Narrative:

During cottonwood 2 FMS departure; we did not initiate a turn prior to waypoint F219G direct to F251G. We (captain/first officer) went over the departure; instructions twice and briefed all aspects of the departure but started the turn late at F219G. I requested the direct routing to F251G but did not intervene manually with the heading bug when the first officer did not immediately get the routing programmed. Things happened really fast on this departure. While I understand the rationale for building the departure the way it is currently built is for potential engine failure; I find it really odd that the FMS departure as selected and programmed will result in a course deviation unless we manually intervene to prevent it from doing so. Preventive measures: I should have taken more time to insure first officer was comfortable with; and understood; the entire departure routing. I should have immediately initiated a turn at F219G without trying to get the first officer to program properly the FMS navigation. I strongly believe we should not have a course deviation programmed into our navigation database that will only be avoided when we manually intervene. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised that his training department subsequently explained that the cottonwood departure is a 'tailored' SID programmed to the specifications of their specific air carrier. This air carrier's SOP is to program departures from airports requiring special engine failure procedures so as to present the worst case scenario when entered into the FMS. Thus; if all engines operate normally; the flight crew is required to modify the FMS display to depict and command the 'normal' departure -- in this case a relatively minor 'direct to fix F251G' route modification. This modification is routinely made during an unstressed condition by the flight crew. If; in fact; there is an engine failure during the departure; 'no' modification to the preprogrammed route is necessary since the 'worst case situation' was already programmed during preflight. The reporter summarized his feelings by stating that while there is merit and apparent logic to such an approach; the display of this worst case scenario on 'tailored' departures will not; therefore; be consistent with what is displayed on 'non tailored' departures on which display of the 'normal' routing is SOP. Thus; flight crews must be trained to specifically address which 'SOP' applies on a given departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B757-200 HAS MINOR COURSE DEV WHEN FO FAILS TO MAKE TURN ON COTTONWOOD DEP AGGRESSIVELY ENOUGH. THE RTE DISPLAYED WHEN THIS SID IS ACTIVATED IN AN FMS RTE ACTUALLY DEPICTS THE ENG FAIL PROC.

Narrative: DURING COTTONWOOD 2 FMS DEP; WE DID NOT INITIATE A TURN PRIOR TO WAYPOINT F219G DIRECT TO F251G. WE (CAPT/FO) WENT OVER THE DEP; INSTRUCTIONS TWICE AND BRIEFED ALL ASPECTS OF THE DEP BUT STARTED THE TURN LATE AT F219G. I REQUESTED THE DIRECT ROUTING TO F251G BUT DID NOT INTERVENE MANUALLY WITH THE HDG BUG WHEN THE FO DID NOT IMMEDIATELY GET THE ROUTING PROGRAMMED. THINGS HAPPENED REALLY FAST ON THIS DEP. WHILE I UNDERSTAND THE RATIONALE FOR BUILDING THE DEP THE WAY IT IS CURRENTLY BUILT IS FOR POTENTIAL ENG FAILURE; I FIND IT REALLY ODD THAT THE FMS DEP AS SELECTED AND PROGRAMMED WILL RESULT IN A COURSE DEV UNLESS WE MANUALLY INTERVENE TO PREVENT IT FROM DOING SO. PREVENTIVE MEASURES: I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN MORE TIME TO INSURE FO WAS COMFORTABLE WITH; AND UNDERSTOOD; THE ENTIRE DEP ROUTING. I SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY INITIATED A TURN AT F219G WITHOUT TRYING TO GET THE FO TO PROGRAM PROPERLY THE FMS NAV. I STRONGLY BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT HAVE A COURSE DEV PROGRAMMED INTO OUR NAV DATABASE THAT WILL ONLY BE AVOIDED WHEN WE MANUALLY INTERVENE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT HIS TRAINING DEPT SUBSEQUENTLY EXPLAINED THAT THE COTTONWOOD DEP IS A 'TAILORED' SID PROGRAMMED TO THE SPECS OF THEIR SPECIFIC ACR. THIS ACR'S SOP IS TO PROGRAM DEPS FROM ARPTS REQUIRING SPECIAL ENG FAILURE PROCS SO AS TO PRESENT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO WHEN ENTERED INTO THE FMS. THUS; IF ALL ENGS OPERATE NORMALLY; THE FLT CREW IS REQUIRED TO MODIFY THE FMS DISPLAY TO DEPICT AND COMMAND THE 'NORMAL' DEP -- IN THIS CASE A RELATIVELY MINOR 'DIRECT TO FIX F251G' RTE MODIFICATION. THIS MODIFICATION IS ROUTINELY MADE DURING AN UNSTRESSED CONDITION BY THE FLT CREW. IF; IN FACT; THERE IS AN ENG FAILURE DURING THE DEP; 'NO' MODIFICATION TO THE PREPROGRAMMED RTE IS NECESSARY SINCE THE 'WORST CASE SIT' WAS ALREADY PROGRAMMED DURING PREFLT. THE RPTR SUMMARIZED HIS FEELINGS BY STATING THAT WHILE THERE IS MERIT AND APPARENT LOGIC TO SUCH AN APCH; THE DISPLAY OF THIS WORST CASE SCENARIO ON 'TAILORED' DEPS WILL NOT; THEREFORE; BE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT IS DISPLAYED ON 'NON TAILORED' DEPS ON WHICH DISPLAY OF THE 'NORMAL' ROUTING IS SOP. THUS; FLT CREWS MUST BE TRAINED TO SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS WHICH 'SOP' APPLIES ON A GIVEN DEP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.