Narrative:

We had departed atl for msy on oct/fri/04 on flight X. This flight was originally scheduled to use another aircraft. While at the gate, however, we were assigned ship X. As we accomplished the items on the preflight checklist, a mechanic came to the cockpit and advised that 2 adjacent stator blades had been found missing from the #2 engine. The flight to msy was conducted within normal operating parameters. We were again assigned to use this same aircraft on oct/sat/04. The departure was scheduled for before YB00 and the load was light. Prior to the initiation of the takeoff roll, the flight was conducted within normal operating parameters. When cleared for takeoff on runway 28, we were advised that the winds were calm and birds were present. The aircraft accelerated quickly as we began the takeoff roll. I called out V1 and I removed my hand from the throttles. Almost immediately thereafter, I heard a loud bang and observed a flash of light on the right side of the aircraft. I also noticed that the right egt reading was off scale high. I called for an aborted takeoff and resumed operational control of the aircraft. The aircraft came to a stop approximately 3000 ft from the end of the runway. After coming to a stop, I called for the engine fire/severe damage checklist. I asked the lead flight attendant to report on the presence of smoke or fire from the right engine. He replied that he saw smoke. I then pulled the #2 engine fire handle. Supplemental information from acn 634732: we taxied to runway 28 with both engines and had 7 min warm-up time (5 mins). The takeoff was flown by me, the first officer. At vr, I heard a loud bang and saw a bright flash and sparks on the right side. The captain called for an abort and took control of the aircraft. I deployed the speed brakes. I notified the tower that we were aborting, and I asked that fire trucks be dispatched. I made a PA. The aircraft came to a stop about 3000 ft from the end of the runway. We never had hot brakes. Fire personnel reported that we had no engine fire and that all tires appeared in good condition. The captain in his judgement believed the engine problem was too severe to take the aircraft into the air. He knew he had approximately 7000 ft remaining at rotation. I was prepared to fly, but since the abort was called, my job was to support his decision. We had flown this same aircraft the night before and we knew its history. The bottom line is, I was trained to fly after V1 and I was ready. Callback conversation with reporter acn 634333 revealed the following information: the missing stator blades were in about the 1 O'clock position. It is not known if they were related to the compressor stall. Maintenance reported that 1 turbine blade was missing. The pilot was subjected to a check ride and questioned about his non compliance with the general policy of the company not to abort above V1 speed if the aircraft will fly. He feels his judgement is being questioned, especially in light of the successful outcome. The severity of the compressor stall raised the question that it might not fly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ABORT ABOVE V1 SPD IN A B767-300 DUE TO COMPRESSOR STALL IS SUCCESSFUL WITH 3000 FT OF RWY REMAINING.

Narrative: WE HAD DEPARTED ATL FOR MSY ON OCT/FRI/04 ON FLT X. THIS FLT WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED TO USE ANOTHER ACFT. WHILE AT THE GATE, HOWEVER, WE WERE ASSIGNED SHIP X. AS WE ACCOMPLISHED THE ITEMS ON THE PREFLT CHKLIST, A MECH CAME TO THE COCKPIT AND ADVISED THAT 2 ADJACENT STATOR BLADES HAD BEEN FOUND MISSING FROM THE #2 ENG. THE FLT TO MSY WAS CONDUCTED WITHIN NORMAL OPERATING PARAMETERS. WE WERE AGAIN ASSIGNED TO USE THIS SAME ACFT ON OCT/SAT/04. THE DEP WAS SCHEDULED FOR BEFORE YB00 AND THE LOAD WAS LIGHT. PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF THE TKOF ROLL, THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED WITHIN NORMAL OPERATING PARAMETERS. WHEN CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 28, WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE WINDS WERE CALM AND BIRDS WERE PRESENT. THE ACFT ACCELERATED QUICKLY AS WE BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL. I CALLED OUT V1 AND I REMOVED MY HAND FROM THE THROTTLES. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, I HEARD A LOUD BANG AND OBSERVED A FLASH OF LIGHT ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT. I ALSO NOTICED THAT THE R EGT READING WAS OFF SCALE HIGH. I CALLED FOR AN ABORTED TKOF AND RESUMED OPERATIONAL CTL OF THE ACFT. THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP APPROX 3000 FT FROM THE END OF THE RWY. AFTER COMING TO A STOP, I CALLED FOR THE ENG FIRE/SEVERE DAMAGE CHKLIST. I ASKED THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT TO RPT ON THE PRESENCE OF SMOKE OR FIRE FROM THE R ENG. HE REPLIED THAT HE SAW SMOKE. I THEN PULLED THE #2 ENG FIRE HANDLE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 634732: WE TAXIED TO RWY 28 WITH BOTH ENGS AND HAD 7 MIN WARM-UP TIME (5 MINS). THE TKOF WAS FLOWN BY ME, THE FO. AT VR, I HEARD A LOUD BANG AND SAW A BRIGHT FLASH AND SPARKS ON THE R SIDE. THE CAPT CALLED FOR AN ABORT AND TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT. I DEPLOYED THE SPD BRAKES. I NOTIFIED THE TWR THAT WE WERE ABORTING, AND I ASKED THAT FIRE TRUCKS BE DISPATCHED. I MADE A PA. THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP ABOUT 3000 FT FROM THE END OF THE RWY. WE NEVER HAD HOT BRAKES. FIRE PERSONNEL RPTED THAT WE HAD NO ENG FIRE AND THAT ALL TIRES APPEARED IN GOOD CONDITION. THE CAPT IN HIS JUDGEMENT BELIEVED THE ENG PROB WAS TOO SEVERE TO TAKE THE ACFT INTO THE AIR. HE KNEW HE HAD APPROX 7000 FT REMAINING AT ROTATION. I WAS PREPARED TO FLY, BUT SINCE THE ABORT WAS CALLED, MY JOB WAS TO SUPPORT HIS DECISION. WE HAD FLOWN THIS SAME ACFT THE NIGHT BEFORE AND WE KNEW ITS HISTORY. THE BOTTOM LINE IS, I WAS TRAINED TO FLY AFTER V1 AND I WAS READY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 634333 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE MISSING STATOR BLADES WERE IN ABOUT THE 1 O'CLOCK POS. IT IS NOT KNOWN IF THEY WERE RELATED TO THE COMPRESSOR STALL. MAINT RPTED THAT 1 TURBINE BLADE WAS MISSING. THE PLT WAS SUBJECTED TO A CHK RIDE AND QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE GENERAL POLICY OF THE COMPANY NOT TO ABORT ABOVE V1 SPD IF THE ACFT WILL FLY. HE FEELS HIS JUDGEMENT IS BEING QUESTIONED, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. THE SEVERITY OF THE COMPRESSOR STALL RAISED THE QUESTION THAT IT MIGHT NOT FLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.