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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 652956 |
Time | |
Date | 200504 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : elp.airport |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : iah.tower |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Super King Air 200/Huron |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground : takeoff roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : elp.tower |
Make Model Name | Merlin Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 1000 |
ASRS Report | 652956 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical non adherence : required legal separation |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took evasive action flight crew : rejected takeoff |
Consequence | faa : investigated faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 1100 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
I was PNF in the right seat of a king air on an IFR flight plan departing elp. We were cleared for takeoff on runway 8R from intersection K. I acknowledged our takeoff clearance and read off the remaining items on our checklist. As we entered the runway and began our takeoff roll; I noticed an aircraft taxiing sbound on taxiway M at a high rate of speed. As I pointed out the other aircraft; the PF stopped our aircraft and we both watched the second aircraft to confirm that it was going to stop and hold short of our runway. We both commented that because of the high rate of speed; it did not appear likely that the aircraft was going to stop. As the aircraft taxied across our runway; we queried the local controller to verify that we had in fact been cleared for takeoff. The local controller re-confirmed our takeoff clearance with an amendment to fly a different heading (our original clearance was to fly runway heading). At that point I stated to the controller that an aircraft had just taxied across our runway. The local controller replied in a 'disinterested' voice that he was aware of the crossing aircraft and that we were still cleared for departure. In that we were cleared for takeoff; we departed the airport. On climb out; the PF took over monitoring the primary radio and I attempted to contact the tower supervisor on ground frequency. My efforts to contact the supervisor were met with resistance by the ground controller until I was eventually informed that the supervisor was not in the building; and could be reached in the TRACON. I asked for a discrete frequency in which to contact the supervisor and was informed that such a conversation would have to be by telephone. Upon the completion of our flight (2 hours after departing el paso); I contacted a woman who idented herself as the tower supervisor. She informed me that she had reviewed the tapes and listened to statements from the personnel in the tower at the time of the incident. She then stated that it was her belief that no incident had taken place as the crossing aircraft had been cleared to taxi over a min prior to our takeoff clearance and that the crossing aircraft had a history of 'taxiing fast.' at that point I informed her that we had received our takeoff clearance and were on the runway in our takeoff roll before we observed the merlin aircraft taxiing sbound on taxiway M and that we stopped our takeoff roll in order to watch the other aircraft taxi across the runway in front of us. The tower supervisor said that my statement was in direct conflict with what she had been told by her crew and that she would conduct a further investigation and contact me at a later date. At no time were we informed of the crossing traffic. At no time did we hear any ATC xmissions to the merlin (either ground or local). I requested that the tapes be marked and saved. The tower supervisor stated that this had already been accomplished. Observations: we were lucky. Because of the open area and high rate of speed; the merlin caught our attention. In a more congested airport and/or a more rushed takeoff scenario; we may have been further along in our takeoff roll without the ability to stop prior to impact. The controllers seemed complacent. ATC tapes will reveal several attempts to make contact with the controllers. There was no supervision in the cabin attendant. ATC personnel were so familiar with the merlin's taxiing history that it was automatically assumed that the merlin had crossed our runway prior to issuing us our takeoff clearance. Our attempts to resolve this situation were met with denial and resistance. This in itself does nothing towards fostering a better working relationship between aviation professionals. The crew of the merlin was not heard to say anything on a frequency we were monitoring.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: BE20 FLT CREW DEPARTING FROM ELP ABORTED TKOF AFTER OBSERVING TFC XING RWY DOWNFIELD.
Narrative: I WAS PNF IN THE R SEAT OF A KING AIR ON AN IFR FLT PLAN DEPARTING ELP. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 8R FROM INTXN K. I ACKNOWLEDGED OUR TKOF CLRNC AND READ OFF THE REMAINING ITEMS ON OUR CHKLIST. AS WE ENTERED THE RWY AND BEGAN OUR TKOF ROLL; I NOTICED AN ACFT TAXIING SBOUND ON TXWY M AT A HIGH RATE OF SPD. AS I POINTED OUT THE OTHER ACFT; THE PF STOPPED OUR ACFT AND WE BOTH WATCHED THE SECOND ACFT TO CONFIRM THAT IT WAS GOING TO STOP AND HOLD SHORT OF OUR RWY. WE BOTH COMMENTED THAT BECAUSE OF THE HIGH RATE OF SPD; IT DID NOT APPEAR LIKELY THAT THE ACFT WAS GOING TO STOP. AS THE ACFT TAXIED ACROSS OUR RWY; WE QUERIED THE LCL CTLR TO VERIFY THAT WE HAD IN FACT BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF. THE LCL CTLR RE-CONFIRMED OUR TKOF CLRNC WITH AN AMENDMENT TO FLY A DIFFERENT HDG (OUR ORIGINAL CLRNC WAS TO FLY RWY HDG). AT THAT POINT I STATED TO THE CTLR THAT AN ACFT HAD JUST TAXIED ACROSS OUR RWY. THE LCL CTLR REPLIED IN A 'DISINTERESTED' VOICE THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE XING ACFT AND THAT WE WERE STILL CLRED FOR DEP. IN THAT WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF; WE DEPARTED THE ARPT. ON CLBOUT; THE PF TOOK OVER MONITORING THE PRIMARY RADIO AND I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THE TWR SUPVR ON GND FREQ. MY EFFORTS TO CONTACT THE SUPVR WERE MET WITH RESISTANCE BY THE GND CTLR UNTIL I WAS EVENTUALLY INFORMED THAT THE SUPVR WAS NOT IN THE BUILDING; AND COULD BE REACHED IN THE TRACON. I ASKED FOR A DISCRETE FREQ IN WHICH TO CONTACT THE SUPVR AND WAS INFORMED THAT SUCH A CONVERSATION WOULD HAVE TO BE BY TELEPHONE. UPON THE COMPLETION OF OUR FLT (2 HRS AFTER DEPARTING EL PASO); I CONTACTED A WOMAN WHO IDENTED HERSELF AS THE TWR SUPVR. SHE INFORMED ME THAT SHE HAD REVIEWED THE TAPES AND LISTENED TO STATEMENTS FROM THE PERSONNEL IN THE TWR AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. SHE THEN STATED THAT IT WAS HER BELIEF THAT NO INCIDENT HAD TAKEN PLACE AS THE XING ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED TO TAXI OVER A MIN PRIOR TO OUR TKOF CLRNC AND THAT THE XING ACFT HAD A HISTORY OF 'TAXIING FAST.' AT THAT POINT I INFORMED HER THAT WE HAD RECEIVED OUR TKOF CLRNC AND WERE ON THE RWY IN OUR TKOF ROLL BEFORE WE OBSERVED THE MERLIN ACFT TAXIING SBOUND ON TXWY M AND THAT WE STOPPED OUR TKOF ROLL IN ORDER TO WATCH THE OTHER ACFT TAXI ACROSS THE RWY IN FRONT OF US. THE TWR SUPVR SAID THAT MY STATEMENT WAS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH WHAT SHE HAD BEEN TOLD BY HER CREW AND THAT SHE WOULD CONDUCT A FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND CONTACT ME AT A LATER DATE. AT NO TIME WERE WE INFORMED OF THE XING TFC. AT NO TIME DID WE HEAR ANY ATC XMISSIONS TO THE MERLIN (EITHER GND OR LCL). I REQUESTED THAT THE TAPES BE MARKED AND SAVED. THE TWR SUPVR STATED THAT THIS HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. OBSERVATIONS: WE WERE LUCKY. BECAUSE OF THE OPEN AREA AND HIGH RATE OF SPD; THE MERLIN CAUGHT OUR ATTN. IN A MORE CONGESTED ARPT AND/OR A MORE RUSHED TKOF SCENARIO; WE MAY HAVE BEEN FURTHER ALONG IN OUR TKOF ROLL WITHOUT THE ABILITY TO STOP PRIOR TO IMPACT. THE CTLRS SEEMED COMPLACENT. ATC TAPES WILL REVEAL SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE CTLRS. THERE WAS NO SUPERVISION IN THE CAB. ATC PERSONNEL WERE SO FAMILIAR WITH THE MERLIN'S TAXIING HISTORY THAT IT WAS AUTOMATICALLY ASSUMED THAT THE MERLIN HAD CROSSED OUR RWY PRIOR TO ISSUING US OUR TKOF CLRNC. OUR ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THIS SIT WERE MET WITH DENIAL AND RESISTANCE. THIS IN ITSELF DOES NOTHING TOWARDS FOSTERING A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP BTWN AVIATION PROFESSIONALS. THE CREW OF THE MERLIN WAS NOT HEARD TO SAY ANYTHING ON A FREQ WE WERE MONITORING.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.