Narrative:

I entered IMC during a patient transport from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Weather at all reporting points along the route was above company day; cross-country minimums. In fact; the lowest conditions reported were ceilings of 2600 ft overcast and 5 mi visibility in light rain at ZZZ2. The flight was relatively uneventful from initial launch from base through pickup at ZZZ and most of the flight with the patient aboard. The pilot of another company aircraft who had heard our last voice report to our company dispatcher; contacted us on the company frequency and informed us that the farther north we got the better the WX conditions would be. About 2/3 of the way through our leg from ZZZ to ZZZ2 we encountered ceilings lower than reported and wispy mist at 500 ft AGL and below. The mist intensified to the point where I was becoming concerned; so we turned southwest; planning to land back at ZZZ and continue the patient transport by ground from there. As we progressed toward ZZZ2; conditions gradually improved the further west we got. The improved conditions we found near ZZZ2 lasted only about 7 to 8 mi and again began to deteriorate similar to the wispy mist we had encountered earlier to the east; however; at 500 ft AGL; we could still see several mi up the interstate. Given those conditions; I believed ceilings and visibility would be improving very soon; however; I still had not mentally discarded the idea of turning back if conditions worsened. About the same time; I passed a tower on my right and saw another; perhaps a mi ahead; at the 10 O'clock position and consulted my sectional chart in an attempt to precisely fix my position in relation to any other obstacles I might need to avoid if I did indeed choose to turn around. While consulting my chart; I heard the radar altimeter tone; I had set the warning flag at 400 ft AGL because the tallest tower I noted near my intended route was 361 ft AGL. I glanced up from the chart; noted the needle gently oscillating at the 400 ft mark; confirmed my altitude and heading with a brief glance outside and applied gentle aft pressure to the cyclic to initiate a gradual climb back to 500 ft AGL. I then contacted center; he told me I was in 'radar contact;' and almost immediately told me to re-contact approach. I switched back to approach; who gave me an assigned heading and altitude. The controller asked if the aircraft and pilot were instrument rated. I replied 'the pilot is; the aircraft is not' and told him that I was trapped between layers. He went on to tell me the WX conditions should be improving as we progressed toward ZZZ2. Given these factors; I was convinced that the safer and better choice was to continue toward ZZZ2. I will admit that I also realized that continuing toward ZZZ2 would put the patient far closer to -- perhaps at -- his destination; however; I considered that 'icing on the cake;' and it was never a factor in my decision to continue. As the controller was cooperating with me and did no sound annoyed or flustered; contrary to company policy; I chose not to squawk 7700 and continued on instruments toward ZZZ2 intending to break off to ZZZ1 after I became VMC again. About 2 mi south of the abc VORTAC; I reacquired continuous visual contact with the ground; notified approach and requested VFR direct to ZZZ1. The controller approved my request; we delivered the patient; and departed to ZZZ2 for fuel. Looking back; I don't see much that I could do differently. While; admittedly; my basic airwork could have been better; I believe I made prudent decisions at all points along the timeline; and we delivered the patient safely. During this flight; as I have in numerous others; I was dealing with my flight environment in the best way I knew how. Unfortunately; dealing with this situation required more heads down time with the chart than on an average flight; both in order to accurately fix my position if things 'went south' and to determine frequencies required at possible alternates. In the future; I will apply even more conservative decision-making criteria during flts in WX close to company minimums; and I will work to reduce heads down time inmy flying.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MEDICAL TRANSPORT HELI BECAME IMC ON A VFR FLT PLAN AND CONTINUED TO HIS DEST.

Narrative: I ENTERED IMC DURING A PATIENT TRANSPORT FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1. WEATHER AT ALL RPTING POINTS ALONG THE RTE WAS ABOVE COMPANY DAY; CROSS-COUNTRY MINIMUMS. IN FACT; THE LOWEST CONDITIONS RPTED WERE CEILINGS OF 2600 FT OVERCAST AND 5 MI VISIBILITY IN LIGHT RAIN AT ZZZ2. THE FLT WAS RELATIVELY UNEVENTFUL FROM INITIAL LAUNCH FROM BASE THROUGH PICKUP AT ZZZ AND MOST OF THE FLT WITH THE PATIENT ABOARD. THE PLT OF ANOTHER COMPANY ACFT WHO HAD HEARD OUR LAST VOICE RPT TO OUR COMPANY DISPATCHER; CONTACTED US ON THE COMPANY FREQUENCY AND INFORMED US THAT THE FARTHER N WE GOT THE BETTER THE WX CONDITIONS WOULD BE. ABOUT 2/3 OF THE WAY THROUGH OUR LEG FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ2 WE ENCOUNTERED CEILINGS LOWER THAN RPTED AND WISPY MIST AT 500 FT AGL AND BELOW. THE MIST INTENSIFIED TO THE POINT WHERE I WAS BECOMING CONCERNED; SO WE TURNED SW; PLANNING TO LAND BACK AT ZZZ AND CONTINUE THE PATIENT TRANSPORT BY GND FROM THERE. AS WE PROGRESSED TOWARD ZZZ2; CONDITIONS GRADUALLY IMPROVED THE FURTHER W WE GOT. THE IMPROVED CONDITIONS WE FOUND NEAR ZZZ2 LASTED ONLY ABOUT 7 TO 8 MI AND AGAIN BEGAN TO DETERIORATE SIMILAR TO THE WISPY MIST WE HAD ENCOUNTERED EARLIER TO THE E; HOWEVER; AT 500 FT AGL; WE COULD STILL SEE SEVERAL MI UP THE INTERSTATE. GIVEN THOSE CONDITIONS; I BELIEVED CEILINGS AND VISIBILITY WOULD BE IMPROVING VERY SOON; HOWEVER; I STILL HAD NOT MENTALLY DISCARDED THE IDEA OF TURNING BACK IF CONDITIONS WORSENED. ABOUT THE SAME TIME; I PASSED A TOWER ON MY R AND SAW ANOTHER; PERHAPS A MI AHEAD; AT THE 10 O'CLOCK POS AND CONSULTED MY SECTIONAL CHART IN AN ATTEMPT TO PRECISELY FIX MY POS IN RELATION TO ANY OTHER OBSTACLES I MIGHT NEED TO AVOID IF I DID INDEED CHOOSE TO TURN AROUND. WHILE CONSULTING MY CHART; I HEARD THE RADAR ALTIMETER TONE; I HAD SET THE WARNING FLAG AT 400 FT AGL BECAUSE THE TALLEST TOWER I NOTED NEAR MY INTENDED RTE WAS 361 FT AGL. I GLANCED UP FROM THE CHART; NOTED THE NEEDLE GENTLY OSCILLATING AT THE 400 FT MARK; CONFIRMED MY ALT AND HDG WITH A BRIEF GLANCE OUTSIDE AND APPLIED GENTLE AFT PRESSURE TO THE CYCLIC TO INITIATE A GRADUAL CLB BACK TO 500 FT AGL. I THEN CONTACTED CTR; HE TOLD ME I WAS IN 'RADAR CONTACT;' AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TOLD ME TO RE-CONTACT APCH. I SWITCHED BACK TO APCH; WHO GAVE ME AN ASSIGNED HDG AND ALT. THE CTLR ASKED IF THE ACFT AND PLT WERE INSTRUMENT RATED. I REPLIED 'THE PLT IS; THE ACFT IS NOT' AND TOLD HIM THAT I WAS TRAPPED BETWEEN LAYERS. HE WENT ON TO TELL ME THE WX CONDITIONS SHOULD BE IMPROVING AS WE PROGRESSED TOWARD ZZZ2. GIVEN THESE FACTORS; I WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SAFER AND BETTER CHOICE WAS TO CONTINUE TOWARD ZZZ2. I WILL ADMIT THAT I ALSO REALIZED THAT CONTINUING TOWARD ZZZ2 WOULD PUT THE PATIENT FAR CLOSER TO -- PERHAPS AT -- HIS DEST; HOWEVER; I CONSIDERED THAT 'ICING ON THE CAKE;' AND IT WAS NEVER A FACTOR IN MY DECISION TO CONTINUE. AS THE CTLR WAS COOPERATING WITH ME AND DID NO SOUND ANNOYED OR FLUSTERED; CONTRARY TO COMPANY POLICY; I CHOSE NOT TO SQUAWK 7700 AND CONTINUED ON INSTRUMENTS TOWARD ZZZ2 INTENDING TO BREAK OFF TO ZZZ1 AFTER I BECAME VMC AGAIN. ABOUT 2 MI S OF THE ABC VORTAC; I REACQUIRED CONTINUOUS VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE GND; NOTIFIED APCH AND REQUESTED VFR DIRECT TO ZZZ1. THE CTLR APPROVED MY REQUEST; WE DELIVERED THE PATIENT; AND DEPARTED TO ZZZ2 FOR FUEL. LOOKING BACK; I DON'T SEE MUCH THAT I COULD DO DIFFERENTLY. WHILE; ADMITTEDLY; MY BASIC AIRWORK COULD HAVE BEEN BETTER; I BELIEVE I MADE PRUDENT DECISIONS AT ALL POINTS ALONG THE TIMELINE; AND WE DELIVERED THE PATIENT SAFELY. DURING THIS FLT; AS I HAVE IN NUMEROUS OTHERS; I WAS DEALING WITH MY FLT ENVIRONMENT IN THE BEST WAY I KNEW HOW. UNFORTUNATELY; DEALING WITH THIS SIT REQUIRED MORE HEADS DOWN TIME WITH THE CHART THAN ON AN AVERAGE FLT; BOTH IN ORDER TO ACCURATELY FIX MY POS IF THINGS 'WENT SOUTH' AND TO DETERMINE FREQUENCIES REQUIRED AT POSSIBLE ALTERNATES. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL APPLY EVEN MORE CONSERVATIVE DECISION-MAKING CRITERIA DURING FLTS IN WX CLOSE TO COMPANY MINIMUMS; AND I WILL WORK TO REDUCE HEADS DOWN TIME INMY FLYING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.