Narrative:

On friday, 9/2004, I was the captain of a B777-200. We originated our flight in ZZZ, and were now scheduled to fly den-ZZZ1 with the majority of the same cabin crew and the same aircraft. Upon arrival at the gate in den, customer service entered the gate and began to deplane passenger as we were 12 minutes late and had a quick turn. First officer and I had just completed the parking checklist and were about to leave the cockpit to say goodbye to the passenger that were deplaning when FAA air carrier inspector mr X entered the cockpit and introduced himself and advised us that he would be conducting an en route inspection to ZZZ1 with us. Mr X then left the cockpit and introduced himself to the cabin crew while the first officer debriefed a den mechanic about the state of the aircraft. At this first introduction, mr X explained to us that he would need to see our license and medical certificates and that he was going to check all of the flight attendant manuals. It became apparent at this first meeting with inspector 'X' that his manner of conducting an en route inspection was going to cause interference with the normal operation of the flight. I advised mr X that we were going to operations to obtain our dispatch release and flight plan and that we would present our licenses upon returning to the aircraft. Upon returning to the aircraft, I observed mr X had summoned all the flight attendant forward and was methodically checking their names on the crew manifest to their identification badge names and then conducting an inspection of each of their manuals. I could see several fas standing in a line, in the first class cabin, waiting to have their manuals inspected and looking quite concerned. I asked one of the fas if there was a problem and they informed me that the agent wanted to board the aircraft and that we had some new fas that had just joined us in den and that this waiting in line was not allowing the fas the opportunity to conduct their normal preflight operations. I then had a chance to overhear a portion of the critique that mr X was providing to some of the fas while he was inspecting their manuals. He was critiquing one of the fas that the location of the information in their manuals was incorrect and in doing so he was inferring that the manual may be considered as not being current and thus in violation on the far's. The flight attendant was required to take the time and explain that they use these pages in question regularly and that it was more useful to have the pages in a place in the manuals that was easily available. After entering the cockpit, the first officer and I began to conduct our preflight SOP's when mr X again entered the cockpit. He picked up the new logbook binder from the jumpseat and threw it onto the center console between us where it landed with a loud 'bang.' at first I was surprised by this action and was not sure what was going on. I looked back from my seat to observe mr X, while first officer reached for the logbook. Seeing first officer picking up the logbook, mr X loudly exclaimed, 'no I want the captain to tell me what is wrong with this?' I picked up the logbook and said that I did not know what he was talking about. He then asked again, in voice and manner normally reserved for what might have been considered appropriate for an oral examination 30 years ago, 'well captain, what is wrong with this logbook?' I was very surprised at the manner of questioning that was coming from mr X. I told him I did not know and he said that there were 3 minor cabin deferrals in the book and only 2 MEL placards in the pouch. He went on to insinuate that since we brought the airplane in we were operating illegally. We explained that maintenance was in the cockpit while we were in dispatch and that we had no idea what, if any, paperwork had been added or removed but that we would request a complete new set of placards via ACARS, which first officer in fact did. After the inspection of my pilot's certificate, mr X commented that at lease I knew what a cyclic and collective are, to which I jokingly responded, 'yes, I'm afraid I do.' it was clear from his facial expressions that I had apparently offended him as he asked with a scowl on his face, 'what do you mean by that comment?' I then explained that I had flown helicopters in the us military and was very happy to be here today. This explanation did not appear to situation well with him. This interference with the fas prior to departure and his overbearing and confrontational attitude prior to departure set a somber mood in the cockpit that was counter productive to the safe and efficient operation of the flight. Prior to departure I advised mr X that I expected him to be an active member of the crew and that if he observed anything out of the ordinary we wanted to hear it from him. He assured us that he would provide input in a timely manner and there would be no surprises if he observed anything out of the ordinary. During the taxi out, we received a call from the cabin. Since this was an unusual time to receive a cabin call, I listened to the conversation between first officer and the purser, I heard that someone was standing and seats were being swapped. I then stopped the aircraft on the taxiway. I later learned that it was not passenger that were swapping seats, but some of our fas. Apparently when the new fas joined us in den they did not have the opportunity to be completely briefed by the purser, due to the fact that their normal flow of operation had been disrupted and delayed as a result of the time taken to stand in a line to have their manuals and company identification's inspected prior to departure. Once reaching cruise, mr X asked to see the logbook again and we revisited the issue of MEL placards. He showed us that the hot plate in the galley was written up as inoperative. He then explained that we did not have the MEL placard for the hot plate. I contacted maintenance control and we determined that the original maintenance code that had been entered for the inoperative hot plate was incorrect and that one digit of the correct code was missing. We provided the correct reference number and maintenance control updated the release and issued the correct MEL placard for the log. During the FMS visual approach to ZZZ1 our approach clearance was cancelled at approximately 6000 ft and we were given delay vectors away from the field to sequence us behind other traffic. During the extended vectors south of the runway xx centerline, during a low workload time, first officer pointed out one of the local VFR visual landmarks below us. I did not respond or comment and we subsequently received our approach clearance and landed uneventfully on runway xx and taxied to the gate. After the flight, mr X debriefed us on the MEL placard issue. He advised us that since it was now taken care of with the in-flight maintenance control contact, he would consider that to be the end of it. He then turned to the first officer and admonished him that the comments during the approach were a violation of the sterile cockpit rule and that it was inappropriate. First officer accepted the critique and mr X then left the aircraft. On monday morning, 9/2004, I received a phone call from assistant chief pilot explaining that he had received a phone call from mr X who explained the issue that we had with the MEL discrepancy and the alleged violation of the sterile cockpit rule. In reflecting on this en route check I was very disappointed in the conduct of mr X. His disruption of the fas normal procedures, prior to departure placed the entire crew on edge and lowered the level of safety of our operation. His personal conduct in the cockpit, with the throwing of the logbook onto the center console and then his demeaning and overbearing questioning to know what was wrong with the logbook, was totally unprofessional behavior. It has been many years since I have witnessed this type of behavior in the cockpit. This confrontational and obnoxious behavior is what lead this industry to institute CRM as an industry standard to enhance and promote aviation safety. Luckily this type of behavior has greatly diminished in the ranks of professional pilots industry wide, but unfortunately we still have a few individuals that just don't 'get it.' I regret that the behavior I witnessed in mr X, an agent of the FAA, during this en route check is a classic example of how an overbearing insensitive crewmember can cause distractions and reduce the level of safety in the operation by putting fellow crewmembers ill at ease for the entire flight. My confidence in the FAA is reduced as a result of the encounter with mr X. When an official representing the FAA indicates at the completion of a flight that the issues he discussed with us in the debriefing are concluded, I trust that he is telling the truth. I trust that will be the end of the issue. In short, I expect the truth out of the man and in this case we were let down when he chose to contact company management with these issues in contradiction to what he indicated to us during the debriefing. As a result of this observed behavior in mr X, I am now faced with a decision in the future should mr X conduct an en route check on my aircraft. Will I allow him to disrupt the cabin crew again? Now that I know that I cannot trust what he says during a debriefing, will I be able to safely concentrate on conducting a safe operation or will I be significantly distracted to the point that I can not operate at the highest level of safety that the FAA and company expect of me and my crew? This is not a position that I appreciate being placed in and it is entirely avoidable with changes in the manner of mr X's approach to the job and interpersonal communication skills. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the captain indicated this inspector has an infamous reputation in all chief pilot's offices with this air carrier. The captain thinks the inspector is dangerous, because he disrupts things so much, and alienates people. The pilot will not fly with the inspector again, even if he has to call in sick.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777-200. RPTR ALLEGES AN FAA AIR CARRIER INSPECTOR DELAYED PAX BOARDING, DELAYED THE FLT DEPARTURE, DISRUPTED FLT ATTENDANTS' DUTIES, ALSO DISRUPTED FLT CREW DUTIES, WHEN GIVING AN ENRTE CHECK. THE INSPECTOR ALSO THREW THE ACFT LOGBOOK ONTO THE PEDESTAL.

Narrative: ON FRIDAY, 9/2004, I WAS THE CAPT OF A B777-200. WE ORIGINATED OUR FLT IN ZZZ, AND WERE NOW SCHEDULED TO FLY DEN-ZZZ1 WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE SAME CABIN CREW AND THE SAME ACFT. UPON ARR AT THE GATE IN DEN, CUSTOMER SVC ENTERED THE GATE AND BEGAN TO DEPLANE PAX AS WE WERE 12 MINUTES LATE AND HAD A QUICK TURN. FO AND I HAD JUST COMPLETED THE PARKING CHKLIST AND WERE ABOUT TO LEAVE THE COCKPIT TO SAY GOODBYE TO THE PAX THAT WERE DEPLANING WHEN FAA AIR CARRIER INSPECTOR MR X ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND INTRODUCED HIMSELF AND ADVISED US THAT HE WOULD BE CONDUCTING AN ENRTE INSPECTION TO ZZZ1 WITH US. MR X THEN LEFT THE COCKPIT AND INTRODUCED HIMSELF TO THE CABIN CREW WHILE THE FO DEBRIEFED A DEN MECHANIC ABOUT THE STATE OF THE ACFT. AT THIS FIRST INTRODUCTION, MR X EXPLAINED TO US THAT HE WOULD NEED TO SEE OUR LICENSE AND MEDICAL CERTIFICATES AND THAT HE WAS GOING TO CHECK ALL OF THE FA MANUALS. IT BECAME APPARENT AT THIS FIRST MEETING WITH INSPECTOR 'X' THAT HIS MANNER OF CONDUCTING AN ENRTE INSPECTION WAS GOING TO CAUSE INTERFERENCE WITH THE NORMAL OPERATION OF THE FLT. I ADVISED MR X THAT WE WERE GOING TO OPS TO OBTAIN OUR DISPATCH RELEASE AND FLT PLAN AND THAT WE WOULD PRESENT OUR LICENSES UPON RETURNING TO THE ACFT. UPON RETURNING TO THE ACFT, I OBSERVED MR X HAD SUMMONED ALL THE FA FORWARD AND WAS METHODICALLY CHECKING THEIR NAMES ON THE CREW MANIFEST TO THEIR ID BADGE NAMES AND THEN CONDUCTING AN INSPECTION OF EACH OF THEIR MANUALS. I COULD SEE SEVERAL FAS STANDING IN A LINE, IN THE FIRST CLASS CABIN, WAITING TO HAVE THEIR MANUALS INSPECTED AND LOOKING QUITE CONCERNED. I ASKED ONE OF THE FAS IF THERE WAS A PROB AND THEY INFORMED ME THAT THE AGENT WANTED TO BOARD THE ACFT AND THAT WE HAD SOME NEW FAS THAT HAD JUST JOINED US IN DEN AND THAT THIS WAITING IN LINE WAS NOT ALLOWING THE FAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT THEIR NORMAL PREFLT OPS. I THEN HAD A CHANCE TO OVERHEAR A PORTION OF THE CRITIQUE THAT MR X WAS PROVIDING TO SOME OF THE FAS WHILE HE WAS INSPECTING THEIR MANUALS. HE WAS CRITIQUING ONE OF THE FAS THAT THE LOCATION OF THE INFO IN THEIR MANUALS WAS INCORRECT AND IN DOING SO HE WAS INFERRING THAT THE MANUAL MAY BE CONSIDERED AS NOT BEING CURRENT AND THUS IN VIOLATION ON THE FAR'S. THE FA WAS REQUIRED TO TAKE THE TIME AND EXPLAIN THAT THEY USE THESE PAGES IN QUESTION REGULARLY AND THAT IT WAS MORE USEFUL TO HAVE THE PAGES IN A PLACE IN THE MANUALS THAT WAS EASILY AVAILABLE. AFTER ENTERING THE COCKPIT, THE FO AND I BEGAN TO CONDUCT OUR PREFLT SOP'S WHEN MR X AGAIN ENTERED THE COCKPIT. HE PICKED UP THE NEW LOGBOOK BINDER FROM THE JUMPSEAT AND THREW IT ONTO THE CENTER CONSOLE BETWEEN US WHERE IT LANDED WITH A LOUD 'BANG.' AT FIRST I WAS SURPRISED BY THIS ACTION AND WAS NOT SURE WHAT WAS GOING ON. I LOOKED BACK FROM MY SEAT TO OBSERVE MR X, WHILE FO REACHED FOR THE LOGBOOK. SEEING FO PICKING UP THE LOGBOOK, MR X LOUDLY EXCLAIMED, 'NO I WANT THE CAPT TO TELL ME WHAT IS WRONG WITH THIS?' I PICKED UP THE LOGBOOK AND SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT. HE THEN ASKED AGAIN, IN VOICE AND MANNER NORMALLY RESERVED FOR WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE FOR AN ORAL EXAM 30 YEARS AGO, 'WELL CAPT, WHAT IS WRONG WITH THIS LOGBOOK?' I WAS VERY SURPRISED AT THE MANNER OF QUESTIONING THAT WAS COMING FROM MR X. I TOLD HIM I DID NOT KNOW AND HE SAID THAT THERE WERE 3 MINOR CABIN DEFERRALS IN THE BOOK AND ONLY 2 MEL PLACARDS IN THE POUCH. HE WENT ON TO INSINUATE THAT SINCE WE BROUGHT THE AIRPLANE IN WE WERE OPERATING ILLEGALLY. WE EXPLAINED THAT MAINT WAS IN THE COCKPIT WHILE WE WERE IN DISPATCH AND THAT WE HAD NO IDEA WHAT, IF ANY, PAPERWORK HAD BEEN ADDED OR REMOVED BUT THAT WE WOULD REQUEST A COMPLETE NEW SET OF PLACARDS VIA ACARS, WHICH FO IN FACT DID. AFTER THE INSPECTION OF MY PLT'S CERTIFICATE, MR X COMMENTED THAT AT LEASE I KNEW WHAT A CYCLIC AND COLLECTIVE ARE, TO WHICH I JOKINGLY RESPONDED, 'YES, I'M AFRAID I DO.' IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS FACIAL EXPRESSIONS THAT I HAD APPARENTLY OFFENDED HIM AS HE ASKED WITH A SCOWL ON HIS FACE, 'WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT COMMENT?' I THEN EXPLAINED THAT I HAD FLOWN HELICOPTERS IN THE US MIL AND WAS VERY HAPPY TO BE HERE TODAY. THIS EXPLANATION DID NOT APPEAR TO SIT WELL WITH HIM. THIS INTERFERENCE WITH THE FAS PRIOR TO DEP AND HIS OVERBEARING AND CONFRONTATIONAL ATTITUDE PRIOR TO DEP SET A SOMBER MOOD IN THE COCKPIT THAT WAS COUNTER PRODUCTIVE TO THE SAFE AND EFFICIENT OP OF THE FLT. PRIOR TO DEP I ADVISED MR X THAT I EXPECTED HIM TO BE AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE CREW AND THAT IF HE OBSERVED ANYTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY WE WANTED TO HEAR IT FROM HIM. HE ASSURED US THAT HE WOULD PROVIDE INPUT IN A TIMELY MANNER AND THERE WOULD BE NO SURPRISES IF HE OBSERVED ANYTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY. DURING THE TAXI OUT, WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE CABIN. SINCE THIS WAS AN UNUSUAL TIME TO RECEIVE A CABIN CALL, I LISTENED TO THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FO AND THE PURSER, I HEARD THAT SOMEONE WAS STANDING AND SEATS WERE BEING SWAPPED. I THEN STOPPED THE ACFT ON THE TXWY. I LATER LEARNED THAT IT WAS NOT PAX THAT WERE SWAPPING SEATS, BUT SOME OF OUR FAS. APPARENTLY WHEN THE NEW FAS JOINED US IN DEN THEY DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE COMPLETELY BRIEFED BY THE PURSER, DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEIR NORMAL FLOW OF OPERATION HAD BEEN DISRUPTED AND DELAYED AS A RESULT OF THE TIME TAKEN TO STAND IN A LINE TO HAVE THEIR MANUALS AND COMPANY ID'S INSPECTED PRIOR TO DEP. ONCE REACHING CRUISE, MR X ASKED TO SEE THE LOGBOOK AGAIN AND WE REVISITED THE ISSUE OF MEL PLACARDS. HE SHOWED US THAT THE HOT PLATE IN THE GALLEY WAS WRITTEN UP AS INOP. HE THEN EXPLAINED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE THE MEL PLACARD FOR THE HOT PLATE. I CONTACTED MAINT CTL AND WE DETERMINED THAT THE ORIGINAL MAINT CODE THAT HAD BEEN ENTERED FOR THE INOP HOT PLATE WAS INCORRECT AND THAT ONE DIGIT OF THE CORRECT CODE WAS MISSING. WE PROVIDED THE CORRECT REFERENCE NUMBER AND MAINT CTL UPDATED THE RELEASE AND ISSUED THE CORRECT MEL PLACARD FOR THE LOG. DURING THE FMS VISUAL APCH TO ZZZ1 OUR APCH CLRNC WAS CANCELLED AT APPROX 6000 FT AND WE WERE GIVEN DELAY VECTORS AWAY FROM THE FIELD TO SEQUENCE US BEHIND OTHER TFC. DURING THE EXTENDED VECTORS S OF THE RWY XX CTRLINE, DURING A LOW WORKLOAD TIME, FO POINTED OUT ONE OF THE LOCAL VFR VISUAL LANDMARKS BELOW US. I DID NOT RESPOND OR COMMENT AND WE SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED OUR APCH CLRNC AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY ON RWY XX AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. AFTER THE FLT, MR X DEBRIEFED US ON THE MEL PLACARD ISSUE. HE ADVISED US THAT SINCE IT WAS NOW TAKEN CARE OF WITH THE INFLT MAINT CTL CONTACT, HE WOULD CONSIDER THAT TO BE THE END OF IT. HE THEN TURNED TO THE FO AND ADMONISHED HIM THAT THE COMMENTS DURING THE APCH WERE A VIOLATION OF THE STERILE COCKPIT RULE AND THAT IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE. FO ACCEPTED THE CRITIQUE AND MR X THEN LEFT THE ACFT. ON MONDAY MORNING, 9/2004, I RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM MR X WHO EXPLAINED THE ISSUE THAT WE HAD WITH THE MEL DISCREPANCY AND THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE STERILE COCKPIT RULE. IN REFLECTING ON THIS ENRTE CHK I WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED IN THE CONDUCT OF MR X. HIS DISRUPTION OF THE FAS NORMAL PROCS, PRIOR TO DEP PLACED THE ENTIRE CREW ON EDGE AND LOWERED THE LEVEL OF SAFETY OF OUR OPERATION. HIS PERSONAL CONDUCT IN THE COCKPIT, WITH THE THROWING OF THE LOGBOOK ONTO THE CENTER CONSOLE AND THEN HIS DEMEANING AND OVERBEARING QUESTIONING TO KNOW WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE LOGBOOK, WAS TOTALLY UNPROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR. IT HAS BEEN MANY YEARS SINCE I HAVE WITNESSED THIS TYPE OF BEHAVIOR IN THE COCKPIT. THIS CONFRONTATIONAL AND OBNOXIOUS BEHAVIOR IS WHAT LEAD THIS INDUSTRY TO INSTITUTE CRM AS AN INDUSTRY STANDARD TO ENHANCE AND PROMOTE AVIATION SAFETY. LUCKILY THIS TYPE OF BEHAVIOR HAS GREATLY DIMINISHED IN THE RANKS OF PROFESSIONAL PLTS INDUSTRY WIDE, BUT UNFORTUNATELY WE STILL HAVE A FEW INDIVIDUALS THAT JUST DON'T 'GET IT.' I REGRET THAT THE BEHAVIOR I WITNESSED IN MR X, AN AGENT OF THE FAA, DURING THIS ENRTE CHECK IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF HOW AN OVERBEARING INSENSITIVE CREWMEMBER CAN CAUSE DISTRACTIONS AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF SAFETY IN THE OPERATION BY PUTTING FELLOW CREWMEMBERS ILL AT EASE FOR THE ENTIRE FLT. MY CONFIDENCE IN THE FAA IS REDUCED AS A RESULT OF THE ENCOUNTER WITH MR X. WHEN AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTING THE FAA INDICATES AT THE COMPLETION OF A FLT THAT THE ISSUES HE DISCUSSED WITH US IN THE DEBRIEFING ARE CONCLUDED, I TRUST THAT HE IS TELLING THE TRUTH. I TRUST THAT WILL BE THE END OF THE ISSUE. IN SHORT, I EXPECT THE TRUTH OUT OF THE MAN AND IN THIS CASE WE WERE LET DOWN WHEN HE CHOSE TO CONTACT COMPANY MANAGEMENT WITH THESE ISSUES IN CONTRADICTION TO WHAT HE INDICATED TO US DURING THE DEBRIEFING. AS A RESULT OF THIS OBSERVED BEHAVIOR IN MR X, I AM NOW FACED WITH A DECISION IN THE FUTURE SHOULD MR X CONDUCT AN ENRTE CHK ON MY ACFT. WILL I ALLOW HIM TO DISRUPT THE CABIN CREW AGAIN? NOW THAT I KNOW THAT I CANNOT TRUST WHAT HE SAYS DURING A DEBRIEFING, WILL I BE ABLE TO SAFELY CONCENTRATE ON CONDUCTING A SAFE OP OR WILL I BE SIGNIFICANTLY DISTRACTED TO THE POINT THAT I CAN NOT OPERATE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF SAFETY THAT THE FAA AND COMPANY EXPECT OF ME AND MY CREW? THIS IS NOT A POSITION THAT I APPRECIATE BEING PLACED IN AND IT IS ENTIRELY AVOIDABLE WITH CHANGES IN THE MANNER OF MR X'S APPROACH TO THE JOB AND INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION SKILLS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT INDICATED THIS INSPECTOR HAS AN INFAMOUS REPUTATION IN ALL CHIEF PLT'S OFFICES WITH THIS ACR. THE CAPT THINKS THE INSPECTOR IS DANGEROUS, BECAUSE HE DISRUPTS THINGS SO MUCH, AND ALIENATES PEOPLE. THE PLT WILL NOT FLY WITH THE INSPECTOR AGAIN, EVEN IF HE HAS TO CALL IN SICK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.