Narrative:

En route ewr-phl, along V-30 between sbj and etx vors, switched from new york approach to allentown approach. Allentown controller accepted handoff and said 'air carrier X, philly is having us hold incoming traffic, expect a turn to pottstown shortly and 1 maybe 2 turns in a hold on the inbound radial at the 10 DME fix.' now prepared for some kind of holding clearance, I broke out the pen and paper, ready to copy a clearance. Meanwhile, the controller was issuing a full, formal holding clearance to an air carrier Y DHC8. Once finished with air carrier Y, the controller cleared us direct to pottsown. The captain selected direct to pottstown on the FMS and then the controller said 'air carrier X, hold on the 15 mi DME fix on the inbound radial, right turns, 10 mi legs, and expect further clearance at XXXX time.' as I was copying down the clearance, the captain was trying to program the hold into the FMS, but the FMS would not accept the holding fix because we had already passed it. The controller had issued us the clearance too late and we had passed the fix. As the seconds passed, the captain fumbled and cursed at the FMS as I watched. This point here is important for 2 reasons: 1) company policy says under 10000 ft the PNF operates the single FMS (this is frequently broken as the FMS panel is on the captain's side of center panel). 2) I was reluctant to take either the plane or the FMS from the captain because he was very old and very senior and had been intimidating me the whole trip. By this point the controller had noticed that we had passed the 15 DME fix and told us 'you can take a little extra room to get established outbound.' at that point I took the airplane from the captain and with the heading bug flew outbound 180 degrees from what we had been flying inbound. My navigation source was still selected as the FMS, which is unfortunate because at that point, in the captain's dealings with the FMS, we lost the course we had been flying inbound to the VOR. Additionally we couldn't simply select the VOR as the navigation source and track the inbound assigned radial because the controller never assigned us one. Therefore, we were left guessing. To compound matters, the captain and I couldn't agree on what headings to fly therefore, we were flying around by the seat of our pants. While all this debating was going on, we also got 30 KTS slow -- not dangerous at that point, but sloppy and potentially dangerous. I myself have learned a couple things: 1) stand up for myself, if I don't like something speak up. I should have taken the FMS or the airplane earlier. 2) when I'm the PF, fly the airplane! Don't let the captain or the FMS distract me. 3) when having problems with the FMS, switch the navigation source to the VOR as soon as possible and fly it old school. 4) don't be afraid to ask ATC to clarify a clearance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 CREW IMPROPERLY ENTERED A HOLDING PATTERN IN ABE CLASS E AIRSPACE.

Narrative: ENRTE EWR-PHL, ALONG V-30 BTWN SBJ AND ETX VORS, SWITCHED FROM NEW YORK APCH TO ALLENTOWN APCH. ALLENTOWN CTLR ACCEPTED HDOF AND SAID 'ACR X, PHILLY IS HAVING US HOLD INCOMING TFC, EXPECT A TURN TO POTTSTOWN SHORTLY AND 1 MAYBE 2 TURNS IN A HOLD ON THE INBOUND RADIAL AT THE 10 DME FIX.' NOW PREPARED FOR SOME KIND OF HOLDING CLRNC, I BROKE OUT THE PEN AND PAPER, READY TO COPY A CLRNC. MEANWHILE, THE CTLR WAS ISSUING A FULL, FORMAL HOLDING CLRNC TO AN ACR Y DHC8. ONCE FINISHED WITH ACR Y, THE CTLR CLRED US DIRECT TO POTTSOWN. THE CAPT SELECTED DIRECT TO POTTSTOWN ON THE FMS AND THEN THE CTLR SAID 'ACR X, HOLD ON THE 15 MI DME FIX ON THE INBOUND RADIAL, R TURNS, 10 MI LEGS, AND EXPECT FURTHER CLRNC AT XXXX TIME.' AS I WAS COPYING DOWN THE CLRNC, THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO PROGRAM THE HOLD INTO THE FMS, BUT THE FMS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE HOLDING FIX BECAUSE WE HAD ALREADY PASSED IT. THE CTLR HAD ISSUED US THE CLRNC TOO LATE AND WE HAD PASSED THE FIX. AS THE SECONDS PASSED, THE CAPT FUMBLED AND CURSED AT THE FMS AS I WATCHED. THIS POINT HERE IS IMPORTANT FOR 2 REASONS: 1) COMPANY POLICY SAYS UNDER 10000 FT THE PNF OPERATES THE SINGLE FMS (THIS IS FREQUENTLY BROKEN AS THE FMS PANEL IS ON THE CAPT'S SIDE OF CTR PANEL). 2) I WAS RELUCTANT TO TAKE EITHER THE PLANE OR THE FMS FROM THE CAPT BECAUSE HE WAS VERY OLD AND VERY SENIOR AND HAD BEEN INTIMIDATING ME THE WHOLE TRIP. BY THIS POINT THE CTLR HAD NOTICED THAT WE HAD PASSED THE 15 DME FIX AND TOLD US 'YOU CAN TAKE A LITTLE EXTRA ROOM TO GET ESTABLISHED OUTBOUND.' AT THAT POINT I TOOK THE AIRPLANE FROM THE CAPT AND WITH THE HDG BUG FLEW OUTBOUND 180 DEGS FROM WHAT WE HAD BEEN FLYING INBOUND. MY NAV SOURCE WAS STILL SELECTED AS THE FMS, WHICH IS UNFORTUNATE BECAUSE AT THAT POINT, IN THE CAPT'S DEALINGS WITH THE FMS, WE LOST THE COURSE WE HAD BEEN FLYING INBOUND TO THE VOR. ADDITIONALLY WE COULDN'T SIMPLY SELECT THE VOR AS THE NAV SOURCE AND TRACK THE INBOUND ASSIGNED RADIAL BECAUSE THE CTLR NEVER ASSIGNED US ONE. THEREFORE, WE WERE LEFT GUESSING. TO COMPOUND MATTERS, THE CAPT AND I COULDN'T AGREE ON WHAT HDGS TO FLY THEREFORE, WE WERE FLYING AROUND BY THE SEAT OF OUR PANTS. WHILE ALL THIS DEBATING WAS GOING ON, WE ALSO GOT 30 KTS SLOW -- NOT DANGEROUS AT THAT POINT, BUT SLOPPY AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS. I MYSELF HAVE LEARNED A COUPLE THINGS: 1) STAND UP FOR MYSELF, IF I DON'T LIKE SOMETHING SPEAK UP. I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE FMS OR THE AIRPLANE EARLIER. 2) WHEN I'M THE PF, FLY THE AIRPLANE! DON'T LET THE CAPT OR THE FMS DISTRACT ME. 3) WHEN HAVING PROBS WITH THE FMS, SWITCH THE NAV SOURCE TO THE VOR ASAP AND FLY IT OLD SCHOOL. 4) DON'T BE AFRAID TO ASK ATC TO CLARIFY A CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.