Narrative:

A pilot friend and I departed ZZZ1 at approximately XA40 local time en route to ZZZ2. Estimated time in route was 2 hours. My friend obtained an IFR WX briefing for the route and informed me that conditions were MVFR mid way along the route and there was an airmet for moderate rime/mixed ice. The briefer informed him that PIREPS seemed to indicate icing to our east; though he certainly didn't rule out the possibility of it being along our route of flight. We departed VFR in order to get off the ground faster. My intention was to make ZZZ2 soon after sunset; as I knew there was a possibility we were going to be IMC and I prefer to avoid night IMC in my C172. Approximately 20 mi south of ZZZ1; the ceiling started to come down rapidly. We made a turn back north and I instructed my friend to contact ARTCC for a pop-up IFR clearance; as I asked him to be responsible for the radios on this flight. We were handled in a very professional manner and as I turned back south we were cleared direct to ZZZ2 at 6000 ft. I requested this altitude because I thought it might put us above a layer and out of the clouds. As it turned out; 6000 ft kept us in solid IMC. We diligently watched for icing and found no signs for the first 20 mins. Around the VOR; a very light frost started to accumulate on the windshield and the leading edge of the wing. I requested 8000 ft and was cleared to climb. I noted a slightly sluggish climb performance; but didn't think anything of it; as we were within a few hundred pounds of maximum gross and at a relatively high altitude. Upon reaching 8000 ft it became clear that the icing situation was going to be worse. The outside air temperature was around 23 degrees F and the ice started to accumulate a slight faster rate. During our climb we passed through a layer; so I requested 7000 ft to hopefully get VMC again. ARTCC was professional as usual and granted the request without hesitation. Upon reaching 7000 ft we were told to switch to ZZZ ARTCC and to 'expect a lot of questions.' we were puzzled by this statement; but we did switch frequencies and check in at 7000 ft. Ice was starting to accumulate at a great rate at this point and I had to add increasingly more power to keep us at a normal cruise speed. It was at this point (approximately 5 mins after switching to ZZZ ARTCC) that I decided it was time to divert. I asked my passenger to get the approach plates and look for an alternate. Our closest option was ZZZ3; but they didn't have an approach we were capable of completing. I decided ZZZ was a better alternative because they have an ILS and we were already at a convenient intercept heading. My passenger advised ARTCC that we were diverting and we were given a clearance to 4000 ft and a heading of 210 degrees to intercept the final approach course. I tuned the #1 navigation radio and identified the station; which was apparently transmitting correctly. At this point I had to add full power to maintain my assigned altitude. Even with full power; the aircraft was flying at approximately 80 KTS; 100 KTS being the normal cruise speed. Center cleared us for the approach and I waited for the localizer needle to come in. After approximately 5-10 mins became clear that something was wrong. The GS had come in but the localizer was still pegged full left. I tapped on instrument face; checked the frequency; and toggled the knobs to try and get a reading. When I toggled the knobs; the CDI came slightly off full deflection; but returned almost immediately. ARTCC contacted us to tell us we had flown through the final approach course. He told us we were some direction from a fix; but I don't remember what direction or what fix. The controller did not tell us if we were north or south of course; simply that we were not set up properly. At this point; I asked my passenger to declare an emergency; as it was clear we had picked up over a quarter of an inch of ice and could not identify the localizer to find the airport. ARTCC did not confirm the emergency; but did tell us to do a 360 degree turn to intercept the final approach course. The controller also told us we were cleared to climb; an instruction which was obviously impossible at that time. I was very confused at this point and became completely disoriented with regards to our position. The communications become less clear to me at this point. I remember the controller repeatedly telling us we were west of course. This instruction confused both my passenger (an instrument rated; commercial pilot) and myself because the final approach course to ZZZ is 244 degrees. Because I was able to identification the GS; I decided to descend. I knew from experience that ZZZ is between two ridges and I was fairly confident we were still between the two. My passenger contacted ARTCC and said again; 'we want to make it clear that we are unable to maintain altitude and we do not have the localizer. We need a heading to the final approach course.' the controller then told us to turn left 15 degrees and then 20 degrees more. I complied and was now on a heading of approximately 180 degrees. ARTCC advised us that we were below their radar coverage and told to contact them when we got on the ground. Around that time my passenger and I were able to see straight down to a highway; but not forward towards where we thought the airport was. I continued to follow the GS down and remember checking the altimeter to get an idea of where we were in relation to the elevation of the airport. When we saw the highway it was around 2100 ft MSL. Within 500 ft my passenger spotted the airport 90 degrees to our right. I made the turn and landed without incident. We advised ARTCC we were on the ground and they did not ask for any more information or a report. It is clear to me now after reflecting on the flight that if we were in the clouds 10 mins longer; both my passenger and myself would have perished from the amount of ice on the aircraft. Like most accidents; I feel this flight had a chain of events which could have led to a dire situation. 1) judgement and decision making. My passenger and I made the decision to take the flight (ultimately my decision) because the WX on our original return date of sun looked worse. Both he and myself had to return in order to make it to work on monday. I clearly remember this thought coming in to play as I made the decision to take the flight. 2) WX. The WX forecast was; without question; not good enough for us to safely complete the flight. It was always a personal rule of mine to never fly IMC when the temperature is below freezing. I broke that rule because the ceiling reports indicated we could complete the flight VFR if need be. As always; I gave myself an out in case the situation worsened. What I did not anticipate was how rapidly the ice formed on the aircraft and how few options we had for airports along the route. I am familiar with this route and know the terrain to be very rugged and unforgiving. Had I stopped to think about just this one factor; I wouldn't have made the flight. 3) the equipment. I knew from our flight from ZZZ2 to ZZZ1 the day before that both communication and navigation 2 were inoperative. In addition; I discovered during the run-up procedure that the left seat (mine as the PIC) push to talk was not functional. This left us only one way to communication and navigation. Again; on a nice VFR day this would not have been a problem. In IMC approaching dusk; it became a major hazard. I'm still not certain if my radio malfunctioned or if the localizer was OTS; but if the second navigation were working; I would have had another option. 4) my passenger. As is the case with most pilots with my experience level; I have little working knowledge of operating within a flight crew. I knew my passenger well and trusted him to be able to communication and navigate without my assistance. It became clear after departing ZZZ1 that he was not current in instrument operations and needed some assistance with the radios. More importantly; I assumed that because he was a pilot; we had an additional safety factor. In reality; had he not been there; I would have not taken the flight. Thus; it is evident to me now that he provided an absolute false sense of security for me that contributed to my poor decision to depart. 5) my currency. Though I was instrument current at the time of the flight; I had no experience in icing conditions and approximately only 6 hours in actual IMC. I feel very good about my flying during the incident; but my lack of situational awareness was staggering. Had I been more aware of our position in relation to the localizer; I would have noticed the problem sooner and been more able to comply with ATC's instructions. As it was; I was completely at the mercy of a controller who I feel did an inadequate job of helping me find the final approach course. When we were told we were west of course; I was so confused that it was difficult for me to even identify the general direction of the airport; much less the course in relation to our position. Every time I get in an airplane I look to take some new piece knowledge out of the flight. Obviously; the lessons are endless on a flight like this; but I believe it can be summed up in a few ways. The bottom line is that every pilot needs limits and needs to stick to those limits. I'm at a fairly dangerous time in my flying career where I have enough experience to be confident; but not enough to really know better. In the future; I will be more disciplined about sticking to limits; almost all of which I crossed with this flight. I should have taken any piece of my preflight data and made the decision to not fly. Not only was the WX poor and beyond my equipment's capabilities; but the limited equipment I had was not all functioning properly. Also it is now very evident that an additional pilot in the cockpit does not automatically make the situation safer. In fact; it can make it worse for the simple reason that you trust two pilots to get out of any situation. This in and of itself may be enough to put you in a position beyond both of your capabilities; as it did this flight. Finally; currency and training is very very important. In the future; I plan to spend more time working on unusual and emergency sits. Up to this point much of my instrument training and flying has been largely normal. Supplemental information from acn 652801: we were told by ground personnel that several other aircraft had declared emergencys coming in to ZZZ that afternoon. All in all; it was an extremely frightening experience; one that I hope never to repeat. I've certainly gained a very real appreciation for the dangers posed by icing. Frankly; I doubt that I'll ever again contemplate flying a light aircraft (without proper equipment) into sits in which icing is even a possibility. I consider it a minor miracle that we were able to put the aircraft down safely on an airport; and I feel pretty lucky to be alive.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TWO COMMERCIAL PLTS IN A C172 ENCOUNTER DETERIORATING WX; OPEN AN IFR FLT PLAN AND CONTINUE INTO AN ENCOUNTER WITH ICING CONDITIONS THAT REQUIRE THE DECLARATION OF AN EMER.

Narrative: A PLT FRIEND AND I DEPARTED ZZZ1 AT APPROX XA40 LOCAL TIME ENRTE TO ZZZ2. ESTIMATED TIME IN RTE WAS 2 HRS. MY FRIEND OBTAINED AN IFR WX BRIEFING FOR THE RTE AND INFORMED ME THAT CONDITIONS WERE MVFR MID WAY ALONG THE RTE AND THERE WAS AN AIRMET FOR MODERATE RIME/MIXED ICE. THE BRIEFER INFORMED HIM THAT PIREPS SEEMED TO INDICATE ICING TO OUR E; THOUGH HE CERTAINLY DIDN'T RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF IT BEING ALONG OUR RTE OF FLT. WE DEPARTED VFR IN ORDER TO GET OFF THE GND FASTER. MY INTENTION WAS TO MAKE ZZZ2 SOON AFTER SUNSET; AS I KNEW THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY WE WERE GOING TO BE IMC AND I PREFER TO AVOID NIGHT IMC IN MY C172. APPROX 20 MI S OF ZZZ1; THE CEILING STARTED TO COME DOWN RAPIDLY. WE MADE A TURN BACK N AND I INSTRUCTED MY FRIEND TO CONTACT ARTCC FOR A POP-UP IFR CLRNC; AS I ASKED HIM TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RADIOS ON THIS FLT. WE WERE HANDLED IN A VERY PROFESSIONAL MANNER AND AS I TURNED BACK S WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO ZZZ2 AT 6000 FT. I REQUESTED THIS ALT BECAUSE I THOUGHT IT MIGHT PUT US ABOVE A LAYER AND OUT OF THE CLOUDS. AS IT TURNED OUT; 6000 FT KEPT US IN SOLID IMC. WE DILIGENTLY WATCHED FOR ICING AND FOUND NO SIGNS FOR THE FIRST 20 MINS. AROUND THE VOR; A VERY LIGHT FROST STARTED TO ACCUMULATE ON THE WINDSHIELD AND THE LEADING EDGE OF THE WING. I REQUESTED 8000 FT AND WAS CLRED TO CLB. I NOTED A SLIGHTLY SLUGGISH CLB PERFORMANCE; BUT DIDN'T THINK ANYTHING OF IT; AS WE WERE WITHIN A FEW HUNDRED LBS OF MAX GROSS AND AT A RELATIVELY HIGH ALT. UPON REACHING 8000 FT IT BECAME CLR THAT THE ICING SITUATION WAS GOING TO BE WORSE. THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMP WAS AROUND 23 DEGS F AND THE ICE STARTED TO ACCUMULATE A SLIGHT FASTER RATE. DURING OUR CLB WE PASSED THROUGH A LAYER; SO I REQUESTED 7000 FT TO HOPEFULLY GET VMC AGAIN. ARTCC WAS PROFESSIONAL AS USUAL AND GRANTED THE REQUEST WITHOUT HESITATION. UPON REACHING 7000 FT WE WERE TOLD TO SWITCH TO ZZZ ARTCC AND TO 'EXPECT A LOT OF QUESTIONS.' WE WERE PUZZLED BY THIS STATEMENT; BUT WE DID SWITCH FREQUENCIES AND CHK IN AT 7000 FT. ICE WAS STARTING TO ACCUMULATE AT A GREAT RATE AT THIS POINT AND I HAD TO ADD INCREASINGLY MORE PWR TO KEEP US AT A NORMAL CRUISE SPD. IT WAS AT THIS POINT (APPROX 5 MINS AFTER SWITCHING TO ZZZ ARTCC) THAT I DECIDED IT WAS TIME TO DIVERT. I ASKED MY PAX TO GET THE APCH PLATES AND LOOK FOR AN ALTERNATE. OUR CLOSEST OPTION WAS ZZZ3; BUT THEY DIDN'T HAVE AN APCH WE WERE CAPABLE OF COMPLETING. I DECIDED ZZZ WAS A BETTER ALTERNATIVE BECAUSE THEY HAVE AN ILS AND WE WERE ALREADY AT A CONVENIENT INTERCEPT HDG. MY PAX ADVISED ARTCC THAT WE WERE DIVERTING AND WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO 4000 FT AND A HDG OF 210 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH COURSE. I TUNED THE #1 NAV RADIO AND IDENTIFIED THE STATION; WHICH WAS APPARENTLY XMITTING CORRECTLY. AT THIS POINT I HAD TO ADD FULL PWR TO MAINTAIN MY ASSIGNED ALT. EVEN WITH FULL PWR; THE ACFT WAS FLYING AT APPROX 80 KTS; 100 KTS BEING THE NORMAL CRUISE SPD. CTR CLRED US FOR THE APCH AND I WAITED FOR THE LOCALIZER NEEDLE TO COME IN. AFTER APPROX 5-10 MINS BECAME CLR THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG. THE GS HAD COME IN BUT THE LOC WAS STILL PEGGED FULL L. I TAPPED ON INSTRUMENT FACE; CHKED THE FREQUENCY; AND TOGGLED THE KNOBS TO TRY AND GET A READING. WHEN I TOGGLED THE KNOBS; THE CDI CAME SLIGHTLY OFF FULL DEFLECTION; BUT RETURNED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. ARTCC CONTACTED US TO TELL US WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH THE FINAL APCH COURSE. HE TOLD US WE WERE SOME DIRECTION FROM A FIX; BUT I DON'T REMEMBER WHAT DIRECTION OR WHAT FIX. THE CTLR DID NOT TELL US IF WE WERE N OR S OF COURSE; SIMPLY THAT WE WERE NOT SET UP PROPERLY. AT THIS POINT; I ASKED MY PAX TO DECLARE AN EMER; AS IT WAS CLR WE HAD PICKED UP OVER A QUARTER OF AN INCH OF ICE AND COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE LOC TO FIND THE ARPT. ARTCC DID NOT CONFIRM THE EMER; BUT DID TELL US TO DO A 360 DEG TURN TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH COURSE. THE CTLR ALSO TOLD US WE WERE CLRED TO CLB; AN INSTRUCTION WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE AT THAT TIME. I WAS VERY CONFUSED AT THIS POINT AND BECAME COMPLETELY DISORIENTED WITH REGARDS TO OUR POS. THE COMS BECOME LESS CLR TO ME AT THIS POINT. I REMEMBER THE CTLR REPEATEDLY TELLING US WE WERE W OF COURSE. THIS INSTRUCTION CONFUSED BOTH MY PAX (AN INSTRUMENT RATED; COMMERCIAL PLT) AND MYSELF BECAUSE THE FINAL APCH COURSE TO ZZZ IS 244 DEGS. BECAUSE I WAS ABLE TO ID THE GS; I DECIDED TO DSND. I KNEW FROM EXPERIENCE THAT ZZZ IS BETWEEN TWO RIDGES AND I WAS FAIRLY CONFIDENT WE WERE STILL BETWEEN THE TWO. MY PAX CONTACTED ARTCC AND SAID AGAIN; 'WE WANT TO MAKE IT CLR THAT WE ARE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ALT AND WE DO NOT HAVE THE LOC. WE NEED A HDG TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE.' THE CTLR THEN TOLD US TO TURN L 15 DEGS AND THEN 20 DEGS MORE. I COMPLIED AND WAS NOW ON A HDG OF APPROX 180 DEGS. ARTCC ADVISED US THAT WE WERE BELOW THEIR RADAR COVERAGE AND TOLD TO CONTACT THEM WHEN WE GOT ON THE GND. AROUND THAT TIME MY PAX AND I WERE ABLE TO SEE STRAIGHT DOWN TO A HWY; BUT NOT FORWARD TOWARDS WHERE WE THOUGHT THE ARPT WAS. I CONTINUED TO FOLLOW THE GS DOWN AND REMEMBER CHKING THE ALTIMETER TO GET AN IDEA OF WHERE WE WERE IN RELATION TO THE ELEVATION OF THE ARPT. WHEN WE SAW THE HWY IT WAS AROUND 2100 FT MSL. WITHIN 500 FT MY PAX SPOTTED THE ARPT 90 DEGS TO OUR R. I MADE THE TURN AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. WE ADVISED ARTCC WE WERE ON THE GND AND THEY DID NOT ASK FOR ANY MORE INFO OR A RPT. IT IS CLR TO ME NOW AFTER REFLECTING ON THE FLT THAT IF WE WERE IN THE CLOUDS 10 MINS LONGER; BOTH MY PAX AND MYSELF WOULD HAVE PERISHED FROM THE AMOUNT OF ICE ON THE ACFT. LIKE MOST ACCIDENTS; I FEEL THIS FLT HAD A CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH COULD HAVE LED TO A DIRE SIT. 1) JUDGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING. MY PAX AND I MADE THE DECISION TO TAKE THE FLT (ULTIMATELY MY DECISION) BECAUSE THE WX ON OUR ORIGINAL RETURN DATE OF SUN LOOKED WORSE. BOTH HE AND MYSELF HAD TO RETURN IN ORDER TO MAKE IT TO WORK ON MONDAY. I CLRLY REMEMBER THIS THOUGHT COMING IN TO PLAY AS I MADE THE DECISION TO TAKE THE FLT. 2) WX. THE WX FORECAST WAS; WITHOUT QUESTION; NOT GOOD ENOUGH FOR US TO SAFELY COMPLETE THE FLT. IT WAS ALWAYS A PERSONAL RULE OF MINE TO NEVER FLY IMC WHEN THE TEMP IS BELOW FREEZING. I BROKE THAT RULE BECAUSE THE CEILING RPTS INDICATED WE COULD COMPLETE THE FLT VFR IF NEED BE. AS ALWAYS; I GAVE MYSELF AN OUT IN CASE THE SIT WORSENED. WHAT I DID NOT ANTICIPATE WAS HOW RAPIDLY THE ICE FORMED ON THE ACFT AND HOW FEW OPTIONS WE HAD FOR ARPTS ALONG THE RTE. I AM FAMILIAR WITH THIS RTE AND KNOW THE TERRAIN TO BE VERY RUGGED AND UNFORGIVING. HAD I STOPPED TO THINK ABOUT JUST THIS ONE FACTOR; I WOULDN'T HAVE MADE THE FLT. 3) THE EQUIPMENT. I KNEW FROM OUR FLT FROM ZZZ2 TO ZZZ1 THE DAY BEFORE THAT BOTH COM AND NAV 2 WERE INOP. IN ADDITION; I DISCOVERED DURING THE RUN-UP PROC THAT THE L SEAT (MINE AS THE PIC) PUSH TO TALK WAS NOT FUNCTIONAL. THIS LEFT US ONLY ONE WAY TO COM AND NAV. AGAIN; ON A NICE VFR DAY THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A PROB. IN IMC APCHING DUSK; IT BECAME A MAJOR HAZARD. I'M STILL NOT CERTAIN IF MY RADIO MALFUNCTIONED OR IF THE LOC WAS OTS; BUT IF THE SECOND NAV WERE WORKING; I WOULD HAVE HAD ANOTHER OPTION. 4) MY PAX. AS IS THE CASE WITH MOST PLTS WITH MY EXPERIENCE LEVEL; I HAVE LITTLE WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF OPERATING WITHIN A FLT CREW. I KNEW MY PAX WELL AND TRUSTED HIM TO BE ABLE TO COM AND NAVIGATE WITHOUT MY ASSISTANCE. IT BECAME CLR AFTER DEPARTING ZZZ1 THAT HE WAS NOT CURRENT IN INSTRUMENT OPS AND NEEDED SOME ASSISTANCE WITH THE RADIOS. MORE IMPORTANTLY; I ASSUMED THAT BECAUSE HE WAS A PLT; WE HAD AN ADDITIONAL SAFETY FACTOR. IN REALITY; HAD HE NOT BEEN THERE; I WOULD HAVE NOT TAKEN THE FLT. THUS; IT IS EVIDENT TO ME NOW THAT HE PROVIDED AN ABSOLUTE FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY FOR ME THAT CONTRIBUTED TO MY POOR DECISION TO DEPART. 5) MY CURRENCY. THOUGH I WAS INSTRUMENT CURRENT AT THE TIME OF THE FLT; I HAD NO EXPERIENCE IN ICING CONDITIONS AND APPROX ONLY 6 HRS IN ACTUAL IMC. I FEEL VERY GOOD ABOUT MY FLYING DURING THE INCIDENT; BUT MY LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS STAGGERING. HAD I BEEN MORE AWARE OF OUR POS IN RELATION TO THE LOC; I WOULD HAVE NOTICED THE PROB SOONER AND BEEN MORE ABLE TO COMPLY WITH ATC'S INSTRUCTIONS. AS IT WAS; I WAS COMPLETELY AT THE MERCY OF A CTLR WHO I FEEL DID AN INADEQUATE JOB OF HELPING ME FIND THE FINAL APCH COURSE. WHEN WE WERE TOLD WE WERE W OF COURSE; I WAS SO CONFUSED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO EVEN IDENTIFY THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE ARPT; MUCH LESS THE COURSE IN RELATION TO OUR POS. EVERY TIME I GET IN AN AIRPLANE I LOOK TO TAKE SOME NEW PIECE KNOWLEDGE OUT OF THE FLT. OBVIOUSLY; THE LESSONS ARE ENDLESS ON A FLT LIKE THIS; BUT I BELIEVE IT CAN BE SUMMED UP IN A FEW WAYS. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT EVERY PLT NEEDS LIMITS AND NEEDS TO STICK TO THOSE LIMITS. I'M AT A FAIRLY DANGEROUS TIME IN MY FLYING CAREER WHERE I HAVE ENOUGH EXPERIENCE TO BE CONFIDENT; BUT NOT ENOUGH TO REALLY KNOW BETTER. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL BE MORE DISCIPLINED ABOUT STICKING TO LIMITS; ALMOST ALL OF WHICH I CROSSED WITH THIS FLT. I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN ANY PIECE OF MY PREFLT DATA AND MADE THE DECISION TO NOT FLY. NOT ONLY WAS THE WX POOR AND BEYOND MY EQUIPMENT'S CAPABILITIES; BUT THE LIMITED EQUIPMENT I HAD WAS NOT ALL FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. ALSO IT IS NOW VERY EVIDENT THAT AN ADDITIONAL PLT IN THE COCKPIT DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MAKE THE SITUATION SAFER. IN FACT; IT CAN MAKE IT WORSE FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT YOU TRUST TWO PLTS TO GET OUT OF ANY SIT. THIS IN AND OF ITSELF MAY BE ENOUGH TO PUT YOU IN A POS BEYOND BOTH OF YOUR CAPABILITIES; AS IT DID THIS FLT. FINALLY; CURRENCY AND TRAINING IS VERY VERY IMPORTANT. IN THE FUTURE; I PLAN TO SPEND MORE TIME WORKING ON UNUSUAL AND EMER SITS. UP TO THIS POINT MUCH OF MY INSTRUMENT TRAINING AND FLYING HAS BEEN LARGELY NORMAL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 652801: WE WERE TOLD BY GND PERSONNEL THAT SEVERAL OTHER ACFT HAD DECLARED EMERS COMING IN TO ZZZ THAT AFTERNOON. ALL IN ALL; IT WAS AN EXTREMELY FRIGHTENING EXPERIENCE; ONE THAT I HOPE NEVER TO REPEAT. I'VE CERTAINLY GAINED A VERY REAL APPRECIATION FOR THE DANGERS POSED BY ICING. FRANKLY; I DOUBT THAT I'LL EVER AGAIN CONTEMPLATE FLYING A LIGHT ACFT (WITHOUT PROPER EQUIPMENT) INTO SITS IN WHICH ICING IS EVEN A POSSIBILITY. I CONSIDER IT A MINOR MIRACLE THAT WE WERE ABLE TO PUT THE ACFT DOWN SAFELY ON AN ARPT; AND I FEEL PRETTY LUCKY TO BE ALIVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.