Narrative:

While taxiing out of ord we were unable to get our final weights via ACARS. As we moved up to #1 for runway 32L at T10; we advised tower that we didn't have our weights. Controller advised us to cross and pull in to the runway 9R pad and let him know when we were ready. After clearing runway 32L; the captain turned us in to a holding spot on the pad and I sent a message to the new centralized load planning with the passenger count that the flight attendants had given us. I received the following reply in response from the load planner via ACARS: 'thank you; but I need the station to input the passenger count.' first we were told by the company to trust the passenger manifest given to us by the gate agents and not to have flight attendants do an actual count. Now the load planners will not accept the actual count from the aircraft; but must instead wait on a computer generated count from the station. This is a safety and captain's authority/authorized issue that must be addressed as soon as possible. To ignore and not solicit actual information from flight and cabin crews concerning weight and balance is unsatisfactory and unsafe. There is no question in the FARS about this and the company is in violation of the FARS by ignoring air crew provided data. Additionally; and just as important; this is a security issue. If there is a discrepancy in the passenger count; the it must be resolved. In addition; if there is a discrepancy discovered by load planning; then they should send an ACARS message to the crew to contact station operations in lieu of final weights so that the count discrepancy can be resolved. Also; when any weight and balance illegality issue comes up with load planning; their immediate first action step should be to contact the captain with the issue and seek his/her direction on how to resolve the issue. The captain can then contact the dispatcher with the problem and seek his/her input on the issue. This is vital to ensure that the captain is kept in the loop since he/she is ultimately responsible for safe operation of the aircraft per the FARS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PLT COMPLAINS ABOUT A WT AND BAL PROCEDURAL CHANGE DELAYING FLTS AND DENYING FLT CREW SAFETY AND SECURITY INPUTS TO SYS.

Narrative: WHILE TAXIING OUT OF ORD WE WERE UNABLE TO GET OUR FINAL WTS VIA ACARS. AS WE MOVED UP TO #1 FOR RWY 32L AT T10; WE ADVISED TWR THAT WE DIDN'T HAVE OUR WTS. CTLR ADVISED US TO CROSS AND PULL IN TO THE RWY 9R PAD AND LET HIM KNOW WHEN WE WERE READY. AFTER CLRING RWY 32L; THE CAPT TURNED US IN TO A HOLDING SPOT ON THE PAD AND I SENT A MESSAGE TO THE NEW CENTRALIZED LOAD PLANNING WITH THE PAX COUNT THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS HAD GIVEN US. I RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING REPLY IN RESPONSE FROM THE LOAD PLANNER VIA ACARS: 'THANK YOU; BUT I NEED THE STATION TO INPUT THE PAX COUNT.' FIRST WE WERE TOLD BY THE COMPANY TO TRUST THE PAX MANIFEST GIVEN TO US BY THE GATE AGENTS AND NOT TO HAVE FLT ATTENDANTS DO AN ACTUAL COUNT. NOW THE LOAD PLANNERS WILL NOT ACCEPT THE ACTUAL COUNT FROM THE ACFT; BUT MUST INSTEAD WAIT ON A COMPUTER GENERATED COUNT FROM THE STATION. THIS IS A SAFETY AND CAPT'S AUTH ISSUE THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED ASAP. TO IGNORE AND NOT SOLICIT ACTUAL INFO FROM FLT AND CABIN CREWS CONCERNING WT AND BAL IS UNSATISFACTORY AND UNSAFE. THERE IS NO QUESTION IN THE FARS ABOUT THIS AND THE COMPANY IS IN VIOLATION OF THE FARS BY IGNORING AIR CREW PROVIDED DATA. ADDITIONALLY; AND JUST AS IMPORTANT; THIS IS A SECURITY ISSUE. IF THERE IS A DISCREPANCY IN THE PAX COUNT; THE IT MUST BE RESOLVED. IN ADDITION; IF THERE IS A DISCREPANCY DISCOVERED BY LOAD PLANNING; THEN THEY SHOULD SEND AN ACARS MESSAGE TO THE CREW TO CONTACT STATION OPS IN LIEU OF FINAL WTS SO THAT THE COUNT DISCREPANCY CAN BE RESOLVED. ALSO; WHEN ANY WT AND BAL ILLEGALITY ISSUE COMES UP WITH LOAD PLANNING; THEIR IMMEDIATE FIRST ACTION STEP SHOULD BE TO CONTACT THE CAPT WITH THE ISSUE AND SEEK HIS/HER DIRECTION ON HOW TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE. THE CAPT CAN THEN CONTACT THE DISPATCHER WITH THE PROB AND SEEK HIS/HER INPUT ON THE ISSUE. THIS IS VITAL TO ENSURE THAT THE CAPT IS KEPT IN THE LOOP SINCE HE/SHE IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR SAFE OP OF THE ACFT PER THE FARS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.