Narrative:

After all passenger were loaded (69), the gate agent entered the flight deck and stated '69 passenger, 5 bags forward, 66 bags in the aft cargo compartment.' the first officer recorded this information and began computing weight and balance data. At that time, I was busy dealing with an extremely disruptive child. The issue with the child was resolved and the first officer completed the paperwork. I reviewed it and passed it out the door. We closed the main cabin door. As soon as the forward and aft cargo doors closed, we ran the starting engines checklist. The ground crew pushed us back and we taxied to the runway. During the takeoff roll, operations attempted contact on communication #2. At a safe altitude I called them back and was informed that 22 checked bags had not been loaded. Operations then informed me that our correct bag count was not 44 aft instead of 66. Our performance/weight and balance computations were based on 66 bags aft, which is what we were told prior to pushback. In other words operations gave us a bag count prior to actually loading the bags. They also secured the cargo compartment and mistakenly left 22 bags on a cart in front of operations. Finally, they pushed us back and saluted without realizing that all the bags had not been loaded. This was a difference of 671 pounds and .8 index forward. Had we been close to performance or weight and balance limits, this could have developed into an extremely dangerous and catastrophic situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ700 CREW WAS GIVEN AN INCORRECT BAGGAGE COUNT FOR THE FLT WT AND BAL CALCULATIONS.

Narrative: AFTER ALL PAX WERE LOADED (69), THE GATE AGENT ENTERED THE FLT DECK AND STATED '69 PAX, 5 BAGS FORWARD, 66 BAGS IN THE AFT CARGO COMPARTMENT.' THE FO RECORDED THIS INFO AND BEGAN COMPUTING WT AND BAL DATA. AT THAT TIME, I WAS BUSY DEALING WITH AN EXTREMELY DISRUPTIVE CHILD. THE ISSUE WITH THE CHILD WAS RESOLVED AND THE FO COMPLETED THE PAPERWORK. I REVIEWED IT AND PASSED IT OUT THE DOOR. WE CLOSED THE MAIN CABIN DOOR. AS SOON AS THE FORWARD AND AFT CARGO DOORS CLOSED, WE RAN THE STARTING ENGS CHKLIST. THE GND CREW PUSHED US BACK AND WE TAXIED TO THE RWY. DURING THE TKOF ROLL, OPS ATTEMPTED CONTACT ON COM #2. AT A SAFE ALT I CALLED THEM BACK AND WAS INFORMED THAT 22 CHKED BAGS HAD NOT BEEN LOADED. OPS THEN INFORMED ME THAT OUR CORRECT BAG COUNT WAS NOT 44 AFT INSTEAD OF 66. OUR PERFORMANCE/WT AND BAL COMPUTATIONS WERE BASED ON 66 BAGS AFT, WHICH IS WHAT WE WERE TOLD PRIOR TO PUSHBACK. IN OTHER WORDS OPS GAVE US A BAG COUNT PRIOR TO ACTUALLY LOADING THE BAGS. THEY ALSO SECURED THE CARGO COMPARTMENT AND MISTAKENLY LEFT 22 BAGS ON A CART IN FRONT OF OPS. FINALLY, THEY PUSHED US BACK AND SALUTED WITHOUT REALIZING THAT ALL THE BAGS HAD NOT BEEN LOADED. THIS WAS A DIFFERENCE OF 671 LBS AND .8 INDEX FORWARD. HAD WE BEEN CLOSE TO PERFORMANCE OR WT AND BAL LIMITS, THIS COULD HAVE DEVELOPED INTO AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND CATASTROPHIC SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.