Narrative:

On an IFR flight from cid to cys with den as an alternate, our aircraft was being operated in IMC conditions. En route we were monitoring the cheyenne WX via a hand-held pda equipped with an 'anywhere map' xm WX satellite WX capability. Approaching cys we heard the ZDV controller advise an aircraft in front of us that other aircraft attempting to land at cys had recently missed the approach were in the process of diverting to another location, specifically ako. Upon hearing that another aircraft was diverting to ako I made what I now feel was a 'less than well thought out decision.' in anticipation of the WX not getting any better at cys we requested ZDV to divert to ako instead of heading to our filed alternate at denver. Unfortunately before requesting, and receiving, a revised clearance into ako we did not check to make sure that the ako approach plate was available to us in the aircraft. After several mins of searching we realized that we did not have the ako approach plates on board. We then contacted FSS in an attempt to get a verbal description of an appropriate ako approach because we did not want to clutter an already congested center frequency. Unfortunately, the FSS briefer responded with, 'I don't have those and even if I did I'm not a pilot.' at that point we asked the FSS briefer to suggest any field within 100 mi that was reporting VFR conditions. While waiting for a reply from the FSS briefer the obviously busy center controller informed us to anticipate holding at the ako VOR while we waited for the aircraft in front of us to complete its approach into ako. Rather than wait to hear back from FSS regarding a VFR alternate we somewhat reluctantly informed center that we did not have the ako plates. Without missing a beat, or giving us any well deserved grief, the center controller asked us which approach into ako we wanted. From the xm WX we knew that the winds favored runway 11 and we requested an approach for that runway. Very soon afterwards the controller informed us that the only approach into runway 11 at ako was an RNAV approach but that there was a VOR approach into runway 29. We responded that we would like the VOR runway 29 approach and without missing a beat the controller began providing us with a verbal description of the VOR runway 29 approach into ako. I copied the approach description and even answered in the 'negative' when the controller asked if I had any questions regarding what we needed to do. Yet somehow, once we were cleared for the ako approach I still managed to misinterpret our instructions and made an initial turn away from the airport versus towards it. In other words, I turned outbound on the 110 degree radial (heading 110 degrees) versus inbound on the 110 degree radial heading 290 degrees. Once I realized that the DME was increasing and that I had configured the HSI to track the 110 degree radial outbound versus the 290 degree radial inbound I made what I now feel was another poor judgement call. We had been cleared for the approach, switched to the unicom frequency, and were VMC at our last assigned 'cruise altitude' so instead of switching back to center to announce yet another mistake I opted to execute a course reversal to track inbound on the 110 degree radial heading 290 degrees. Once I did that, and reconfigured the HSI, everything fell into place and we completed an uneventful but nervously flown approach into ako. After landing I was able to compare the controller's instructions with the actual VOR runway 29 IAP. At that time it became obvious that even though I had managed to accurately copy his very clearly stated instructions I had never let go of the idea of landing on runway 11 (the runway that we had originally requested an approach for). Had we not been VMC, between layers and in daylight conditions at the time that I realized the error in my navigation, or had the center controller been any less clear in providing a very accurate description of how the approach was to be flown once we intercepted the final approach course inbound, I'd hate to think how this might have worked out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SINGLE PLT OF C340 DIVERTS TO ALTERNATE ARPT FOR WHICH HE HAS NO IAP CHARTS. ZDV RADAR CTLR PROVIDES ASSISTANCE AND DATA FOR VOR RWY 29 APCH.

Narrative: ON AN IFR FLT FROM CID TO CYS WITH DEN AS AN ALTERNATE, OUR ACFT WAS BEING OPERATED IN IMC CONDITIONS. ENRTE WE WERE MONITORING THE CHEYENNE WX VIA A HAND-HELD PDA EQUIPPED WITH AN 'ANYWHERE MAP' XM WX SATELLITE WX CAPABILITY. APCHING CYS WE HEARD THE ZDV CTLR ADVISE AN ACFT IN FRONT OF US THAT OTHER ACFT ATTEMPTING TO LAND AT CYS HAD RECENTLY MISSED THE APCH WERE IN THE PROCESS OF DIVERTING TO ANOTHER LOCATION, SPECIFICALLY AKO. UPON HEARING THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS DIVERTING TO AKO I MADE WHAT I NOW FEEL WAS A 'LESS THAN WELL THOUGHT OUT DECISION.' IN ANTICIPATION OF THE WX NOT GETTING ANY BETTER AT CYS WE REQUESTED ZDV TO DIVERT TO AKO INSTEAD OF HDG TO OUR FILED ALTERNATE AT DENVER. UNFORTUNATELY BEFORE REQUESTING, AND RECEIVING, A REVISED CLRNC INTO AKO WE DID NOT CHK TO MAKE SURE THAT THE AKO APCH PLATE WAS AVAILABLE TO US IN THE ACFT. AFTER SEVERAL MINS OF SEARCHING WE REALIZED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE THE AKO APCH PLATES ON BOARD. WE THEN CONTACTED FSS IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET A VERBAL DESCRIPTION OF AN APPROPRIATE AKO APCH BECAUSE WE DID NOT WANT TO CLUTTER AN ALREADY CONGESTED CTR FREQ. UNFORTUNATELY, THE FSS BRIEFER RESPONDED WITH, 'I DON'T HAVE THOSE AND EVEN IF I DID I'M NOT A PLT.' AT THAT POINT WE ASKED THE FSS BRIEFER TO SUGGEST ANY FIELD WITHIN 100 MI THAT WAS RPTING VFR CONDITIONS. WHILE WAITING FOR A REPLY FROM THE FSS BRIEFER THE OBVIOUSLY BUSY CTR CTLR INFORMED US TO ANTICIPATE HOLDING AT THE AKO VOR WHILE WE WAITED FOR THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US TO COMPLETE ITS APCH INTO AKO. RATHER THAN WAIT TO HEAR BACK FROM FSS REGARDING A VFR ALTERNATE WE SOMEWHAT RELUCTANTLY INFORMED CTR THAT WE DID NOT HAVE THE AKO PLATES. WITHOUT MISSING A BEAT, OR GIVING US ANY WELL DESERVED GRIEF, THE CTR CTLR ASKED US WHICH APCH INTO AKO WE WANTED. FROM THE XM WX WE KNEW THAT THE WINDS FAVORED RWY 11 AND WE REQUESTED AN APCH FOR THAT RWY. VERY SOON AFTERWARDS THE CTLR INFORMED US THAT THE ONLY APCH INTO RWY 11 AT AKO WAS AN RNAV APCH BUT THAT THERE WAS A VOR APCH INTO RWY 29. WE RESPONDED THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE VOR RWY 29 APCH AND WITHOUT MISSING A BEAT THE CTLR BEGAN PROVIDING US WITH A VERBAL DESCRIPTION OF THE VOR RWY 29 APCH INTO AKO. I COPIED THE APCH DESCRIPTION AND EVEN ANSWERED IN THE 'NEGATIVE' WHEN THE CTLR ASKED IF I HAD ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING WHAT WE NEEDED TO DO. YET SOMEHOW, ONCE WE WERE CLRED FOR THE AKO APCH I STILL MANAGED TO MISINTERPRET OUR INSTRUCTIONS AND MADE AN INITIAL TURN AWAY FROM THE ARPT VERSUS TOWARDS IT. IN OTHER WORDS, I TURNED OUTBOUND ON THE 110 DEG RADIAL (HDG 110 DEGS) VERSUS INBOUND ON THE 110 DEG RADIAL HDG 290 DEGS. ONCE I REALIZED THAT THE DME WAS INCREASING AND THAT I HAD CONFIGURED THE HSI TO TRACK THE 110 DEG RADIAL OUTBOUND VERSUS THE 290 DEG RADIAL INBOUND I MADE WHAT I NOW FEEL WAS ANOTHER POOR JUDGEMENT CALL. WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE APCH, SWITCHED TO THE UNICOM FREQ, AND WERE VMC AT OUR LAST ASSIGNED 'CRUISE ALT' SO INSTEAD OF SWITCHING BACK TO CTR TO ANNOUNCE YET ANOTHER MISTAKE I OPTED TO EXECUTE A COURSE REVERSAL TO TRACK INBOUND ON THE 110 DEG RADIAL HDG 290 DEGS. ONCE I DID THAT, AND RECONFIGURED THE HSI, EVERYTHING FELL INTO PLACE AND WE COMPLETED AN UNEVENTFUL BUT NERVOUSLY FLOWN APCH INTO AKO. AFTER LNDG I WAS ABLE TO COMPARE THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS WITH THE ACTUAL VOR RWY 29 IAP. AT THAT TIME IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT EVEN THOUGH I HAD MANAGED TO ACCURATELY COPY HIS VERY CLRLY STATED INSTRUCTIONS I HAD NEVER LET GO OF THE IDEA OF LNDG ON RWY 11 (THE RWY THAT WE HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED AN APCH FOR). HAD WE NOT BEEN VMC, BTWN LAYERS AND IN DAYLIGHT CONDITIONS AT THE TIME THAT I REALIZED THE ERROR IN MY NAV, OR HAD THE CTR CTLR BEEN ANY LESS CLR IN PROVIDING A VERY ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF HOW THE APCH WAS TO BE FLOWN ONCE WE INTERCEPTED THE FINAL APCH COURSE INBOUND, I'D HATE TO THINK HOW THIS MIGHT HAVE WORKED OUT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.