Narrative:

This is a summary of an event on a falcon 900B involving the direct vision window on the pilot's side. While taxiing the aircraft for takeoff, I closed and locked the dv window in accordance with normal taxi checks and observed the green band indicating locking lever in the proper position. The checklist response for the challenge of 'dv window' is 'closed and green band' and I responded as such to the copilot. I had closed the window on the previous 8 legs of this trip and noted and remarked to the copilot that this window seemed more difficult to close than our other falcon 900B. I had used 2 hands to close in lieu of the normal single-handed operation I was accustomed to using to close and lock the window. Although it was more difficult to close by comparison to our other falcon 900B, I did not suspect it was not working properly. The window appeared and felt to be seated and locked normally. I was cleared for takeoff on runway 30L. During the takeoff roll, I became aware of an air flow sound in the cockpit which at first seemed normal and became more noticeable as the takeoff progressed. I concluded it was coming from the window and the sic made a remark that it was the window. The window had not opened and I elected to continue the takeoff. In the short time span I had to make the decision, I deemed it more prudent to continue the takeoff since the window was still closed and I would try to 'reseat' it airborne versus executing a high speed abort. After rotation and gear retraction, the copilot flew the aircraft while I tried to reseat the window by pushing on it into the frame and rechking and locking lever. The noise in the cockpit at this point was extreme. I could not hear any radio xmissions and the copilot and I cold barely communicate with each other as we yelled over the noise. The window stayed in what seemed to be a closed position, but the noise continued. I decided against touching it other pushing on it as I thought that would potentially make the situation worse. The copilot was having trouble communicating outside the aircraft so 7700 was set in the squawk. Once 7700 was set, the copilot heard a transmission from ATC requesting intentions. With full volume and pressing the ear pieces and microphone of the headset as close as possible, the copilot was able to communicate the intent for a VFR return. Once on downwind, I then flew the aircraft at 2100 ft while the copilot communicated with ATC, which was very difficult. Throughout the event, I never heard any xmissions going in or out of the aircraft due to the noise on my side. The noise had been evident in the cabin and the pilot team had been heard yelling by those in the cabin. There was confusion in the cockpit due to the noise and I queried the copilot as to which runway we were cleared. This communication occurred on downwind and early base so there was plenty of time to line up correctly on runway 30L, and there was never a conflict with runway 30R. The landing was uneventful. We cleared the runway to the left and secured the emergency. We were cleared to a run-up area in the center of the field to determine whether we would be able to take off again. Once the taxi checks were done, I planned to open and close the window several times to check it. I used a flashlight to examine the window internally and externally and also physically confirmed several times that it was seated, closed, and locked. I completed these actions and was confident the window was fine for a subsequent takeoff. The subsequent takeoff was uneventful. I reported the window to our maintenance personnel the next day after arriving at home station. There are several aspects of this emergency that provide valuable insight. First, of course, is vigilance with windows and doors. Although the window did not adversely affect the flight ability, the extreme noise caused by it created the need to declare an emergency and impacted CRM and communication. Also, the time to make an abort decision may be a few seconds or less. Finally, the copilot told me afterward that tower had asked us to confirm the gear down. This was an outstanding xchk. The controller(south) did a truly superb job throughout the event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FALCON 900B'S DIRECT VIEW WINDOW DID NOT FULLY SEAT BEFORE TKOF AND REQUIRED A RETURN LAND BECAUSE OF NOISE.

Narrative: THIS IS A SUMMARY OF AN EVENT ON A FALCON 900B INVOLVING THE DIRECT VISION WINDOW ON THE PLT'S SIDE. WHILE TAXIING THE ACFT FOR TKOF, I CLOSED AND LOCKED THE DV WINDOW IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL TAXI CHKS AND OBSERVED THE GREEN BAND INDICATING LOCKING LEVER IN THE PROPER POS. THE CHKLIST RESPONSE FOR THE CHALLENGE OF 'DV WINDOW' IS 'CLOSED AND GREEN BAND' AND I RESPONDED AS SUCH TO THE COPLT. I HAD CLOSED THE WINDOW ON THE PREVIOUS 8 LEGS OF THIS TRIP AND NOTED AND REMARKED TO THE COPLT THAT THIS WINDOW SEEMED MORE DIFFICULT TO CLOSE THAN OUR OTHER FALCON 900B. I HAD USED 2 HANDS TO CLOSE IN LIEU OF THE NORMAL SINGLE-HANDED OP I WAS ACCUSTOMED TO USING TO CLOSE AND LOCK THE WINDOW. ALTHOUGH IT WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO CLOSE BY COMPARISON TO OUR OTHER FALCON 900B, I DID NOT SUSPECT IT WAS NOT WORKING PROPERLY. THE WINDOW APPEARED AND FELT TO BE SEATED AND LOCKED NORMALLY. I WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 30L. DURING THE TKOF ROLL, I BECAME AWARE OF AN AIR FLOW SOUND IN THE COCKPIT WHICH AT FIRST SEEMED NORMAL AND BECAME MORE NOTICEABLE AS THE TKOF PROGRESSED. I CONCLUDED IT WAS COMING FROM THE WINDOW AND THE SIC MADE A REMARK THAT IT WAS THE WINDOW. THE WINDOW HAD NOT OPENED AND I ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE TKOF. IN THE SHORT TIME SPAN I HAD TO MAKE THE DECISION, I DEEMED IT MORE PRUDENT TO CONTINUE THE TKOF SINCE THE WINDOW WAS STILL CLOSED AND I WOULD TRY TO 'RESEAT' IT AIRBORNE VERSUS EXECUTING A HIGH SPD ABORT. AFTER ROTATION AND GEAR RETRACTION, THE COPLT FLEW THE ACFT WHILE I TRIED TO RESEAT THE WINDOW BY PUSHING ON IT INTO THE FRAME AND RECHKING AND LOCKING LEVER. THE NOISE IN THE COCKPIT AT THIS POINT WAS EXTREME. I COULD NOT HEAR ANY RADIO XMISSIONS AND THE COPLT AND I COLD BARELY COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER AS WE YELLED OVER THE NOISE. THE WINDOW STAYED IN WHAT SEEMED TO BE A CLOSED POS, BUT THE NOISE CONTINUED. I DECIDED AGAINST TOUCHING IT OTHER PUSHING ON IT AS I THOUGHT THAT WOULD POTENTIALLY MAKE THE SIT WORSE. THE COPLT WAS HAVING TROUBLE COMMUNICATING OUTSIDE THE ACFT SO 7700 WAS SET IN THE SQUAWK. ONCE 7700 WAS SET, THE COPLT HEARD A XMISSION FROM ATC REQUESTING INTENTIONS. WITH FULL VOLUME AND PRESSING THE EAR PIECES AND MIKE OF THE HEADSET AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE, THE COPLT WAS ABLE TO COMMUNICATE THE INTENT FOR A VFR RETURN. ONCE ON DOWNWIND, I THEN FLEW THE ACFT AT 2100 FT WHILE THE COPLT COMMUNICATED WITH ATC, WHICH WAS VERY DIFFICULT. THROUGHOUT THE EVENT, I NEVER HEARD ANY XMISSIONS GOING IN OR OUT OF THE ACFT DUE TO THE NOISE ON MY SIDE. THE NOISE HAD BEEN EVIDENT IN THE CABIN AND THE PLT TEAM HAD BEEN HEARD YELLING BY THOSE IN THE CABIN. THERE WAS CONFUSION IN THE COCKPIT DUE TO THE NOISE AND I QUERIED THE COPLT AS TO WHICH RWY WE WERE CLRED. THIS COM OCCURRED ON DOWNWIND AND EARLY BASE SO THERE WAS PLENTY OF TIME TO LINE UP CORRECTLY ON RWY 30L, AND THERE WAS NEVER A CONFLICT WITH RWY 30R. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE CLRED THE RWY TO THE L AND SECURED THE EMER. WE WERE CLRED TO A RUN-UP AREA IN THE CTR OF THE FIELD TO DETERMINE WHETHER WE WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE OFF AGAIN. ONCE THE TAXI CHKS WERE DONE, I PLANNED TO OPEN AND CLOSE THE WINDOW SEVERAL TIMES TO CHK IT. I USED A FLASHLIGHT TO EXAMINE THE WINDOW INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY AND ALSO PHYSICALLY CONFIRMED SEVERAL TIMES THAT IT WAS SEATED, CLOSED, AND LOCKED. I COMPLETED THESE ACTIONS AND WAS CONFIDENT THE WINDOW WAS FINE FOR A SUBSEQUENT TKOF. THE SUBSEQUENT TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL. I RPTED THE WINDOW TO OUR MAINT PERSONNEL THE NEXT DAY AFTER ARRIVING AT HOME STATION. THERE ARE SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THIS EMER THAT PROVIDE VALUABLE INSIGHT. FIRST, OF COURSE, IS VIGILANCE WITH WINDOWS AND DOORS. ALTHOUGH THE WINDOW DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FLT ABILITY, THE EXTREME NOISE CAUSED BY IT CREATED THE NEED TO DECLARE AN EMER AND IMPACTED CRM AND COM. ALSO, THE TIME TO MAKE AN ABORT DECISION MAY BE A FEW SECONDS OR LESS. FINALLY, THE COPLT TOLD ME AFTERWARD THAT TWR HAD ASKED US TO CONFIRM THE GEAR DOWN. THIS WAS AN OUTSTANDING XCHK. THE CTLR(S) DID A TRULY SUPERB JOB THROUGHOUT THE EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.