR TAXI OFF THE COMPANY RAMP, WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 36L, INTXN A, VIA TXWY C. WE WERE TAXIING S ON TXWY C TOWARDS TXWY A, AND BEING INTERRUPTED CONSTANTLY BY THE CHK AIRMAN, WHO NEITHER OF US KNEW, OR KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT FOR THAT MATTER. ONCE THE CAPT REACHED TXWY B, HE INCORRECTLY TURNED L. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD HIM THIS WAS WRONG, BUT BY THE TIME HE COMPREHENDED WHAT I SAID AND STOPPED, HE HAD GONE TOO FAR TO CORRECT BACK ONTO TXWY C UNTIL REACHING THE L TURN AT TXWY A. IMMEDIATELY, THE DFW GND CTLR CAME ON THE RADIO SCOLDING US, AND I RESPONDED BACK THAT WE WERE AWARE OF THE MISTAKE. (I WAS GETTING READY TO TELL THE CTLR, BUT HE BEAT ME TO THE XMISSION.) OF COURSE, TENSION ROSE QUICKLY, AS WE WERE BEING LINE CHKED BY A MGMNT PLT, AND I QUICKLY BECAME FRUSTRATED AND LESS FOCUSED, NOW WONDERING WHAT THIS MGMNT CHK AIRMAN WOULD EVENTUALLY DO REGARDING THE MISTAKE. BECAUSE OF THIS, I INITIALLY INCORRECTLY READ BACK THE GND CTLR'S CORRECTING INSTRUCTIONS, FURTHER CAUSING EMBARRASSMENT AND FRUSTRATION. THE CTLR CORRECTED ME REGARDING THE READBACK, BUT WE OBVIOUSLY APPEARED VERY UNPROFESSIONAL DURING THIS MOMENT. THE CTLR DID GET US STRAIGHT, AND WE THEN DEPARTED THE ARPT WITHOUT FURTHER ISSUE. THERE WERE NEVER ANY TFC CONFLICTS OR IMMINENT RWY INCURSIONS DURING THIS EVENT. THE CHK AIRMAN CONTINUED TO INTERRUPT AND QUIZ US THROUGHOUT THE FLT, INCLUDING DURING CRITICAL AREAS OF FLT. IT IS MY ASSESSMENT THAT HE WAS NOT JUST TESTING US TO SEE IF WE WOULD SPEAK UP, BUT THAT HE WAS JUST BLIND TO THE FACT THAT HIS ACTIONS WERE VERY DISTRACTING. DURING DSCNT FOR ARR, AND UPON REENTERING ANOTHER CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT, I FINALLY MADE A GESTURE TO HIM TO NOT BOTHER US RIGHT NOW, TO WHICH HE DID NOT FULLY COMPLY. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THIS SIT SET UP A CLASSIC CATCH 22. DAMNED IF YOU DON'T SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE DISTR, AND DAMNED IF YOU DO. I FURTHER STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT TO REMEDY THIS TYPE OF SIT, IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED BY COMPANY POLICY, AND THE FAA REG, THAT THE QUIET CONCEPT DURING CRITICAL PHASES OF FLT SHOULD BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH. FURTHERMORE, WHILE UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A CHK AIRMAN, HE SHOULD NOT CRITIQUE IN ANY WAY, OR OTHERWISE SAY ANYTHING, UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR MISTAKE WHICH IS ABOUT TO OCCUR WHICH MAY CAUSE A DANGEROUS OR CRITICAL ERROR. ACCORDINGLY, ANY ISSUES WHICH ARRIVE DURING THE FLT WHICH WOULD BE PRUDENT TO DISCUSS, SHOULD BE DISCUSSED DURING A DEBRIEF AFTER THE FLT IS COMPLETE. THIS IS A KEY RECOMMENDATION IN MY VIEW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.