Narrative:

I was invited by maintenance manager to observe an engine run on airbus 300. I encouraged my crew to view this maintenance function as a learning tool for all 3 crew members. We received company permission for all three of us to go with maintenance during their engine run. After arriving at the aircraft, maintenance asked that we assist running up the engines while they performed their maintenance duties and engine recordings. The maintenance technician explained that he needed to record engine readings with our engine manager. I stated to him in a serious tone that we would do our best to help as instructed. I asked him to make all his instructions loud and clear and reiterated that he was in charge of this aircraft. He agreed that it was his aircraft. The maintenance technician maintained phone contact with maintenance manager. We followed the engine run-up procedures as instructed by maintenance. All engine readings were recorded by the maintenance technician and then dictated over the phone. After each engine run the maintenance technician and maintenance manager discussed their results. A series of power settings included running the engines at ground idle, flight idle, 104% and takeoff thrust of 115.1% were performed. After the prescribed time, takeoff thrust was set both manually and with the autothrottle system. The maintenance technician relayed this reading. I recall some of the engine readings that were recorded by maintenance: 1) with takeoff thrust set at 115.1 N1 (no autothrottles), #1 engine egt stabilized to 950 degrees C, #2 engines stabilized at approximately 970 degrees and stayed at this level for 20 seconds before we were directed by maintenance to reduce power. Maintenance instructed us to again stabilize the engines as ground idle and began a series of other power settings. 2) a total of 2 autothrottle takeoff thrust functions were performed. I observed the following during this maintenance test: autothrottle test one: at takeoff thrust the #1 engine egt stabilized at 950 degrees C and the #2 engine exceeded 960 degrees (overtemp). The throttles were immediately brought back to ground idle. The maintenance technician and maintenance manager had a long discussion on the phone. I was not privy to the content of their conversation. There appeared to be a disagreement of test results. We were instructed by maintenance manager to repeat the same test again. I discussed my concern about the #2 engine overtemp above 960 degrees C. I was assured that this was a normal maintenance check function. Autothrottle test two: the second autothrottle takeoff thrust test again exceeded 960 degrees C on the #2 engine for period of 33 seconds. The temperature exceeded 973 degrees C and was still climbing when we were instructed by maintenance to reduce the power on both engines to ground idle thrust. I do not recall the egt on the left engine during this maintenance test. The test results were discussed between the maintenance technician and maintenance manager for several mins. We were then instructed by the maintenance technician to return the aircraft to the ramp. We were dismissed by maintenance and disembarked the aircraft. Maintenance personnel continued their duties on said aircraft. We returned to the hotel. It has never been a practice at air carrier to require non maintenance personnel to interfere or enter their observations in the aircraft logbook. This was a maintenance function. I was invited to come along on the maintenance engine run to learn and taxi their aircraft while they were performing their duties. They were short handed with maintenance personnel and needed someone to taxi the aircraft. Before leaving the ramp for the engine run, it was made and understood by all that this was maintenance aircraft and the pilots would assist in taxiing only, and had limited experience with maintenance functions and procedures.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A300 ENG PERFORMANCE RUN WAS CONDUCTED BY A CAPT DUE TO LACK OF QUALIFIED RUN TECHNICIANS. CAPT IS CONCERNED ABOUT #2 ENG EXHAUST GAS TEMP EXCEEDENCE AT TKOF PWR SETTINGS.

Narrative: I WAS INVITED BY MAINT MGR TO OBSERVE AN ENG RUN ON AIRBUS 300. I ENCOURAGED MY CREW TO VIEW THIS MAINT FUNCTION AS A LEARNING TOOL FOR ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS. WE RECEIVED COMPANY PERMISSION FOR ALL THREE OF US TO GO WITH MAINT DURING THEIR ENG RUN. AFTER ARRIVING AT THE ACFT, MAINT ASKED THAT WE ASSIST RUNNING UP THE ENGS WHILE THEY PERFORMED THEIR MAINT DUTIES AND ENG RECORDINGS. THE MAINT TECHNICIAN EXPLAINED THAT HE NEEDED TO RECORD ENG READINGS WITH OUR ENG MGR. I STATED TO HIM IN A SERIOUS TONE THAT WE WOULD DO OUR BEST TO HELP AS INSTRUCTED. I ASKED HIM TO MAKE ALL HIS INSTRUCTIONS LOUD AND CLR AND REITERATED THAT HE WAS IN CHARGE OF THIS ACFT. HE AGREED THAT IT WAS HIS ACFT. THE MAINT TECHNICIAN MAINTAINED PHONE CONTACT WITH MAINT MGR. WE FOLLOWED THE ENG RUN-UP PROCS AS INSTRUCTED BY MAINT. ALL ENG READINGS WERE RECORDED BY THE MAINT TECHNICIAN AND THEN DICTATED OVER THE PHONE. AFTER EACH ENG RUN THE MAINT TECHNICIAN AND MAINT MGR DISCUSSED THEIR RESULTS. A SERIES OF PWR SETTINGS INCLUDED RUNNING THE ENGS AT GND IDLE, FLT IDLE, 104% AND TKOF THRUST OF 115.1% WERE PERFORMED. AFTER THE PRESCRIBED TIME, TKOF THRUST WAS SET BOTH MANUALLY AND WITH THE AUTOTHROTTLE SYS. THE MAINT TECHNICIAN RELAYED THIS READING. I RECALL SOME OF THE ENG READINGS THAT WERE RECORDED BY MAINT: 1) WITH TKOF THRUST SET AT 115.1 N1 (NO AUTOTHROTTLES), #1 ENG EGT STABILIZED TO 950 DEGS C, #2 ENGS STABILIZED AT APPROX 970 DEGS AND STAYED AT THIS LEVEL FOR 20 SECONDS BEFORE WE WERE DIRECTED BY MAINT TO REDUCE PWR. MAINT INSTRUCTED US TO AGAIN STABILIZE THE ENGS AS GND IDLE AND BEGAN A SERIES OF OTHER PWR SETTINGS. 2) A TOTAL OF 2 AUTOTHROTTLE TKOF THRUST FUNCTIONS WERE PERFORMED. I OBSERVED THE FOLLOWING DURING THIS MAINT TEST: AUTOTHROTTLE TEST ONE: AT TKOF THRUST THE #1 ENG EGT STABILIZED AT 950 DEGS C AND THE #2 ENG EXCEEDED 960 DEGS (OVERTEMP). THE THROTTLES WERE IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT BACK TO GND IDLE. THE MAINT TECHNICIAN AND MAINT MGR HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON THE PHONE. I WAS NOT PRIVY TO THE CONTENT OF THEIR CONVERSATION. THERE APPEARED TO BE A DISAGREEMENT OF TEST RESULTS. WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY MAINT MGR TO REPEAT THE SAME TEST AGAIN. I DISCUSSED MY CONCERN ABOUT THE #2 ENG OVERTEMP ABOVE 960 DEGS C. I WAS ASSURED THAT THIS WAS A NORMAL MAINT CHK FUNCTION. AUTOTHROTTLE TEST TWO: THE SECOND AUTOTHROTTLE TKOF THRUST TEST AGAIN EXCEEDED 960 DEGS C ON THE #2 ENG FOR PERIOD OF 33 SECONDS. THE TEMP EXCEEDED 973 DEGS C AND WAS STILL CLBING WHEN WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY MAINT TO REDUCE THE PWR ON BOTH ENGS TO GND IDLE THRUST. I DO NOT RECALL THE EGT ON THE L ENG DURING THIS MAINT TEST. THE TEST RESULTS WERE DISCUSSED BTWN THE MAINT TECHNICIAN AND MAINT MGR FOR SEVERAL MINS. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED BY THE MAINT TECHNICIAN TO RETURN THE ACFT TO THE RAMP. WE WERE DISMISSED BY MAINT AND DISEMBARKED THE ACFT. MAINT PERSONNEL CONTINUED THEIR DUTIES ON SAID ACFT. WE RETURNED TO THE HOTEL. IT HAS NEVER BEEN A PRACTICE AT ACR TO REQUIRE NON MAINT PERSONNEL TO INTERFERE OR ENTER THEIR OBSERVATIONS IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK. THIS WAS A MAINT FUNCTION. I WAS INVITED TO COME ALONG ON THE MAINT ENG RUN TO LEARN AND TAXI THEIR ACFT WHILE THEY WERE PERFORMING THEIR DUTIES. THEY WERE SHORT HANDED WITH MAINT PERSONNEL AND NEEDED SOMEONE TO TAXI THE ACFT. BEFORE LEAVING THE RAMP FOR THE ENG RUN, IT WAS MADE AND UNDERSTOOD BY ALL THAT THIS WAS MAINT ACFT AND THE PLTS WOULD ASSIST IN TAXIING ONLY, AND HAD LIMITED EXPERIENCE WITH MAINT FUNCTIONS AND PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.