Narrative:

I was flying the ILS runway 35L at ZZZ. Visibility when cleared for the approach was 2200 ft RVR touchdown, don't recall the others. Visibility was restr by a fog bank maybe 1000 ft thick. Approach control vector to final was way too shallow to intercept the localizer prior to GS intercept -- a lower altitude was requested for the intercept. Approach let us descend from 9000 ft to 7000 ft. After clearing us to 7000 ft the controller asked if we would be ok for the approach, or if we wanted to be brought back around. We both thought we would be ok at this point. I continued to configure to landing confign. As we descended, the localizer was finally intercepted, but we were still above the GS, in clear conditions. We entered the fog and got stabilized on the approach, but later than we should have. The captain called out approach lights about 100 ft above decision altitude, I looked up and saw the lights and then the runway threshold and called 'landing.' I was concentrating outside and not referencing inside. We got a GS warning, thought I added power and pulled up. Captain said 'pull up.' I apparently didn't pull up enough and we touched down short of the runway threshold. The landing was firm but not hard. It wasn't until we arrived at the gate that we realized that we had hit something short of the runway. Maintenance found damage to brake lines on the left side and FOD to the left engine. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: callback made to both pilots. Both pilots in this incident were consistent in their description of the event in the original narrative. The callback did, however, produce additional information. Although the flight was dispatched with no alternate or contingency fuel, neither pilot felt fuel concerns were a distraction. The first officer, who was by this time hand flying, advised that they were initially advised to expect a runway 35R approach but that the change to runway 35L was adequately briefed by the captain as merely a change in ILS frequency, missed approach heading and decision altitude. Both pilots advised that wing and engine heat were briefed and applied prior to entering the fob. They also advised that they had received a report of tailwinds on the approach although there was no significant wind reported on the ATIS. They suspected that the combination of anti-ice bleed and a decreasing tailwind condition in the later stages of the approach may have led them to underestimate the amount of thrust adjustment necessary to maintain the GS when they achieved a stabilized confign. They restated that the stabilized condition occurred later in the approach than desired or required by SOP, but both felt that such a state was achieved prior to the incident. Although the aircraft was equipped with an autothrottle, it was not employed for the approach. There was minor disagreement as to when both the localizer and GS were captured but both felt it was either at or slightly before dymon intersection. They agreed that due to the rapid descent required to capture the GS from above, the airspeed was higher than desired at capture and that throttles remained at idle for a period so as to reach the planned approach speed. The first officer felt that the glare associated with the bright approach lights may have had an effect on his depth perception after going visual. Both pilots stated there was no low altitude alert given by the tower. Finally, although both pilots were aware that company SOP required the approach to be flown by the captain because RVR was below the air carrier's first officer minimums, neither remembered it at the time. Of the two, the first officer was the most experienced on the aircraft and had flown several thousand hours as a captain before being reassigned to first officer due to company cutbacks. Supplemental information from acn 637946: visibility when cleared for approach was 2200 ft RVR touchdown, 6000 ft for rollout, and I believe 4000 ft mid. Supplemental information from acn 638608: the aircraft landed hard/firm.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF MD80 STRIKE APCH LIGHTS FOLLOWING LOW MINIMUM HAND FLOWN ILS APCH.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING THE ILS RWY 35L AT ZZZ. VISIBILITY WHEN CLRED FOR THE APCH WAS 2200 FT RVR TOUCHDOWN, DON'T RECALL THE OTHERS. VISIBILITY WAS RESTR BY A FOG BANK MAYBE 1000 FT THICK. APCH CTL VECTOR TO FINAL WAS WAY TOO SHALLOW TO INTERCEPT THE LOC PRIOR TO GS INTERCEPT -- A LOWER ALT WAS REQUESTED FOR THE INTERCEPT. APCH LET US DSND FROM 9000 FT TO 7000 FT. AFTER CLRING US TO 7000 FT THE CTLR ASKED IF WE WOULD BE OK FOR THE APCH, OR IF WE WANTED TO BE BROUGHT BACK AROUND. WE BOTH THOUGHT WE WOULD BE OK AT THIS POINT. I CONTINUED TO CONFIGURE TO LNDG CONFIGN. AS WE DSNDED, THE LOC WAS FINALLY INTERCEPTED, BUT WE WERE STILL ABOVE THE GS, IN CLR CONDITIONS. WE ENTERED THE FOG AND GOT STABILIZED ON THE APCH, BUT LATER THAN WE SHOULD HAVE. THE CAPT CALLED OUT APCH LIGHTS ABOUT 100 FT ABOVE DECISION ALT, I LOOKED UP AND SAW THE LIGHTS AND THEN THE RWY THRESHOLD AND CALLED 'LNDG.' I WAS CONCENTRATING OUTSIDE AND NOT REFING INSIDE. WE GOT A GS WARNING, THOUGHT I ADDED PWR AND PULLED UP. CAPT SAID 'PULL UP.' I APPARENTLY DIDN'T PULL UP ENOUGH AND WE TOUCHED DOWN SHORT OF THE RWY THRESHOLD. THE LNDG WAS FIRM BUT NOT HARD. IT WASN'T UNTIL WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE THAT WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD HIT SOMETHING SHORT OF THE RWY. MAINT FOUND DAMAGE TO BRAKE LINES ON THE L SIDE AND FOD TO THE L ENG. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALLBACK MADE TO BOTH PLTS. BOTH PLTS IN THIS INCIDENT WERE CONSISTENT IN THEIR DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT IN THE ORIGINAL NARRATIVE. THE CALLBACK DID, HOWEVER, PRODUCE ADDITIONAL INFO. ALTHOUGH THE FLT WAS DISPATCHED WITH NO ALTERNATE OR CONTINGENCY FUEL, NEITHER PLT FELT FUEL CONCERNS WERE A DISTR. THE FO, WHO WAS BY THIS TIME HAND FLYING, ADVISED THAT THEY WERE INITIALLY ADVISED TO EXPECT A RWY 35R APCH BUT THAT THE CHANGE TO RWY 35L WAS ADEQUATELY BRIEFED BY THE CAPT AS MERELY A CHANGE IN ILS FREQ, MISSED APCH HDG AND DECISION ALT. BOTH PLTS ADVISED THAT WING AND ENG HEAT WERE BRIEFED AND APPLIED PRIOR TO ENTERING THE FOB. THEY ALSO ADVISED THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED A RPT OF TAILWINDS ON THE APCH ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT WIND RPTED ON THE ATIS. THEY SUSPECTED THAT THE COMBINATION OF ANTI-ICE BLEED AND A DECREASING TAILWIND CONDITION IN THE LATER STAGES OF THE APCH MAY HAVE LED THEM TO UNDERESTIMATE THE AMOUNT OF THRUST ADJUSTMENT NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE GS WHEN THEY ACHIEVED A STABILIZED CONFIGN. THEY RESTATED THAT THE STABILIZED CONDITION OCCURRED LATER IN THE APCH THAN DESIRED OR REQUIRED BY SOP, BUT BOTH FELT THAT SUCH A STATE WAS ACHIEVED PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. ALTHOUGH THE ACFT WAS EQUIPPED WITH AN AUTOTHROTTLE, IT WAS NOT EMPLOYED FOR THE APCH. THERE WAS MINOR DISAGREEMENT AS TO WHEN BOTH THE LOC AND GS WERE CAPTURED BUT BOTH FELT IT WAS EITHER AT OR SLIGHTLY BEFORE DYMON INTXN. THEY AGREED THAT DUE TO THE RAPID DSCNT REQUIRED TO CAPTURE THE GS FROM ABOVE, THE AIRSPD WAS HIGHER THAN DESIRED AT CAPTURE AND THAT THROTTLES REMAINED AT IDLE FOR A PERIOD SO AS TO REACH THE PLANNED APCH SPD. THE FO FELT THAT THE GLARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE BRIGHT APCH LIGHTS MAY HAVE HAD AN EFFECT ON HIS DEPTH PERCEPTION AFTER GOING VISUAL. BOTH PLTS STATED THERE WAS NO LOW ALT ALERT GIVEN BY THE TWR. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH BOTH PLTS WERE AWARE THAT COMPANY SOP REQUIRED THE APCH TO BE FLOWN BY THE CAPT BECAUSE RVR WAS BELOW THE ACR'S FO MINIMUMS, NEITHER REMEMBERED IT AT THE TIME. OF THE TWO, THE FO WAS THE MOST EXPERIENCED ON THE ACFT AND HAD FLOWN SEVERAL THOUSAND HRS AS A CAPT BEFORE BEING REASSIGNED TO FO DUE TO COMPANY CUTBACKS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 637946: VISIBILITY WHEN CLRED FOR APCH WAS 2200 FT RVR TOUCHDOWN, 6000 FT FOR ROLLOUT, AND I BELIEVE 4000 FT MID. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 638608: THE ACFT LANDED HARD/FIRM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.