Narrative:

On mar/wed/04 I inspected work on the card. The card indicated there were 3 cracks on slat aft edge. The 3 cracks were stop-drilled and ndt was accomplished. I verified the stop-drilled cracks per manual reference. The manual reference was in the correct area for a slat repair. A turnover on the write-up by the production supervisor indicated that he programmed the slat for future repair and for repeated inspections as per the manual. On oct/wed/04 (far ramp inspection), discovered that aircraft abc, a B737-300, operated in revenue service with a temporary repair to the #3 slat outer lower skin. This is not authorized by the boeing srm. This repair to the slat has been previously accomplished and endorsed by the engineering department at this air carrier. Supplemental information from acn 636380: I was notified recently by our air carrier quality assurance that an FAA inspector found a discrepancy related to a signoff I made on a #3 slat on aircraft abc. I've approached our engineering department about this repair several times and have gotten several different answers. My stop-drilling of these cracks was done with the knowledge of srm and engineering on that date. Callback conversation with reporter acn 636850 revealed the following information: the reporter described the repair on the slat accomplished per the srm. The srm refers to the lower rivet line on the #3 slat for repair of cracks coming from the rivet hole to the slat edge. The repair was to drill out the rivet and stop-drill the crack and install another rivet. The reporter states the shop missed the limits on this repair that it is not permitted 5.5 inches from either end of the slat and 6 inches inboard and outboard of the actuator rod end connection. This is precisely where the repairs were accomplished. Callback conversation with reporter acn 636380 revealed the following information: the reporter said the repair was a common shop practice believed to be accomplished per the srm and verbally approved by engineering. The repair of the lower slat rivet cracks were repaired by drilling out the rivet and stop-drilling the crack then replacing the rivet. The srm limits of the repair were not known to the reporter as everything was verbal instructions and nothing in writing. The reporter said a reading of the srm would have prevented the improper repair.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 #3 SLAT REPAIR WAS DISCOVERED BY AN FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR TO BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE SRM LIMITS.

Narrative: ON MAR/WED/04 I INSPECTED WORK ON THE CARD. THE CARD INDICATED THERE WERE 3 CRACKS ON SLAT AFT EDGE. THE 3 CRACKS WERE STOP-DRILLED AND NDT WAS ACCOMPLISHED. I VERIFIED THE STOP-DRILLED CRACKS PER MANUAL REF. THE MANUAL REF WAS IN THE CORRECT AREA FOR A SLAT REPAIR. A TURNOVER ON THE WRITE-UP BY THE PRODUCTION SUPVR INDICATED THAT HE PROGRAMMED THE SLAT FOR FUTURE REPAIR AND FOR REPEATED INSPECTIONS AS PER THE MANUAL. ON OCT/WED/04 (FAR RAMP INSPECTION), DISCOVERED THAT ACFT ABC, A B737-300, OPERATED IN REVENUE SVC WITH A TEMPORARY REPAIR TO THE #3 SLAT OUTER LOWER SKIN. THIS IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE BOEING SRM. THIS REPAIR TO THE SLAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDORSED BY THE ENGINEERING DEPT AT THIS ACR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 636380: I WAS NOTIFIED RECENTLY BY OUR ACR QUALITY ASSURANCE THAT AN FAA INSPECTOR FOUND A DISCREPANCY RELATED TO A SIGNOFF I MADE ON A #3 SLAT ON ACFT ABC. I'VE APCHED OUR ENGINEERING DEPT ABOUT THIS REPAIR SEVERAL TIMES AND HAVE GOTTEN SEVERAL DIFFERENT ANSWERS. MY STOP-DRILLING OF THESE CRACKS WAS DONE WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF SRM AND ENGINEERING ON THAT DATE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 636850 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR DESCRIBED THE REPAIR ON THE SLAT ACCOMPLISHED PER THE SRM. THE SRM REFERS TO THE LOWER RIVET LINE ON THE #3 SLAT FOR REPAIR OF CRACKS COMING FROM THE RIVET HOLE TO THE SLAT EDGE. THE REPAIR WAS TO DRILL OUT THE RIVET AND STOP-DRILL THE CRACK AND INSTALL ANOTHER RIVET. THE RPTR STATES THE SHOP MISSED THE LIMITS ON THIS REPAIR THAT IT IS NOT PERMITTED 5.5 INCHES FROM EITHER END OF THE SLAT AND 6 INCHES INBOARD AND OUTBOARD OF THE ACTUATOR ROD END CONNECTION. THIS IS PRECISELY WHERE THE REPAIRS WERE ACCOMPLISHED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 636380 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THE REPAIR WAS A COMMON SHOP PRACTICE BELIEVED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED PER THE SRM AND VERBALLY APPROVED BY ENGINEERING. THE REPAIR OF THE LOWER SLAT RIVET CRACKS WERE REPAIRED BY DRILLING OUT THE RIVET AND STOP-DRILLING THE CRACK THEN REPLACING THE RIVET. THE SRM LIMITS OF THE REPAIR WERE NOT KNOWN TO THE RPTR AS EVERYTHING WAS VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS AND NOTHING IN WRITING. THE RPTR SAID A READING OF THE SRM WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE IMPROPER REPAIR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.